AntiSocialMedia with Judd Bagley

Analysis of the abuse of social media — blogs, Wikipedia, message boards, etc — for the purpose of enabling illegal stock market manipulation.

Was Dan Loeb’s capital allied with David Einhorn’s?

August 27th, 2008 by Judd Bagley

Mega-hedge fund manager Daniel Loeb recently disclosed a double-whammy to his investors: substantial losses early in the third quarter of 2008, and the initiation of a formal SEC investigation into the operation of Loeb’s fund, Third Point Partners.

Loeb blamed part of his firm’s losses on the unfortunate fact of being short financial stocks just when the SEC decided to temporarily enforce existing laws prohibiting illegal naked short selling of a handful of such firms.

Loeb blamed the SEC investigation on a perception that his communications with other hedge funds violate securities laws.

While nobody outside the SEC can know with certainty just what it is about Loeb’s communications with other hedge funds that might be problematic, based on my observations of Loeb’s stock message board postings, I do have a theory.

In this installment, we’ll examine apparent coordination between Daniel Loeb and David Einhorn, manager of mega-hedge fund Greenlight Capital.

According to his book, Fooling Some of the People All of the Time, Einhorn established his much-storied short position in Allied Capital (NYSE:ALD) in early May of 2002. Einhorn first publicly outlined his short thesis on the late afternoon of May 15, 2002. The next morning, Allied held a conference call to address Einhorn’s claims. Interestingly, Einhorn himself did not participate in that call, however the first several questions - which achieved a much greater level of specificity and detail than Einhorn offered the night before - were asked by Daniel Loeb.

Either Loeb is an unusually quick study, or he and Einhorn had communicated substantially on the subject of shorting Allied Capital in advance.

Interestingly, on Allied’s Yahoo Finance message board, one of the biggest proponents of the Einhorn thesis also turns out to be Daniel Loeb.

In this message, for example, Loeb’s alter-ego, senor_pinche_wey (as proven here), confronts a poster who questions the veracity of Einhorn’s claims regarding Allied.

A few weeks later, Loeb’s alter-alter ego, mr_pink_esq (also proven here), says of Einhorn’s analysis:

“Looks like Einhorn has this one nailed. Einhorn has one of the best reputations in the business. He would hate to be on the wrong side of this trade.”

And lest you think Loeb was just offering his buddy Einhorn moral support, consider this post, in which Loeb wonders aloud (in the third person) how he might spend the “millions He will make on his ALD short. He was considering purchasing Himself a new car. However He is torn between the Aston Martin DB9, the Bentley GT and the Ferrari 360 Spyder…Maybe if this thing goes bust He can buy Himself a Mercedes Maybach.”

In all, Loeb, with the direct support of known paid message board basher Yolanda Holtzee (using such account names as ms_mint_green_esq and regulators_have_been_notified) personally posted scores of such messages over three years.

This appears to be an example of Loeb and Einhorn coordinating their efforts on the short side.

Coming soon: a clear-cut example of Loeb coordinating efforts with another hedge fund manager in his role as a so-called “activist investor” (and in so doing, skirting key securities laws while holding a metaphorical gun to a target company’s head).

Posted in AntiSocialMedia with Judd Bagley | No Comments »

Daniel Loeb is Mr. Pink and more

August 21st, 2008 by Judd Bagley

I. Daniel Loeb, manager of hedge fund Third Point Partners

The Silicon Investor stock message boards have Mr. Pink.

The Yahoo Finance stock message boards have Mr_Pink_esq.

In this legal filing, hedge fund manager Daniel Loeb admits that he is the Mr. Pink of Silicon Investor.

According to this Wall Street Journal story, Loeb insists that he is not Mr_Pink_esq of Yahoo Finance.

Loeb, as it turns out, is not telling the truth, and here’s how I know it:

On Yahoo Finance, Mr_Pink_esq manually signs all his posts, as either “Mr. P$nk” or “MP”.

Mr_Pink_esq is the only message board poster who signs his posts as Mr. P$nk…with two important exceptions: ricardo_ferberger and senor_pinche_wey.

ricardo_ferberger

On the fourth post of his short career, ricardo_ferberger signed this post to Yahoo’s MEDC stock message board “Mr. P$nk”.

Interestingly, the post expressed a point of view that ran 100% counter to the strawman arguments typical of each of ricardo_ferberger’s previous three contributions, but was entirely consistent with Mr_Pink_esq’s well-established hostility toward MEDC.

Almost immediately, another poster asked ricardo_ferberger why he had used Mr_Pink_esq’s signature. Ricardo_ferberger responded by claiming that he had copied and pasted the entire text of this post by Mr. Pink on Silicon Investor – signature included.

Unfortunately for ricardo_ferberger, the post he claimed to have copied from Silicon Investor was actually time-stamped 14 minutes later than the Yahoo post that supposedly drew from it.

Two conclusions can be drawn from this episode:

  1. Ricardo_ferberger and Mr_Pink_esq are two aliases belonging to the same person.
  2. That person is also Mr. Pink on Silicon investor.

Because we know Mr. Pink on Silicon Investor is hedge fund manager Daniel Loeb, it stands to reason that Loeb lied when he told the Wall Street Journal that he was not Mr_Pink_esq.

Senor_pinche_wey

Though it went entirely ignored at the time, on one occasion, Yahoo Finance poster senor_pinche_wey also signed a post as “Mr. P$nk”.

Senor_pinche_wey@yahoo.com is the email address used by a former participant of several message boards dedicated to Ashtanga yoga – the style Loeb is known to practice.

Shockingly, even  enlightened Ashtanga yoga practitioners have their limits, and – like so many on Yahoo Finance – many lost patience with Senor Pinche Wey. So much so, that one brilliant poster took steps to capture Senor Pinche Wey’s IP address, only to discover that it traced back to Third Point Management.

Indeed, senor_pinche_wey is Daniel Loeb.

This is significant because, as explained in an earlier item, senor_pinche_wey is the (previously) anonymous Yahoo message board poster whose defamatory writings led to a lawsuit and, ultimately, unfortunate legal precedents affirming the rights of childish and abusive stock message board trolls.

Now, for a little running up of the score.

As proof that old habits die hard, in this post to the India Divine Ashtanga Yoga message board, we see Senor Pinche Wey engage in an impressive act of logical contortionism as he tries to explain why he occasionally signs his posts there as “MP” (which is, as mentioned above, how Mr_Pink_esq occasionally signed his posts on Yahoo Finance).

II.Robert Chapman, manager of Chapman Capital

In the same Wall Street Journal story mentioned earlier, it’s revealed that Robert Chapman, manager of hedge fund Chapman Capital, posts on Yahoo message boards as bobbingbargain.

Based on evidence referenced in the same story, it’s apparent that Chapman also posts on Yahoo Finance message boards as kidstockjoec and LaseriumQueen.

A lexical analysis and the dissembler sorting algorithm reveal that the person behind kidstockjoec is also behind disgustedinvestor, tautologicaltrader, notably_absent, herniatedgorilla, and ghaulty_lodgick.

Posted in AntiSocialMedia with Judd Bagley | 1 Comment »

Media Herd Lassoed by a Lie

August 19th, 2008 by Mark Mitchell

In the middle of last week, a previously unknown professor in Switzerland published a report that purported to show that the SEC’s emergency order preventing naked short selling in 19 financial companies had been a mistake. By the end of Friday, that report had become the basis for stories by reporters at the Wall Street Journal, the Financial Times, the Economist, TheDeal.com, Dow Jones Newswires, Reuters, and Hedgeworld.

