Discussing the crime of naked short selling
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Looking to hear what steps can be taken by both a company and shareholders to cause illegal NSS to cover their positions.
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Bull Finch, that's been a tough question for many NSS victims. A cash dividend, if it could be arranged, might help. CMKM Diamonds (now revoked - former symbol CMKI) tried one of the greatest cert pulls in history, but the SEC warned them that they could not do that to force a cover as they would view it as market manipulation. Simply unbelievable that the SEC's TRUE Mission Statement should read that they are there to protect the criminal hedge funds from attacks by average investors. The CMKX saga is a long and crazy one, involving prominent Wall St. Attorney, D. Roger Glenn, and former FBI/CIA/Howard's Hughes right-hand man Robert Maheu. There was recently a lawsuit filed for more than $3 TRILLION dollars. But, that's another story, and it is a CRAZY one.
Here's a recent article about some of those criminal hedge funds and how the SEC is failing miserably to protect investors from them:
http://satwavespro.com/2010/08/23/obama-administration-puts-a-price-tag-on-constitutional-rights/
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Could receiving preferred dividends cause the naked shortman to cover.
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Bull Finch, I'm not sure. In case of CMKX, they gave several different stock dividends during the years prior to revocation. But, I read someone's opinion that the naked shorters just naked short the restricted dividend stocks, too. I don't know the mechanics or whether or not true, but perhaps that's why I'm hearing they most fear a cash dividend. Of course, the issuer has to come up with the cash, and that's often difficult for heavily shorted companies. At least that's what I've heard. JMHO.
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I think the company said that the preferred dividends will pay 3% interest, maybe that is their plan to get the shortman.
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Do you think this is a viable way to cause the naked shortman to cover, and if so would the shortman have to cover on or before the record date, or when the 3% interest is paid. example- preferred dividend record date for shares in the new company is 1/2/2011 but 3% interest is paid to shareholders on 1/2/2012.
By the way the new (buying) companies outstanding share count is substantial less then the selling company.
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Some of the same predators are there, as were at Mira Mar and CMKX!
Matty “bend down�� Brown the boyish 26-year-old founder of an Aliso Viejo-based stock board Investorshub, an Orange County stockbroker and a stock promoter are among seven people indicted in an alleged felony fraud, that could win the group an extensive prison sentence.
The Securities and Exchange Commission simultaneously filed a lawsuit in federal court in Delaware against six of the seven criminal defendants plus two others. The lawsuit alleged the men cleared $6.2 million by allegedly manipulating the price of several penny stocks.
Since that news the internet has come to life with various allegations against InvestorsHub
Firstly their are a number of allegations that credit card numbers and personal information have been sold by Investorshub and that the company uses fairly invasive spyware to obtain personal information READ HERE
Then there is a Mr Davis who filed suit against Investorshub alledging crimes under the RICO Act Investors Hub & Its owners Charged in a 18:1962 Racketeering (RICO) Act Complaint.
Around blog sites all ove rthe internet there are allegations of arrogance, stuidity and narcissism, many complain of a wide variety of treatment they beleive was aimed at Ivestorshub furthering their criminal ambitions, ie the false manipulation of stock prices. Many others are asking how long will it take before the beans are really spilled and the felony indictments are served on Investorshub staff and Moderators (instumental in the criminal manipulation).
Posted by Shayne Heffernan on May 23rd, 2009 and filed under Equities, Markets. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0. You can leave a response by filling following comment form or trackback to this entry from your site
3 Responses for “Investorshub Charges Spark New Allegations on the Web��
MarketInsider says:
August 26, 2009 at 7:55 pmGood report in exposing apparently grievous violations of trust by individuals looking to profit in any way necessary..Thanks for that !