So much for the notion that our financial media is comprised of independent thinkers, all busily analyzing data and asking probing questions in the sacred pursuit of “truth.” Far easier to copy straight from the press release (or, more likely, the email sent around by some short-seller or lobbyist).

“The 19 stocks lost 3.83 percent of value…compared with their peers,” reported the Financial Times.

“The…shares affected by the order lost about 3.8 percent of their value, compared to their peers,” reported Reuters.

“Shares covered by the order lost 3.8% of their value compared with their peers,” reported Dow Jones Newswires.

“Shares covered by the order lost 3.8% of their value compared with their peers,” reported the Wall Street Journal, which merely reprinted the Dow Jones story.

That this phrase was circulated with such precision is all the more remarkable considering that it makes absolutely no sense. “Compared to their peers”? What does that mean? If I have a hundred bucks, I cannot lose $3.80, “compared to my peers.” Either I lose the $3.80, or I do not.

Aside from being gobbledygook, the phrase is grossly misleading. The 19 shares covered by the emergency order did not lose value. To the contrary, their prices rose dramatically from the day that the order was announced until its expiration (at which point prices plunged).

Yet, to drive home the misperception, the Wall Street Journal’s headline reads: “Stocks Under ‘Short’ Order Fell During Protection Period.”

Reuters reported that “many of the 19 stocks…suffered declines in their share prices.”

The Financial Times proclaimed that the emergency order “had contributed to a decline in the [19 companies'] share prices.”

All according to the professor in Switzerland. But clearly, these reporters did not read the report by the professor in Switzerland. If they had, they would have known that the professor, who is named Arturo, did not claim that the 19 stocks’ prices had fallen. He said only that their “abnormal returns” during the period of the emergency order were 3.8% (or 10%, according to a follow-up report) less than the “abnormal returns” of “their peers” — a sample of 59 financial stocks that weren’t subject to the SEC’s order.

An “abnormal return” is the difference between expected returns (based on previous performance of the stocks and overall performance of the market) and actual returns. It is highly debatable whether it makes sense to look at abnormal returns (as opposed to plain old prices), but even supposing they are relevant, Professor Arturo’s numbers (if not his misleading language) suggest that the SEC’s emergency order profoundly improved the performance of those 19 stocks.

The professor analyzes only one time period prior to the emergency order: June 1 to July 14. He finds that over this period, cumulative abnormal returns for the 19 stocks were negative 12.34%. From July 15, when the order was announced, to July 20, cumulative abnormal returns were positive 12.42%. From the time that the order actually went into effect on July 20 to August 8 (the last day for which professor Arturo provides data), the abnormal returns were negative 4.57%, still a lot better than the period prior to the emergency order.

Meanwhile, according to the report, the 59 financial stocks that were not directly affected by the order got an even bigger boost. Their cumulative abnormal returns were negative 10.82% over the pre-emergency order period of June 1 to July 14, and positive 5.68% over the July 20-August 8 period when the emergency order was in place.

It might seem paradoxical that unprotected stocks were helped more than the protected stocks, but it is not really surprising when you consider that illegal naked short selling of many of those 59 companies was far more prevalent than in the cases of the privileged 19. Perhaps criminal naked short sellers, guessing that the SEC might extend its protections across the market, began borrowing real shares or decreasing their short positions in all the companies they were attacking. The stocks that had been under the heaviest naked short attacks saw the biggest gains.

The fact that the abnormal returns of the 19 protected stocks were 3.8% lower than the abnormal returns of other stocks is otherwise meaningless. Investors might rather buy the stocks with higher returns, and in that sense the 59 unprotected stocks are more valuable. But this does not mean that the 19 protected stocks “lost value” during the emergency order. It does not mean that their returns (abnormal or otherwise) worsened. It certainly does not mean that their “prices declined.” Not “compared to their peers.” Not any other way.

Normally, I would be inclined to sympathize with the journalists. Financial statistics are a little bit complicated. Deadlines are tight. And never in history have journalists been more overworked. Often, reporters just don’t have time to do the research, or crunch the numbers themselves.

But the problem here is not just that journalists misread, or chose not to read, a report about a complex issue. No, what horrifies is that an entire pack of journalists failed to make the simplest of all calculations. They failed to compute the difference between good and bad.

Illegal naked short selling is one of the biggest financial swindles of our lifetimes. That is bad.

The SEC took a small step towards preventing this crime. That is good.

Rather than demand that the SEC take a bigger step to protect all of the hundreds of companies affected by illegal naked short selling, a bunch of important financial journalists published a slew of nearly identical stories suggesting that the SEC shouldn’t have acted at all — and their only excuse for writing these stories was that somebody sent them an email misrepresenting a skewed report by some guy in Switzerland named Arturo.

That is bad. Really bad.

Click here for a compilation of these bad stories.

Posted in The Mitchell Report | 1 Comment »

Mr. Norris, We’re Here to Help

August 14th, 2008 by Mark Mitchell

Floyd Norris of the New York Times has written a column about the SEC’s recently expired “emergency order” preventing naked short selling of 19 financial stocks. His argument is…Actually, I have no idea what Mr. Norris is trying to tell us.

Mr. Norris provides a lot of data suggesting that the stock prices of those 19 companies might have gone up, or might have gone down. Meanwhile, the prices of other companies have gone down, or maybe up.

If this has some significance, Mr. Norris doesn’t say.

He adds, however, that short-selling in some companies has increased, and short-selling in other companies has decreased.

This, Mr. Norris writes, “could mean nothing.”

And, in conclusion, “10 of the 17 primary dealers in Treasury securities are headquartered outside the United States…” This reveals something new: financial markets are “global.”

Poor Mr. Norris. Obviously, he wanted to write a good column. But Mr. Norris, who is the chief financial correspondent of the New York Times, got confused. He wandered into the ward where they keep the irrelevant data. Then he forgot what his column was about.

Here’s some help, Mr. Norris. Your column was about the SEC issuing an “emergency order” to prevent fraudulent naked short selling. It was not about an SEC order to prevent stock prices from falling. It was not about an SEC order to curb legal short-selling. It definitely was not about globalization or U.S. Treasury securities.

Fraudulent naked short selling affects several hundred companies. Fraudulent naked short selling probably contributed to the demise of a big bank called Bear Stearns. Gary Matsumoto of Bloomberg News has written an excellent story about this. When you are ready, Mr. Norris, please read the story. It contains relevant data.

Mr. Norris, the SEC did not want other banks to fall prey to this crime.

The SEC did not want the American financial system to collapse.

The SEC is thinking about preventing illegal naked short selling across the market.

The SEC says it would like to stop criminals from selling stock they do not have.

The SEC says it would like to stop criminals from destroying corporations.

Mr. Norris, stopping crime is good.

Mr. Norris, I hope this helps.

Have a nice day.

Posted in The Mitchell Report | No Comments »

5,000 Words About An Obscure Bad Newswire Reporter

August 12th, 2008 by Mark Mitchell

The ever cuddly Carol Remond (“I’m going to shred this guy to bits,” she said of Deep Capture reporter Patrick Byrne) has published yet another defense of criminal naked short sellers. In a recent column for Dow Jones Newswires, Carol writes that the SEC should think twice about cracking down on the criminals because some of the people (she names four) who have complained about illegal naked short selling have run into legal problems of their own.

Maybe I have too much faith in the press, but I suspect that this sort of intellectual dishonesty – this deliberate illogicality and mischief-making – could appear only on the financial pages. Certainly, editors of Metro sections don’t permit their columnists to write that cops should let gang-bangers clean out every convenience store in town just because some Quicky Marts have been caught cheating on their taxes.

Yes, it must be that different standards apply to financial columnists. Probably, it’s because finance is so complicated. Robbing a convenience store – an editor can understand that’s bad. But criminal hedge funds selling something they don’t have – apparently that’s pretty technical. If the columnist says that illegal naked short sellers (hedge funds offloading phantom stock to drive down prices) are good folk…well, she’s been studying this “complex” and “controversial” issue for a long time – let her run with it.

But now the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the SEC, and all the other people (except hedge fund managers) who have seriously studied this issue agree that it is bad for markets when people sell things that don’t exist. That this was ever a matter of “debate” will astound historians for generations to come, but the surreal intellectual “battle” is over, and it is time for Dow Jones to decommission Carol Remond. She’s become the Joan Rivers of the newswires – her gruff exterior failing to compensate for a tired act.

Carol devoted 17 of her 36 columns this year to ridiculing or discrediting critics of illegal short-selling. The other 19 columns carefully omitted mention of naked short selling, even though most of the columns were sourced from short-sellers and focused on companies that had been hit by massive levels of phantom stock. In a number of her columns, Carol alluded favorably to one particular clique of short-sellers while deliberately censoring information about their most egregious shenanigans.

Of course, Carol’s reporting was always a bit off-kilter. There was, for example, her famous April, 2004 column about the NASD’s decision to close a loophole that was allowing criminals to sell phantom stock through Canada. Carol wrote that the move wasn’t fair because “market participants” had told her it was too hard to find real stock. If editors at Dow Jones didn’t wonder why their reporter was advocating for the freedom of criminals to sell unlimited amounts of fake stock, they might have thought it a bit odd that the only “market participant” named in Carol’s story was Pacific International, a notorious Canadian brokerage whose most celebrated employee was funneling cash to the Genovese organized crime family.

Also strange was Carol’s long-standing, close relationship with Anthony Elgindy, a Mafia-connected short-seller who liked to flash his .380 Colt handgun in business meetings. For years, the Dow Jones reporter used Elgindy’s information in numerous stories about the companies he shorted, but she never mentioned that her pal was extorting and blackmailing the companies’ CEOs, bribing FBI agents, and churning out heaps of phantom stock.

Elgindy was convicted in 2005 for racketeering and stock manipulation. Still, Carol might have stayed faithful to her old friend. But it emerged from prosecutors’ evidence that Elgindy had used unflattering terms to describe Carol’s posterior. She became incensed and wrote columns detailing his crimes (but portraying him as an anomaly – the rare short who violated the law). When the judge handed down an 11-year prison sentence, Elgindy broke down in tears, and there in the court gallery was Carol, laughing with glee.

I’m no psychologist, but Carol seems to have a vindictive streak. It was only after Patrick Byrne criticized her reporting that she vowed to “shred this guy to bits,” and proceeded with considerable vigor to tell people that Patrick was running some kind of criminal enterprise out of a gay bathhouse in San Francisco. (He wasn’t.) When she was criticized by the anonymous blogger and redoubtable crusader against phantom stock who calls himself the Easter Bunny, Carol went on a similar rampage, trying to unmask her critic and prove that he was illegally pumping stocks out of a Las Vegas strip club (The Bunny was doing no such thing, though he did register his blog’s domain name to a nudie bar as a joke.).

It is indeed possible that Carol goes to extreme lengths to whitewash illegal naked short selling, not because she fails to see that it is wrong, but simply because the crusaders against the crime have been so critical of her reporting. Carol probably even thought the crusaders had something to do with the SEC issuing her with a subpoena in 2006, when the commission began an investigation into alleged short-seller crimes. Yes, that must have been the final straw. Carol was provoked. She got angry. She became obsessed. And now…it’s war! Vendetta Journalism.

The only other possibility is that Carol is cool-headed and calculating – that a particular clique of short-sellers have fed her nearly every column she has ever written (including those that won her a Loeb Award, the Pulizer of business journalism), and now she is settling debts and currying favor with her benefactors by deliberating covering-up one of the biggest financial crimes of our lifetimes.

That would be something—eeevil!

Whatever the case, I liked her column that was all about an outfit called Institutional Credit Partners accusing Fairfax Financial, a reputable company in Canada, of misrepresenting an off-balance sheet transaction. Carol gave credence to these accusations, though no reputable investigator had ever done so. She also suggested that Institutional Credit Partners was working alone – that it’s “independent” analysis had just revealed this supposedly shocking news about an off-balance sheet transaction.

The truth, which Carol omits, is that the same bogus information was previously circulated by a thug named Spyro Contogouris, who had been hired by a short-selling hedge fund to harass and threaten Fairfax executives. One of Spyro’s many feats was to write an anonymous letter to the pastor of Fairfax’s CEO suggesting that the CEO was a sado-masochistic group sex aficionado who once scammed the Catholic Church out of millions of dollars.

When Carol published her column, the FBI had arrested Spyro for ripping off a Greek shipping magnate. Carol left that part out. She also forgot to mention that Spyro had been bailed out of jail by the manager of the eminently respectable and completely “independent”…Institutional Credit Partners.

But Carol was no doubt keen to attack Fairfax because the company had sued a clique of short sellers, including Steve Cohen of SAC Capital (a subsidiary of which hired the charming Spyro) and David Rocker, formerly of Rocker Partners. These are Carol’s friends and allies.

Which is why Carol received a government subpoena in 2006. The SEC was investigating relationships among a few journalists, David Rocker, and Gradient Analytics – yet another seedy outfit that claims to be “independent,” though its former employees have given sworn affidavits that short-sellers including Rocker dictated much the information in its falsehood-laden financial research reports.

SEC officials continue to believe that Carol has information that could help them understand Gradient and Rocker’s methods. But to the great chagrin of these officials, the SEC leadership shut down its investigation after the Media Mob went ballistic. Apparently, the SEC was violating the right to free speech by issuing subpoenas to journalists and “independent” research shops.

Never mind that one journalist – Herb Greenberg, first at TheStreet.com, then at MarketWatch.com and CNBC – was accused (in a sworn affidavit from a former Gradient employee) of timing his negative stories, premised on Gradient’s false research, so that Rocker could profit from their deleterious effect on stock prices. Never mind that Jon Markman, a one-time managing editor of MSN Money and formerly Herb Greenberg’s co-editor at TheStreet.com, was named as running a dodgy hedge fund out of Gradient’s back office (“independent” research shops aren’t supposed to run hedge funds, especially if they’re trading on their “independent” research).

Never mind, too, that one of Gradient’s managers acquired multiple aliases and fake IDs to conceal his activities. You won’t hear this from certain quarters of the financial media. You certainly won’t hear it from Carol Remond Rocker, Gradient, Spryo the Goon – these are Carol’s bros. Fairfax messed with them. So Carol went to Fairfax’s house for a drive-by shooting. Hidden in the trunk was a heaping pile of phantom stock. (Fairfax has spent most of the last three years on the SEC’s list of companies whose stock is “failing to deliver” in excessive quantities – clear evidence of a sustained, criminal attack by naked short-sellers, covered-up by Carol.).

Here’s another good one: In April, Carol published a column praising a “reclusive financier” named David Gelbaum for “doing his part to try to stave off recession.” A few months earlier, Carol had raved in another column that the same “reclusive financier” was practicing “a new form of philanthropy.” Carol explained that Gelbaum’s “philanthropy” and recession-fighting involved nothing more than financing a number of alternative energy companies through “private placements in public equity” – or PIPEs.