Looks like ‘INVESTORS HUB’
investors/bloggers should always consider taking anything reported on that site, with a grain of skepticism..1
Log in to Reply Shayne Heffernan says:
January 28, 2010 at 3:17 pmMina Mar Group Wins Slander Lawsuit Against the Investors Hub
TORONTO, Jan. 22 /PRNewswire-FirstCall/ – Mina Mar Group Inc. and Mina Mar Marketing Group inform the public that the courts ruled in the favour of Mina Mar Group in slander lawsuit against Investors Hub.
Mr. Justice Belobaba, Ontario Superior Court Of Justice awarded judgment in favor of Mina Mar Group, and awarded $75,000 in general damages, $10,000 in punitive damages and $20,000 for the trial costs to the company.
This was never about the money but rather principle. These stock bashers should not be allowed to destroy other peoples reputations and businesses with slanderous and malicious posts on the Internet
Mina Mar Group wishes to quote some key declarations of the court:
“4… THIS COURT ORDERS that all negative, defamatory and libellous
postings, made by Posters and members of Investors Hub.Com Inc web site are
untrue and are and were made without any foundation nor basis for any of their
content
5… THE COURT ORDERS THAT the Defendants, Robert Zumbrunnen, Matt Brown
and InvestorsHub.com Inc. apologize and publicly retract the libelous
statements made against the Plaintiffs and that they shall send their signed
retraction to the Plaintiffs and publish the same on the web site,
InvestorsHub.com
6. THIS COURT ORDERS that Robert Zumbrunnen, Matt Brown and
InvestorsHub.com Inc. provide the names and addresses of the following of its
members and posters:
Stratey, itlogic, Jim Bishop, Janice Shell, Universal Trader, Rtso,
Mina Mar Group recently introduced the “Get the Facts Right�� statement to our clients, which we remind all of our clients’ shareholders to review before taking any advice from a stock board chat room. Most advisors have hidden agendas and prey on the unsuspecting.
Get the Facts Right. The issuer works hard to continue to keep our shareholders informed, and news is updated frequently via Press Releases, Pink Sheet filings, and updates to our websites. Other websites not sponsored, or recognized by the Company may provide misleading or disinformation to investors in order to manipulate trading patterns for a given stock. Always look for original content from trusted sources, rather than relying on ‘excerpts’ or discussion boards that may not give you the whole story. The Securities and Exchange Commission requires financial institutions or brokerage firms to provide their clients with documentation, describing the risks of investing in penny stocks.
Vigorous enforcement of the court order including motions for contempt of court for any non compliance will commence shortly in Florida.
ABOUT Mina Mar Group:
Mina Mar Group (MMG) is a corporate consultancy firm that specializes in small cap or OTC market business services, including public markets in Frankfurt, Germany, and UK. Our focus is on growth companies or emerging markets such as those in South America, Eastern Europe, and Mainland China. We provide our clients with comprehensive advisory, and consulting services regarding mergers and acquisitions, including reverse mergers of private companies into publicly traded entities, and special purpose companies (SPC) offshore. MMG also offers a full suite of related ancillary services subsequent to the successful completion of a reverse merger, including private placements, PIPE offerings and Pink Sheets Adequate Disclosure documentation, various SEC regulatory filings and a broad range of other corporate governance matters. We license our brand name and back office as a white label solution which allows professionals in the industry to tap into the MMG back office to deliver high quality solutions on a private label basis. We also operate a small shareholders’ advocacy division which seeks out publicly traded companies in distress or where the minority shareholders’ positions are in peril, and assists as a guardian with interim and or turn-around management. Through its wholly owned subsidiary, Mina Mar marketing Group MMMG we offer publicly traded companies services such as investor Relations, and investor awareness.