Now, with these two columns, Carol is having a little fun – thumbing her nose at her critics, seeing what she can get away with, no doubt cackling with diabolical delight. For she knows full well, but pointedly ignores the fact that PIPEs, commonly referred to as “toxic financing,” are the single most notorious weapon of criminal naked short sellers. Crusaders like the Easter Bunny (see his blog, TheSanityCheck.com) have been screaming about this for years, and the SEC agrees that illegal short-selling in the PIPE industry is rife.

In a typical PIPE scam, a hedge fund invests in a cash-strapped, thinly traded public company. In return, the hedge fund receives securities that can be converted to stock, typically at a discount of around 15% to the market rate. The hedge fund manager presents himself as a serious investor, all geared up to build a great company, but then turns around and naked shorts the company, hoping it will go out of business.

With help from a complicit broker, the hedge fund proceeds to shift his discounted shares back and forth among accounts, making it appear that he is delivering real stock to cover his naked shorts. The high volume of trading in discounted shares, coupled with another wave of naked short selling, can send the stock into a “death spiral.” By cracking the stock, the PIPE provider positions himself to earn a big profit by failing to deliver the huge amounts of phantom stock he has sold.

Nathan Vardi of Forbes Magazine describes the proliferation of these scams in an article titled, “Sewer Pipes,” and notes that some of them have been perpetrated by criminals connected to the Mafia – specifically the Genovese organized crime family.

Carol’s columns point out that Mr. Gelbaum, her “reclusive” PIPEs financier, spent much of his career with a hedge fund called Princeton-Newport Partners, which was run by Edward Thorp, a “mathematician” who once authored a book about how to win at blackjack. She doesn’t reveal that Thorp actually developed a system for cheating Las Vegas casinos in cahoots with Manny Kimmel, a mobster from the Genovese organized crime family.

Princeton-Newport derived a significant portion of its revenue from parking stock and colluding in other illegal schemes with Michael Milken, the famous 1980s criminal who has since reinvented himself as a philanthropist, hedge fund collaborator, and media-revered mastermind of miscellaneous investment schemes. A government investigation into Princeton-Newport’s activities produced the key evidence (even more important than the insider trading information provided by Ivan Boesky) leading to Milken’s 1989 conviction on multiple counts of securities fraud.

Neither Gelbaum nor Thorp were charged, but it is perhaps worth noting that the Thorp family worked closely with Anthony Elgindy, the felonious Mob-connected gun-toting short-seller who was Carol’s close friend until he said uncharitable things about her butt. In 2006, the SEC fined Thorp’s son, Jeffrey, $8 million for masterminding a massive fraud that involved (what else?)…toxic PIPEs and naked short-selling.

Carol is aware of this case because she wrote a column about it, noting that the government’s investigation into Elgindy had led agents to his con-conspirator, Jeffrey Thorp. Of course, Carol is incapable of writing anything negative about short-selling, so her column failed to mention that Thorp was a naked short-seller — a strange omission considering the SEC had said that Thorp’s PIPE financing was fraudulent precisely because he had naked shorted into oblivion the 22 companies that he had financed.

The other thing strange about Carol’s column was that it disappeared. It was yanked from the Dow Jones web site. It was removed from media databases, such as Lexus-Nexus and Factiva. It was completely scrubbed from the Internet, though a snippet of it can be found on a blog called Wall Street Folly.

Maybe Carol’s mind was scrubbed, too. Maybe she has no idea that PIPEs and naked short selling go hand in hand. Maybe she completely forgot that a guy working with her old Mob-connected friend, Anthony Elgindy, masterminded the biggest short-selling PIPE fraud of all time. It could even be totally normal that Carol, a reporter who’s life is covering short-sellers, never wrote a story about PIPEs until along came a “reclusive financier”– the former partner of the Mob-connected father of the Mob-connected fraudster who colluded with Carol’s Mob-connected friend while orchestrating the biggest short selling PIPE fraud in history – and only then it was time for Carol to publish two columns about PIPEs and refer to them as a “new form of philanthropy.”

Actually, the “reclusive financier” is probably a decent fellow. He’s never lied to me – that makes him ok in my book. I’m not saying that he’s a fraud. I’m saying that Carol is a fraud. Brainwash, vengeful rage, cold-calculation, lunkheadedness – it’s all the same: she’s a fraud. She lied to us in nearly every one of the 36 columns she wrote this year. There’s an industry infested with mobsters and scalawags and she tracks down the one reclusive PIPE financier who’s a decent fellow. She says he “is doing his part to try to stave off recession.” Carol is lying. The “reclusive financier” is honest – he’d never say something so ridiculous.

Consider the condition of the companies that Mr. Gelbaum has reclusively financed. Carol mentions six of them –Beacon Power Corp., Worldwater & Power Corp., Emcore Corp, Octillion Corp., Bluefire Ethanol Fuels Inc, and Open Energy Corp. When Carol was writing, all of these companies had spent a good deal of time on the SEC’s list of companies likely to have been victimized by illegal naked short selling. Unsurprisingly, the companies’ stock prices have all been on trajectories that look a lot like “death spirals.” Worldwater is now worth a few cents. It was at around $3.00 when it received its reclusive PIPE. Open Energy is trading for less than a penny. Carol reveals none of this.

Oh, my. What other wonderments has Carol conjured? Let’s see — last September, she wrote a column assuring us that the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) is an upstanding institution. What other “journalist” would dare attempt such a feat? I can think of only one: Gary Weiss, a former BusinessWeek reporter who runs black-ops public relations efforts for the DTCC, anonymously attacking the organization’s critics on stock message boards and even wangling special editing privileges of the DTCC’s Wikipedia entry, all the while flat-out lying about his activities.

The DTCC’s job is to “clear and settle” all securities transactions, but it doesn’t do that very well, which is a big reason why there is so much phantom stock (i.e. stock that doesn’t “settle”). The DTCC knows who is naked short selling and it has a lot of data showing how much phantom stock is in the system. But it says it won’t release this information because it’s against DTCC rules. Which isn’t surprising, since the rules are written by the DTCC’s owners, who are the very same Wall Street firms that engage in naked short selling.

The SEC technically regulates the DTCC, but SEC officials admit they have neither a clue how the place operates, nor the power to force it to turn over complete data. So the DTCC is an essentially unregulated, criminal-protecting, black box institution – which happens to handle more than $1.5 quadrillion – or 30 times the total gross product of the entire planet – every year. There should be a pack of journalists outside its machine-gun fortified doors, cameras flashing, questions hurled.

Instead, there is Carol. Her column gloats that a court dismissed a legal case brought against the DTCC by a company called Nanotech, which was attacked by naked short sellers. Carol says it is bad for companies to sue the DTCC. It is bad because the SEC (whose officials say they have no idea what the DTCC does) filed an amicus brief saying that it had signed off on the DTTC’s rules (which are written by naked short-sellers). Listen to the SEC and trust the DTCC, says Carol, who claims to like short-sellers because they are the market’s “skeptics.”

The head of the DTCC’s PR department is named Stuart Z. Goldstein. He’s a real master of whirly logic and circuitous denials. He’s a mean guy, too — nasty as hell. Question the DTCC’s rectitude, and Stuart Z. will threaten to get you fired and unleash the lawyers.

But Carol loves Stuart Z. And Stuart Z. loves Carol. Ask about the DTCC, and get no answer from Stuart Z. Instead, says he, “Read Carol, and you will see, she’s the best there is. Nobody understands the DTCC” – only Carol and Stuart Z.

Stuart Z. and a clique of short-sellers – these are Carol’s friends. That is why Carol goes to such lengths to bash a company called Biovail, which had sued Gradient Analytics, the company that was managed by at least one guy with multiple aliases while it allegedly let short-seller David Rocker ghost write its “independent” research. Carol received a government subpoena when the government investigated Gradient, and she’s keen to show that her creepy friends are swell, so she devotes no less than six of her 36 columns this year to bashing Biovail (NYSE:BVF), her readers no doubt waiting with tongues hanging for just one more column – one last scrap of arcane negativity about a minor drug company in Canada.

The SEC charged Biovail with finagling its finances, so it seems its executives were not entirely wholesome. But six out of 36 columns to show that Gradient was right? That seems a lot considering the many perfectly innocent companies that Gradient has slimed. Gradient was not right about Biovail, either. In fact, it published a lot of blatantly false information about the company, suggesting at one point that its revenues had nosedived at a time when they were in fact soaring.

Meanwhile, shorts working with Gradient paid off a bunch of doctors to get them to testify (to the media and government investigators) that they had been “bribed” by Biovail to prescribe one of its drugs. The company maintained that it only paid the doctors a small hourly fee to participate in a marketing program (which is a standard sleazy practice of most pharmaceutical companies) but the government leveled charges, citing the doctors’ testimony, though not the fact that the doctors had been paid-off by short-sellers. Biovail settled out of court rather than accept even the small risk of a conviction that would have shut it out of the U.S. market and destroyed its business.

It is quite common for miscreant short-sellers to pay for phony testimony. There is, in fact, a company called Gerson Lehrman, run by former hedge fund employees, that specializes in locating, training and paying-off experts of dubious veracity – largely on behalf of short-selling clients.

When Carol’s friend David Rocker and Gradient Analytics began short-selling Taser, the stun-gun company, there was no strong evidence that a Taser gun had ever killed anyone. This was clearly unacceptable, so Rocker found an expert. His name was James Ruggieri and he was an unemployed high school dropout who’d never touched a stun-gun and didn’t know anything about electricity—but Ruggieri had a plan, and that was to get himself a bunch of chickens and plug them into an electrical socket.

This worked well. Some of the chickens caught on fire, half of them died, and from this, the high school dropout deduced that stun-guns could kill half of all people – a conclusion that he submitted to the American Academy of Forensic Science.

Soon a gaggle of Rocker’s media friends were reporting that a renowned expert from the American Academy of Forensic Science had concluded that stun guns kill. No doubt with help from short-sellers, dozens of people filed lawsuits claiming that their relatives had died after getting Tasered. How did they know? The American Academy of Forensic Science said so.

All but one lawsuit was dismissed, but in the meantime, Taser’s executives had to spend much of three years touring the country, publicly zapping themselves at every opportunity to demonstrate that Tasers don’t kill. (It is possible that Tasers have killed some people, but there is no science to support this, only anecdotal evidence of Taser incidents followed by deaths, most of which might have been caused by cocaine overdoses and other factors).

While the high school dropout was electrocuting chickens, Rocker allegedly busied himself writing Gradient Analytic’s “independent” research reports and submitted them to his friends at the SEC, which dutifully launched an investigation into Taser. The investigation sapped Taser’s resources and distracted its executives–who now had to spend half their time answering to government investigators, and the other half firing Tasers into their chests – for several years until, finally, the SEC announced that Taser’s books were clean – Gradient’s “independent” research, dictated by Rocker, was utterly false.

Of course, Taser has spent most of the past three years on the SEC’s list of companies whose stock is failing to deliver in excessive quantities. That’s undisputable evidence that it is the victim of a sustained attack by hedge funds selling phantom stock.

But you won’t hear about this from Carol Remond. You won’t hear about any of the dozens of companies similarly trampled by short-sellers – only to be cleared of wrong-doing by government investigators. Carol says only bad companies criticize her short selling and “independent” research-writing friends. And she’s got just 36 columns a year to tell us about all of those bad companies. Six of them are called Biovail.

Another four columns focus on a company called RemoteMDX, which makes GPS tracking bracelets used by prisons. RemoteMDX might be a bad company. It might not. Carol provides no good evidence either way. Instead, she merely notes that short-sellers are all over it. She names only one—Citron Research, whose principal, Andrew Left, was once caught double-cashing checks and was also banned for three years from the commodities and futures business after the National Futures Association found that he “made false and misleading statements to cheat, defraud or deceive a customer…”

Mr. Left has been accused of naked short-selling by a company called BIDZ.com, but he assures me in an email that he has never sold phantom stock. “I believe naked short selling is dangerous to the financial system,” he says.

He’s right. Mr. Left is honest. Carol is the fraud.

According to Carol, the most suspicious thing about RemoteMDX is that a German brokerage claims that an investor ordered a bunch of the company’s stock and never paid for it. So now the brokerage is stuck with the stock. Carol seems to think that this is RemoteMDX’s fault. I don’t know why.

The more likely culprit is the brokerage, Norddeutsche Landesbank (NordLB). As Carol notes, NordLB claims to have purchased 14.75 million shares on February 25. But a total of only 3.2 million shares traded that day. Could it be that NordLB took possession of around 11 million phantom shares in service to a naked short selling client or broker? Would NordLB’s announcement that it was looking to offload 14.75 million unwanted shares put downward pressure on the stock price, to the great benefit of naked short sellers?

I don’t know the answers to those questions. But it’s certain Carol wouldn’t ask them. Carol’s sources say RemoteMDX is suspicious. Are the sources suspicious? The sources are short-sellers and if you’re a journalist in “the game,” you don’t ask that question.

That is why Carol’s readers do not know that RemoteMDX has spent 128 days this year on the SEC’s list of phantom stock victims. And that is why Carol neglects to reveal that while nobody other than Carol and her shadowy sources have accused RemoteMDX of wrongdoing, the German authorities have begun to investigate the brokerage, NordLB, for “irregular trading” in RemoteMDX’s stock.

Meanwhile, another column by Carol. Headline: “Autopsy of a Naked Shorting Poster Child: USXP.” That’s Universal Express. Somebody needs to tell the colorful tale of this company—Carol doesn’t do it justice. But for now, it suffices to say that USXP’s CEO has been charged with some heinous crimes – cooking the books, stealing corporate money, selling unauthorized shares, churning out outlandishly false press releases, and being married to the Imelda Marcos of Boca Raton.

USXP’s shareholders – highly organized, devotional, and ever-ebullient–say (in emails to just about every journalist, lawyer, professor and government official in the country) that the jury is still out and the judge has been bought. They say the SEC’s charges were designed to silence the CEO, who had given a speech about naked short selling. Then the government put him in a jail usually reserved for brutal killers. Then they stuck him in solitary confinement. All to silence his views on naked short-selling. It’s a cover-up! A massive conspiracy!

Gee, I wonder why Carol wants people to believe that this company is the “poster child” for crusaders against naked short selling. I don’t know enough about USXP to have an opinion. But to Carol, it looks bad. It sounds crazy. It suits her propaganda.

A company called Allied Capital is no poster child, but it’s been plenty shafted by naked short sellers. It has spent months on the SEC’s victim list, with up to 3.5 million of its shares failing to deliver. Meanwhile, David Einhorn, who is part of Carol’s short-seller clique, has spent much of the past three years insinuating that Allied is something like Enron (which titillates journalists looking to break the next big corporate scandal). Einhorn has even written a book about his attack on Allied, which Carol must read, and I must review, because it’s a pretty good description of the short-and-distort game.

People like Deep Capture reporter Patrick Byrne began exposing Einhorn a couple of years ago, and the short-seller seems to have calculated that it was time to take the PR offensive. His strategy is clear: reveal all his tactics, and hope that his openness lends an aura of innocence – as if he really believes the tactics are legit. Then spin the story to make it seem like Einhorn is some kind of folk hero – a concerned citizen fighting an epic battle against an evil corporation, a corrupt government, and a dysfunctional status quo.