The information contained herein is based on sources which we believe to be reliable but is not guaranteed by us as being accurate and does not purport to be a complete statement or summary of the available data. The owner, publisher, editor and their associates are not responsible for errors and omissions. They may from time to time have a position in the securities mentioned herein and may increase or decrease such positions without notice. Any opinions expressed are subject to change without notice. MMG encourages readers and investors to supplement the information in these reports with independent research and other professional advice. All information on featured companies is provided by the companies profiled, or is available from public sources and MMG makes no representations, warranties or guarantees as to the accuracy or completeness of the disclosure by the profiled companies or the information contained herein. MMG and its affiliates are not registered investment advisors or broker-dealers. MMG has been advised that the investments in companies profiled are considered to be high risk and use of the information provided is at the investor’s sole risk. MMG also advises that the purchase of such high risk securities may result in the loss of some or all of the investment. Investors should not rely solely on the information presented. Rather, investors should use the information provided by the profiled companies as a starting point for doing additional independent research on the profiled companies in order to allow the investor to form his or her own opinion regarding investing in the profiled companies. Factual statements made by the profiled companies are made as of the date stated and are subject to change without notice. Investing in micro-cap securities is highly speculative and carries an extremely high degree of risk. It is possible that an investor’s entire investment may be lost or impaired due to the speculative nature of the companies profiled. MMG makes no recommendation that the securities of the companies profiled should be purchased, sold or held by individuals or entities that learn of the profiled companies through MMG. MMG owners may or may not hold positions in the companies that are profiled. The information contained herein contains forward-looking information within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1993 and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 including statements regarding expected continual growth of the company and the value of its securities. In accordance with the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 it is hereby noted that statements contained herein that look forward in time which include everything other than historical information, involve risk and uncertainties that may affect the company’s actual results of operation. Factors that could cause actual results to differ include the size and growth of the market for the company’s products, the company’s ability to fund its capital requirements in the near term and in the long term, pricing pressures, unforeseen and/or unexpected circumstances in happenings, pricing pressures, etc. Investing in securities is speculative and carries risk. Past performance does not guarantee future results.
BMFL
next week(s) is here
Last edited by Bull Finch (2010-08-25 13:33:53)
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Including the STAINED KNIGHT (KCG) who acted as the facilitator!
BMFL
next week(s) is here
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DTCC has played there usual part in this, hiding the tracks!
Naked Short Selling now dominates the OTC markets, having been blamed by most for monument collapses during the financial crisis, the SEC attempted to, but failed to control the process.
Naked Short Sellers focus in companies they feel are “destroyable†normally this is a company that uses their market to raise capital, the case of many Pink Sheet and OTC businesses, so it is no surprize to see that naked shorting is at an all time high.
The Naked Short Sellers move in removing any chance of small companies gaining access to any form of reasonable funding by selling the stock short, effectively increasing the float, and using the basic rules of supply and demand changing the very nature of the companys market and market price.
Many of the positive runs forward of small companies in the last 6 months have been destroyed by short sellers, when in the past the small companies could have taken advantage of improved market valuation, raised funds and moved their business models to the next level.
The chances of a small company now making it out of the woods on to a main board are limited at best.
Naked short selling was clearly the end of great companies like Lehnam’s, Bear Stearns.
If you have any doubts you should take a look at sites like:
And I am not alone in this opinion
For more than two years, playing the blame game has become a popular pastime among Wall Street pundits. Who bears the most responsibility for the market crash? Was it the politicians, who egged on lenders and investment bankers to take foolish risks in the name of policy goals like widespread home ownership? Or was it the bankers’ greed that triggered the near cataclysm?
One argument that the bankers themselves, along with many in the regulatory community, can readily accept is that ruthless and unscrupulous short-sellers must take a big share of the blame for the collapse of both Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.
Mention the names of certain hedge funds or noted short-sellers in front of former senior figures at either firm, and watch their demeanor transform instantly from calm and well-spoken to vituperative. “They brought us down,†one senior player at Lehman Brothers told StreetWise only months after the investment bank was forced to file for bankruptcy court protection.
With Lehman’s bankruptcy court proceedings still underway, it came as little surprise to find the investment bank’s estate alleging in filings last week that Och-Ziff Capital Management was part of a plan to spin false rumors about Lehman in the months and weeks leading up to its collapse.