Einhorn even suggests that he lost his battle against Allied – he’s a victim, which is a more sympathetic thing to be than a rich short-seller. He says if he ever makes any profits from shorting Allied, he’s going to donate it all to charity! (He’s made a lot of profits, but so far there’s no evidence of any donations).

Anyone who disagrees with Einhorn’s analysis, or begins to investigate him for stock manipulation, is lambasted as a corporate shill and part of the broken establishment, which no journalist wants to be.

Brilliant public relations, actually. It seems to have worked. Journalists follow this guy like he’s the Jerry Garcia of finance. But all you have to do is read his book and see that he was lying about Allied all along. One of his partners had “influence” at the SEC, he says, so the commission, along with other agencies, launched a multi-year investigation that cost Allied upwards of $50 million. But, as Einhorn notes, everybody – investment banks, the SEC, court judges – concludes that he’s full of it. Allied is no Enron.

The only crime at Allied involved the Michigan office of an Allied subsidiary called BLX. The office gave out some fraudulent loans to friends. In other words, it scammed Allied. Some members of Congress have asked the Small Business Administration to explain in more detail its oversight of BLX. So Carol wrote a column about that, her suggestion being that David Einhorn—friend of Carol’s friends, enemy of Carol’s critics—must be right about Allied. It’s the next Enron.

In a similar vein, Carol wrote a column that noted in a tone of sheer giddiness that her friend David Rocker had countersued Overstock, the company run by Deep Capture reporter Patrick Byrne. This was significant, Carol suggested, because Rocker had once countersued some company in Belgium that turned out to be a fraud. Get it? Crooks in Belgium sued Rocker. Patrick Byrne sued Rocker. Therefore, Patrick Byrne is a crook.

Right, and exploding chickens in your backyard is science. Rocker no doubt delivered Carol’s brilliant deduction to the SEC, which was still investigating Overstock at Rocker’s behest. Keeping things weird, Sam Antar, a convicted felon who orchestrated the swindle at Crazy Eddie appliances, which was once the world’s biggest corporate fraud, had begun to help Rocker run the SEC’s investigation of Overstock while posting on the Internet his own “independent” research, which looked a lot like the “independent” research that Gradient and Rocker made together.

Shortly after Carol’s column was published, the SEC announced that it would take no action against Overstock, but Carol didn’t write about that. Patrick is the founder of Deep Capture, and I’m writing for Deep Capture, so call me biased, but it seems to me that Carol ought to apologize for insinuating that Patrick was a crook.

But Overstock was never Carol’s real concern. Rather, she was intent on discrediting Patrick’s crusade against illegal naked short selling. Last August, when the NYSE busted somebody for this crime, Carol wrote a column that said, “Turns out that one guy did, in fact, illegally trade shares in [Overstock]” But, of course, it “doesn’t come close to amount to [sic] the massive conspiracy alleged by Overstock.”

Actually, Carol, Overstock alleged that several million phantom Overstock shares have been floating around the market for the past few years. Patrick Byrne and many others (including myself) are crusading against the crime because hundreds of companies have been similarly affected and it threatens the stability of our financial system.

At this point, every expert unattached to your clique of short-sellers agrees with this assessment. The Chairman of the SEC agrees with it. And you, out of vindictiveness or allegiance to some pretty dirty players, are one of the only people still calling it a “conspiracy” theory.

That’s why I just wrote 5,000 words about you.

(Click here for a compendium of Carol Remond stories)

Posted in The Mitchell Report | No Comments »

A Peace Sign for Wall Street

August 3rd, 2008 by Patrick Byrne

groovey1 A Peace Sign for Wall Street

Greetings, and peace. As we Irish say, “I’m sorry for your troubles.”

In today’s Salt Lake Tribune there is a story that is 100% correct: two years ago an elder statesman of the hedge fund industry sat me down to tell me that I had become the most hated man in living memory in New York, that you folks despise me utterly, and so on. All true, I’m sure. So it goes.

However, from examining the logs I also know that thousands of people from major Wall Street institutions have visited this site and are passing these pieces around. I was planning on writing an open message to you in the 2007 holiday season, or the 2008, yet while I have learned that I have but little influence over this course of events, I have even less over its pace. Now it is August, and the time to write has arrived.

I have said harsh things about Wall Street. Harsh words have been said about me as well. Let’s get past that for a moment. Instead, I have a story to share before we return to our battle.

Richard Feynman, one of the greatest physicists of the 20th century, sat in a drum circle telling stories that were compiled into the book Surely You’re Joking, My. Feynman (which can be conveniently purchased at a discount site I know). Some stories came from his days as a 24 year-old quant working on the Manhattan Project. One concerns the time he was sent to review plans for the factory in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where the uranium for the atomic bomb would be purified. I will quote from it at length, both for its charm and, also, because it says something about the battle into which you folks and I seem to be locked.

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Some of the special problems I had at Los Alamos were rather interesting. One thing had to do with the safety of the plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Los Alamos was going to make the bomb, but at Oak Ridge they were trying to separate the isotopes of uranium — uranium 238 and uranium 235, the explosive one. They were just beginning to get infinitesimal amounts from an experimental thing of 235, and at the same time they were practicing the chemistry. There was going to be a big plant, they were going to have vats of the stuff, and then they were going to take the purified stuff and repurify and get it ready for the next stage. (You have to purify it in several stages.) So they were practicing on the one hand, and they were just getting a little bit of U235 from one of the pieces of apparatus experimentally on the other hand. And they were trying to learn how to assay it, to determine how much uranium 235 there is in it. Though we would send them instructions, they never got it right.

So finally Emil Segre said that the only possible way to get it right was for him to go down there and see what they were doing. The army people said, “No, it is our policy to keep all the information of Los Alamos at one place.”

The people in Oak Ridge didn’t know anything about what it was to be used for; they just knew what they were trying to do. I mean the higher people knew they were separating uranium, but they didn’t know how powerful the bomb was, or exactly how it worked or anything. The people underneath didn’t know at all what they were doing. And the army wanted to keep it that way. There was no information going back and forth. But Segre insisted they’d never get the assays right, and the whole thing would go up in smoke. So he finally went down to see what they were doing, and as he was walking through he saw them wheeling a tank carboy of water, green water — which is uranium nitrate solution.

He said, “Uh, you’re going to handle it like that when it’s purified too? Is that what you’re going to do?”

They said, “Sure — why not?”

“Won’t it explode?” he said.

Huh! Explode?

Then the army said, “You see! We shouldn’t have let any information get to them! Now they are all upset.”

It turned out that the army had realized how much stuff we needed to make a bomb — twenty kilograms or whatever it was — and they realized that this much material, purified, would never be in the plant, so there was no danger. But they did not know that the neutrons were enormously more effective when they are slowed down in water. In water it takes less than a tenth — no, a hundredth — as much material to make a reaction that makes radioactivity. It kills people around and so on. It was very dangerous, and they had not paid any attention to the safety at all.

So a telegram goes from Oppenheimer to Segre: “Go through the entire plant. Notice where all the concentrations are supposed to be, with the process as they designed it. We will calculate in the meantime how much material can come together before there’s an explosion.”

Two groups started working on it. Christy’s group worked on water solutions and my group worked on dry powder in boxes. We calculated about how much material they could accumulate safely. And Christy was going to go down and tell them all at Oak Ridge what the situation was, because this whole thing is broken down and we have to go down and tell them now. So I happily gave all my numbers to Christy and said, you have all the stuff, so go. Christy got pneumonia; I had to go….