The subtext: If it weren’t for these deliberate malicious efforts by short-sellers to spread rumors, the investment bank would have stood a better chance of survival. (Among other targets of the wrath of the late Lehman and its estate is JPMorgan Chase. The Lehman side alleges the bank denied Lehman access to liquidity at crucial stage for reasons that went beyond the commercial requirements, a claim that JPMorgan Chase denies.)
Short-sellers aren’t a popular breed on Wall Street. When times are good, they are the naysayers, the people who look for the worm in the apple. And unlike regulators, who (when they are doing their job properly) are performing the same task in hopes of making the markets function more efficiently or tackling malfeasance, short-sellers just want to make money from the stupidity or misfortune of others. Celebrating (or envying) others’ success is part of the American way. Profiting from another’s misery, however, is seen as slightly less than respectable.
The unpalatable truth is that short-sellers serve a vital function in the financial markets, just as vultures do in removing carrion. No short-seller deliberately decides to bet against a powerful financial firm by shorting its stock for the fun of it.
A firm that decides to establish a short position usually does so in the wake of significant research—research that can often be more intensive than that conducted by long-only investors. After all, the latter stand only to use the sum they have invested while the rules of short selling mean that if the hedge fund shorting a stock gets their thesis wrong, it could end up in a short squeeze with losses many times the size of that original bet.
Not only do the “shorts†force the true believers to question their assumptions about a firm’s health and stability, they provide additional liquidity to the markets. “Without the hedge funds that short just aggressively as they will go long, it would be a lot harder or more expensive for other market participants to do what they want to do in the markets,†argues one veteran trader.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, even former Bear Stearns CEO Jimmy Cayne had to admit to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission that his firm had substantial financial issues that would have led to its near collapse in the long term. His comments to the commissioners, in response to questions, seemed to confirm that to the extent that short-sellers had any impact on the investment bank’s demise, it was only in determining its timing. Naked short selling—the practice of selling stock that the short-seller doesn’t own and hasn’t borrowed to sell—may have pushed the bank over the edge, but it walked all the way to the cliff under its own steam.
The debate over whether and how to rein in short selling has lost no momentum in the years that have elapsed since the collapse of Bear and Lehman. But the real problem isn’t short selling, whether naked or fully-dressed in pinstriped suits.
Rather, it’s market manipulation. When Lehman’s estate tries to understand what hedge funds like Steve Cohen’s SAC Capital, Greenlight, or Och-Ziff were up to, that’s what they are really griping about. It’s not the fact of the short sale, but the rumormongering. And banning particular kinds of transactions—even the extremely risky practice of naked shorting—won’t fix that problem.
That didn’t stop the German government from trying, of course. Last May, it imposed an overnight ban on naked shorting of bonds, stocks of German companies, and credit default swaps on bonds issued by European Union governments in the midst of the efforts to bail out Greece and somehow stop the Euro from melting down. This month, the International Monetary Fund issued a report card on that ban. Rather than making the markets function better, the IMF concluded, “market efficiency and quality in fact deteriorated substantially.†Nor did it help put a floor underneath asset prices.
Meanwhile, Shang Fulin, head of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, sent a signal to the North American and European markets that if they were going to crack down on short selling, China may be willing to step into any void that is left.
Shang told a financial group in Shanghai last June that the country plans to expand margin trading, short selling, and the use of financial derivatives—a reminder to regulators elsewhere that attempts to rein in speculation are likely to be fruitless without some kind of global agreement.
Restrictions on short selling elsewhere may simply drive a significant amount of trading onto Asian markets, if that is the only place that hedge fund managers can execute their strategies.