At any rate, I arrived at Oak Ridge. The first thing I did was have them take me to the plant, and I said nothing. I just looked at everything. I found out that the situation was even worse than Segre reported, because he noticed certain boxes in big lots in a room, but he didn’t notice a lot of boxes in another room on the other side of the same wall — and things like that. Now, if you have too much stuff together, it goes up, you see.

So I went through the entire plant. I have a very bad memory, but when I work intensively I have a good short-term memory, and so I could remember all kinds of crazy things like building 90-207, vat number so-and-so, and so forth.

I went to my room that night, and went through the whole thing, explained where all the dangers were, and what you would have to do to fix this. It’s rather easy. You put cadmium in solutions to absorb the neutrons in the water, and you separate the boxes so they are not too dense, according to certain rules.

The next day there was going to be a big meeting. I forgot to say that before I left Los Alamos Oppenheimer said to me, “Now, the following people are technically able down there at Oak Ridge: Mr. Julian Webb, Mr. So-and-so, and so on. I want you to make sure that these people are at the meeting, that you tell them how the thing can be made safe, so that they really understand.”

I said, “What if they’re not at the meeting? What am I supposed to do?”

He said, “Then you should say: Los Alamos cannot accept the responsibility for the safety of the Oak Ridge plant unless…!”

I said, “You mean me, little Richard, is going to go in there and say –?”

He said, “Yes, little Richard, you go and do that.”

I really grew up fast!

When I arrived, sure enough, the big shots in the company and the technical people that I wanted were there, and the generals and everyone who was interested in this very serious problem. That was good because the plant would have blown up if nobody had paid attention to this problem.

There was a Lieutenant Zumwalt who took care of me. He told me that the colonel said I shouldn’t tell them how the neutrons work and all the details because we want to keep things separate, so just tell them what to do to keep it safe.

I said, “In my opinion it is impossible for them to obey a bunch of rules unless they understand how it works. It’s my opinion that it’s only going to work if I tell them, and Los Alamos cannot accept the responsibility for the safety of the Oak Ridge plant unless they are fully informed as to how it works!”

It was great. The lieutenant takes me to the colonel and repeats my remark. The colonel says, “Just five minutes,” and then he goes to the window and he stops and thinks. That’s what they’re very good at — making decisions. I thought it was very remarkable how a problem of whether or not information as to how the bomb works should be in the Oak Ridge plant had to be decided and could be decided in five minutes. So I have a great deal of respect for these military guys, because I never can decide anything very important in any length of time at all.

In five minutes he said, “All right, Mr. Feynman, go ahead.”

I sat down and I told them all about neutrons, how they worked, da da, ta ta ta, there are too many neutrons together, you’ve got to keep the material apart, cadmium absorbs, and slow neutrons are more effective than fast neutrons, and yak yak — all of which was elementary stuff at Los Alamos, but they had never heard of any of it….

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Richard Feynman was not only one of the greatest scientific minds of the 20th century, he was also hilarious, and I encourage you to read his book. I include this Las Alamos story here for the resemblance it bears to our battle over “naked short selling”. I am not claiming to be smarter or more moral than any of you folks. I do believe, however, that you have a problem in your “factory” (the nation’s stock settlement system) of which you are unaware. That problem is the systemic risk created by unsettled trades. Like the U-235 in Feynman’s story, this is dangerous, and from my point of view, it looks like you folks have not paid much attention to the safety question. We of the Market Reform Movement worry about “how much material can come together before there’s an explosion.”

I will assume that all Wall Street readers understand why an unsettled trade is a derivative, and specifically, a Contract For Difference (“CFD”). You know also that the value of a derivative is a function of some underlying event (that’s what makes it “a derivative”). Unsettled equity trades seem to me unusual in their ability to affect the underlying events of which their values are derivative. Florida orange farmers wanting to hedge their risk can buy all the derivative contracts on sunshine in Florida that they want, but it will not affect the amount of sunshine in Florida. Similarly, Credit Default Swaps do not affect the rates of third party defaults (in any immediate sense, anyway). But from the SEC’s recent Emergency Order it would appear that the SEC, the 19 financial institutions now enjoying special protection, and 8,500 banks clamoring for the same treatment, have come to recognize naked short selling can affect share prices.

This is not to say that naked short selling always affects the underlying event (one could naked short Berkshire Hathaway all day long and it would not affect its share price), nor is it to say that unsettled equity trades are the only derivatives with this ability (various debt-related derivatives may be another, in the long run). However, if one considers naked shorting in small and mid-size stocks, one sees that it is a derivative that affects the underlying events immediately and directly.

So if the underlying event drives the value of the derivative, and this derivative can drive the underlying event, there exists a self-reinforcing dynamic. That’s a “short squeeze”, and it is what makes unsettled trades particularly dangerous. A market participant may believe she has simply written CFD’s on (by failing to deliver) 10 million shares of a small software firm that is currently trading at 20 cents and trades 50,000 shares per day. She carries that as a $2 million liability. But she cannot settle this CFD with cash. To settle her position she must buy stock, and if the stock in question trades 50,000 shares/day it is going to take her a long time to buy those 10 million shares, and (because the price squeezes) it will cost her a lot more than $2 million to buy them.

Thus, when it comes to the potential liabilities associated with unsettled equity trades, the nominal liability is a fraction, and perhaps a quite tiny fraction, of the money it is going to take to clean up that liability. In the Feynman story, “…they did not know that the neutrons were enormously more effective when they are slowed down in water. In water it takes less than a tenth — no, a hundredth — as much material to make a reaction that makes radioactivity. It kills people around and so on. It was very dangerous, and they had not paid any attention to the safety at all.” Similarly, unsettled equity trades in our capital market could well be “enormously more effective” than their current nominal value would indicate.

How many times more effective? 2? 10? 20? I have no idea. However, for ease of reference, I will refer to this as “The Feynman Principle”, and the ratio of true-cost-to-cover versus nominal liability as “F”.

Let us look at where these unsettled trades can reside within the piping of the “factory” that is our nation’s stock settlement system, The Depository Trust & Clearing Company (“DTCC”). I will use Goldman and Morgan as hypothetical examples only.

• “Desked trades” – Imagine Goldman takes your order for 1,000 shares of stock, but stashes your order in a desk and sends you statements saying that you have those 1,000 shares in your account (and use your money towards the $10 billion they pay themselves at the end of the year for being so clever). They have written a CDF to you without your knowledge: there is a 1,000 share failure-to-deliver to you at Goldman (which no one else knows about, incidentally).

• “Pre-netting” - Goldman has one client sell 5,000 shares and another buys 3,000. The seller never delivers. Goldman “pre-nets” the trades before submitting them to the DTCC. Hence, the DTCC sees only 2,000 shares of the failure.

• “CNS netting” - Goldman submits to the DTCC’s Continuous Net Settlement system that it sold 2,000 shares that it does not deliver. Imagine Morgan Stanley was on the other side of that particular trade. But maybe Morgan has a client who sold 1,000 to a Goldman client, and which that Morgan client failed-to-deliver. The DTCC nets the two trades, and therefore sees just 1,000 shares of failure (Goldman to Morgan).

• “Stock Borrow Program” (“SBP”) - The DTCC looks at that 1,000 share failure, and says, “We have 400 shares we can loan Goldman from our Stock Borrow Program”, i.e., from the accounts of other BD’s within the DTCC. That reduces the failures it sees to 600.