Short-sellers—even those who are “naked short-sellers†— may be vultures, but vultures are useful creatures, even in the financial markets. In volatile and sideways-moving markets, investors in funds that are able to sell short have another way to make money. “That’s part of what being nimble is all about,†says one hedge fund trader, who admits that he occasionally shorts stocks he doesn’t own. “Yes, it’s a lot riskier, but that just means I have to have a lot more confidence in my judgment and my research. And if I get it wrong, I pay a much heavier price.â€
The problem isn’t with short selling, per se, but with abusive behavior by some of those short-sellers. The solution, therefore, isn’t to ban short selling, but to better monitor the Wall Street rumor mill, watching for strange moves in asset prices and seeing whether they can be linked to particular short-sellers, strategies, or rumors.
It’s the people, not the trading strategy, that are the real problem. It’s always going to be harder to police what a handful of reckless short-sellers are saying and doing than it is to slap a ban on short selling itself. But it’s the right way to protect the integrity and the efficiency of our financial markets.
Read more: /2010/08/20/wall-street-banks-can-revive-partnership-culture-by-making-top-bankers-
Forbes.comTwo years ago the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the middle of dealing with the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, slapped a temporary moratorium on short selling in shares of 799 financial companies (well, some of them weren’t so financial, but whatever.) At the same time in Sept. 2008, it opened an investigation into the trading habits of hedge funds, particularly their short selling activities, much to the chagrin of the fund industry.
Nothing has ever come of those investigations, however, and a lawyer for Och Ziff Capital Management said in bankruptcy court Wednesday that it’s because there was nothing to see, after all. The probe “has gone nowhere because there is nothing,†said Kenneth Bressler, the attorney from Blank Rome who is representing the $26 billion hedge fund Och Ziff in a spat with Lehman’s bankruptcy representatives.
The SEC looked into most major hedge funds and their trading in shares of Lehman, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, American International Group, and Merrill Lynch, the lawyer said during the hearing. Contacted Thursday, a representative for Bressler said he wouldn’t comment beyond what was said in court.
Since the crisis days, the SEC has been busy slapping fines on Wall Street for misleading disclosures (Citigroup, $75 million, which a judge isn’t too keen on, and Goldman, $550 million) and cracking down on insider trading, but it hasn’t come up with an example to be made of nefarious short selling in bank stocks. It’s most recent cases involving short selling were brought against two small Los Angeles investment advisory firms in January and another two traders in Florida in May, all four for short selling before a secondary offering.
You’ll recall that back in the worst of the crisis, and even now, the chief executives of major Wall Street firms were crying foul about short-sellers targeting vulnerable financial stocks to make a profit. Lehman’s fallen chief executive, Richard Fuld, blamed short seller for driving Lehman into the ground. Conspiracy theories abounded in the weeks after the March 2008 collapse of Bear Stearns that hedge funds had colluded to drive its stock down.
Vikram Pandit, the chief executive of Citigroup, told a special Congressional panel this March that traders benefit when fear overtakes a market. “That’s the tool that short-sellers need to make money.â€
Still, no smoking gun…yet. In February the SEC voted in new rules restricting short selling activity in stocks that have fallen 10% already.
Lehman’s bankruptcy representatives are tussling with Och Ziff over a document subpoena Lehman sent the fund to get records of its trading. Lehman accuses the fund in court papers of having either received or spread damaging rumors and it wants the bankruptcy court to tell Och Ziff to comply. Och Ziff is resisting the subpoena, saying it is too vague and the document production could cost an onerous $3 million. The judge on Wednesday didn’t make a ruling.
Och Ziff is the only firm to resist Lehman, the fallen Wall Street bank claims. Six subpoenas were sent out. Reuters last week identified some of the other recipients as Greenlight Capital (which famously went negative on Lehman in the fall 2007 and spring 2008), SAC Capital, Citadel Investment Group and Goldman.
Is there an answer?Unless the SEC works with the DTCC and brokers to stop this, then no there is no answer, and given the amount of money involved in total expect those invested in short selling to continue to do so.At Heffernan Inc we have come to realize that it is not a game that can be won on the OTC, in fact they only way around the issue that we could see was to plan a 100% shift to a foreign exchange where there is no naked shorting and was outside the reach of the market makers active in the practice.As the company, BZTG as it is now, Changes to Heffernan Inc we will seek to remove all stock to a new foreign exchange making for a full and complete covering of the short sold stock, it will be interesting to see how that turns out, we think we are on a big winner!Shayne Heffernan
BMFL
next week(s) is here
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Note the ticker symbol (GWGO) to this day is still fighting the NAKED SHORTMAN under a different symbol.
Short Seller Captured Capital
How smart companies fight illegal short selling
Email PDF Print
Waltham, MA (PRWEB) March 8, 2006
It’s not uncommon to read about small publicly traded companies complaining about the evils of naked short selling and the negative impact that it has on their price of their stock. It is however, quite uncommon for companies to actually take action and do something about it. The difficult, sometimes daunting task of taking on the issue of naked shorting is usually costly and time consuming, taking valuable resources away from the company’s operations. Some of the most prominent anti-naked short selling proponents include Overstock.com (OSTK), Great West Gold (GWGO), Global Links Communications (GLKC), and CMKM Diamonds which has ceased trading since October of 2005.
One of the newest companies to take on naked short selling is Loftwerks Inc (LFWK). While many of the fore-mentioned companies diverted resources towards fighting naked short positions in their companies, Loftwerks has tackled the problem by diverting more money back into the company, and buying back shares. In fact, in recent news releases Loftwerks has announced that insiders of their company hold more shares of their company’s stock, than have actually been issued. CEO Dennis Ammerman stated, "Insiders decided to buy more shares than are legally available. There is no stock definition for this type of buying; therefore, we created our own definition. We call it 'Short Seller Captured Capital.’�� Essentially what this means to Loftwerks shareholders is that insiders own the entire outstanding share count, and then some.
The last time a scenario such as this was revealed, was with Global Links Communications. Robert Simpson, CEO of Global Zann Corp. at one point had in his possession the entire issued and outstanding stock of GLKC, and filed the ownership with the SEC as required. Despite owning all the stock of Global Links, the stock continued to trade millions of shares per day. As investors caught wind, shares of Global Links quickly gained more than 1000% moving from under .01 to over .14 in a matter of weeks.
CMKM Diamonds continues to press on in its fight against naked short selling, now in its 5th month of its historic certificate withdrawal from the DTCC. Since the call to request physical delivery of shares in November, the task force set up to account for the shares has tallied over 400 billion of the 703 billion issued. The latest deadline to show ownership is March 15th, which leaves many investors worried that a naked short position in the company will not be proven. Widespread reports indicate that many shareholders that have requested their certificates are having trouble actually getting them from their brokers. Other shareholders are completely unaware of the certificate pull altogether, since the main method of communication for the process is through message boards and the internet. Undisclosed at this point is the level of ownership of CEO Urban Casavant, and family, as well as the numerous business partners the company was involved with.
For more information visit our website at http://www.thestreetwire.com
###
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BMFL
next week(s) is here
Last edited by Bull Finch (2010-08-27 10:43:24)
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Posted by: bvickers Date: Saturday, August 28, 2010 7:02:24 PM
In reply to: None Post # of 157263
NAKED SHORT SELLING DOMINATES THE MARKETS
http://www.livetradingnews.com/naked-sho....rkets-19684.htm
Last Update: August 23, 2010 09:43 ET
NAKED SHORT SELLING DOMINATES THE MARKETS
Naked Short Selling now dominates the OTC markets, having been blamed by most for monument collapses during the financial crisis, the SEC attempted to, but failed to control the process.
Naked Short Sellers focus in companies they feel are “destroyable†normally this is a company that uses their market to raise capital, the case of many Pink Sheet and OTC businesses, so it is no surprize to see that naked shorting is at an all time high.
The Naked Short Sellers move in removing any chance of small companies gaining access to any form of reasonable funding by selling the stock short, effectively increasing the float, and using the basic rules of supply and demand changing the very nature of the companys market and market price.