• “Ex-clearing” - Suppose Goldman and Morgan apply to the DTCC to move 500 of those fails ex-clearing, and the DTCC approves. Those 500 FTD’s are turned into a derivative contract between Goldman and Morgan. As a private contract, it is not regulated by the SEC, and the DTCC does not even know when that contract gets cleaned up, if ever.

• “Offshore Failures” – Suppose someone sells 1,000 shares into this market from a foreign offshore exchange? There is a different terminology to describe such failures, and therefore the data is hard to get to. What is clear, however, is that there is little pressure to clean up failures among exchanges.

In this example, there are 100 failures at the CNS level. Yet there were 7,000 failures throughout the system. Therefore, we should remember that, however many unsettled equity trades there are at the CNS level, it is likely to be a fraction, and maybe a quite tiny fraction, of the total unsettled trades in the system.

What is the ratio of total fails in the system to those trapped in the CNS system? No one seems to know (and in fact, while the individual pieces of data are known individually, I strongly suspect that no one party has the bird’s eye view of how many of these there are at all levels). The estimates I am told range from 3 to 15. For ease I will refer to this as, “The Iceberg Principle” and the ratio of total failures to CNS failures as “I”.

So how big a problem is this?

•The last reported size of the failures-to-deliver at the CNS level are $8.7 billion.

•By Iceberg Principle, total failures = I X $8.7 billion ≈ $30 to $120 billion.

•By Feynman Principle, total cost to cover = F X I X $8.7b = F X ($30 to $120 billion).

So respectfully, Wall Street, I believe you are Oak Ridge, Tennessee, blithely going about your jobs at the factory, taking for granted “the piping” that is our settlement system. I believe you have manufactured, and are sitting squarely on top of, a financial atomic bomb. That’s not good for you, of course, and if it goes critical, America is downwind.

Since I have learned that these columns are getting passed around Wall Street, I thought it would be a good idea to explain to you why I took on this Crusade (or “Mitzvah” or “Jihad”, depending on where you stand). I truly wish that this could be solved without anyone getting hurt, and in fact, that is what I am trying to see happens. You folks may “despise” me, but I’m not vindictive, and I do not despise anyone in return. I believe that many of you know that mine is a necessary and righteous battle. (Of course, feel free to lend a hand if you get a chance!)

And in any case, I am sorry for your troubles.

Peace.

Sincerely and respectfully,

Patrick M. Byrne

Posted in 7) Unsettled Trades & Systemic Risk | 7 Comments »

Wall Street to USA: “I…drink…your…MILKSHAKE!”

August 2nd, 2008 by Patrick Byrne

The closing minutes of “There Will Be Blood” handily dramatizes naked short selling and, more generally, Wall Street’s relationship to the United States (WARNING: movie spoiler).

Oilman Daniel Plainview (Daniel Day-Lewis) discovers oil near Bakersfield, California, and buys up property in the area for drilling. He covets in particular the vast oil reserves under the land of William Bandy. Bandy refuses to sell on the advice of his preacher, Paul Sunday. Plainview goes on to build a fortune pumping oil from the tracts he has purchased.

Years later, a down-on-his-luck Preacher Sunday approaches Daniel Plainview and offers to help him purchase “the Bandy tract” to Plainview (in return for a kick-back, naturally). Here is Plainview’s response:

The movie ends on this cheery note:

These clips provide fine metaphor for the issue which Deep Capture seeks to expose: naked short selling. Wall Street has figured out how to drink America’s milkshake. The “straw” used is the act of taking investors’ savings in return for stock that Wall Street never actually had, never really borrowed, and consequently, never delivered. But they took the cash. This “straw” is composed of loopholes and rationalizations: loopholes that let them drain the capital of Americans, and rationalizations that let them do it with a straight face on the grounds that _______ (insert meaningless rationalization here: “They’re rich and thus good for it”; “All liquidity is good, even liquidity based on fraud”; “People who complain about paying for things they never receive are whining”; “The folks doing this are smarter than everyone else and have $45 million apartments” etc.)

The US is the supine Preacher Sunday, bleeding to death with a crushed skull. And Wall Street is, most definitely, finished with us.

Posted in 9) The Deep Capture Campaign | No Comments »

Gary Weiss knows what Joe knows

August 1st, 2008 by Judd Bagley

How did Gary Weiss come to know the substance, sentiment and timing of one of New York Times business columnist Joe Nocera’s most vicious attacks against opponents of illegal naked short selling, long before it was published?

We asked Joe.

Joe doesn’t know.

It all started on January 10, 2006, when Business Week writer Tim Mullaney clumsily fell into the very trap he had set for Overstock.com CEO (and Deep Capture reporter) Patrick Byrne. You can read all the gruesome details here and then here.

One week later, Gary Weiss launched his blog. We know from emails between Weiss and Floyd Schneider (read this to learn how I came to posses them) that at about that same time, Weiss began trying to convince journalists and editorial columnists to pen attacks on opponents of illegal naked short selling, particularly Patrick Byrne and Bob O’Brien (whom Weiss calls “Bob O’Baloney”), the pseudonymous author of the highly influential Sanity Check blog.

Weiss did this with little success, until February 22 of 2006, according to the following two emails Weiss sent to Floyd Schneider:

From: garyrweiss@verizon.net

To: Floyd3491@aol.com

Subject: Re: (no subject)

Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2006 18:34:19 -0500

Received: from unknown (HELO maincomputer) (garyrweiss@verizon.net@70.23.60.180 with login) by smtp101.vzn.mail.dcn.yahoo.com with SMTP; 22 Feb 2006 23:34:15 -0000

—–

Incidentally, don’t tell nobody! — but was preoccupied today. Interview with Joe Nocera of the Times for his Saturday column. Seems he is focussing on the naked-Mullaney situation. Mullaney tells me Nocera is sympathetic. We shall see……

Mullaney obviously is extremely nervous but me, I am fairly pleased I must say. I was… oh… shall we say unfavorable toward our Mr. O’Baloney.

The above is confidential!

Followed shortly by…

From: garyrweiss@verizon.net

To: Floyd3491@aol.com

Subject: Re: (no subject)

Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2006 18:56:25 -0500

Received: from unknown (HELO maincomputer) (garyrweiss@verizon.net@70.23.60.180 with login) by smtp102.vzn.mail.dcn.yahoo.com with SMTP; 22 Feb 2006 23:56:21 -0000

—–

Yeah, well I want to shift on to be a little quiet and modest between now and Friday. Yes, O’Baloney seems to have run up the white flag it would seem, at least for the time being. I think the SABEW blog seems to have brought him to reality. That is what was picked up by Nocera, by the way. This is totally my doing! Yuk yuk yuk.

The Mullaney thing really touches a raw nerve, you know.

Based on the above, we can conclude that at least three days ahead its publication date, Gary Weiss knew all about Nocera’s February 25, 2006 column Overstock’s Campaign of Menace.

Note, in the first of the two emails, Weiss insisted that “The above is confidential!”

This is with good reason, as it’s considered a serious breach of ethics for a business writer to reveal the nature of his or her coverage of public companies to outsiders ahead of time, lest the information be used to the advantage of an unscrupulous investor (ie, “trading ahead” of the story).

And yet, Weiss knew. And boasted about knowing.

Recently, Patrick Byrne asked Joe Nocera to comment on this apparent ethical misstep.

Here is Nocera’s response:

From: Joe Nocera

To: Patrick Byrne

Subject: Re: that gary weiss email

Sent: Thursday, July 17, 2008 11:31 AM

—–

I have no idea why Mr. Weiss would make those claims, nor has he ever had any “inside information” about any of my columns. I don’t give out such information. all best, Joe Nocera

I welcome Joe to explain how reality, and his apparent interpretation of it, can possibly co-exist.

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