Many of the positive runs forward of small companies in the last 6 months have been destroyed by short sellers, when in the past the small companies could have taken advantage of improved market valuation, raised funds and moved their business models to the next level.
The chances of a small company now making it out of the woods on to a main board are limited at best.
Naked short selling was clearly the end of great companies like Lehnam’s, Bear Stearns.
If you have any doubts you should take a look at sites like:
http://failstodeliver.com/
And I am not alone in this opinion
Portfolio.com say
For more than two years, playing the blame game has become a popular pastime among Wall Street pundits. Who bears the most responsibility for the market crash? Was it the politicians, who egged on lenders and investment bankers to take foolish risks in the name of policy goals like widespread home ownership? Or was it the bankers’ greed that triggered the near cataclysm?
One argument that the bankers themselves, along with many in the regulatory community, can readily accept is that ruthless and unscrupulous short-sellers must take a big share of the blame for the collapse of both Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.
Mention the names of certain hedge funds or noted short-sellers in front of former senior figures at either firm, and watch their demeanor transform instantly from calm and well-spoken to vituperative. “They brought us down,†one senior player at Lehman Brothers told StreetWise only months after the investment bank was forced to file for bankruptcy court protection.
With Lehman’s bankruptcy court proceedings still underway, it came as little surprise to find the investment bank’s estate alleging in filings last week that Och-Ziff Capital Management was part of a plan to spin false rumors about Lehman in the months and weeks leading up to its collapse.
The subtext: If it weren’t for these deliberate malicious efforts by short-sellers to spread rumors, the investment bank would have stood a better chance of survival. (Among other targets of the wrath of the late Lehman and its estate is JPMorgan Chase. The Lehman side alleges the bank denied Lehman access to liquidity at crucial stage for reasons that went beyond the commercial requirements, a claim that JPMorgan Chase denies.)
Short-sellers aren’t a popular breed on Wall Street. When times are good, they are the naysayers, the people who look for the worm in the apple. And unlike regulators, who (when they are doing their job properly) are performing the same task in hopes of making the markets function more efficiently or tackling malfeasance, short-sellers just want to make money from the stupidity or misfortune of others. Celebrating (or envying) others’ success is part of the American way. Profiting from another’s misery, however, is seen as slightly less than respectable.
The unpalatable truth is that short-sellers serve a vital function in the financial markets, just as vultures do in removing carrion. No short-seller deliberately decides to bet against a powerful financial firm by shorting its stock for the fun of it.
A firm that decides to establish a short position usually does so in the wake of significant research—research that can often be more intensive than that conducted by long-only investors. After all, the latter stand only to use the sum they have invested while the rules of short selling mean that if the hedge fund shorting a stock gets their thesis wrong, it could end up in a short squeeze with losses many times the size of that original bet.
Not only do the “shorts†force the true believers to question their assumptions about a firm’s health and stability, they provide additional liquidity to the markets. “Without the hedge funds that short just aggressively as they will go long, it would be a lot harder or more expensive for other market participants to do what they want to do in the markets,†argues one veteran trader.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, even former Bear Stearns CEO Jimmy Cayne had to admit to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission that his firm had substantial financial issues that would have led to its near collapse in the long term. His comments to the commissioners, in response to questions, seemed to confirm that to the extent that short-sellers had any impact on the investment bank’s demise, it was only in determining its timing. Naked short selling—the practice of selling stock that the short-seller doesn’t own and hasn’t borrowed to sell—may have pushed the bank over the edge, but it walked all the way to the cliff under its own steam.
The debate over whether and how to rein in short selling has lost no momentum in the years that have elapsed since the collapse of Bear and Lehman. But the real problem isn’t short selling, whether naked or fully-dressed in pinstriped suits.
Rather, it’s market manipulation. When Lehman’s estate tries to understand what hedge funds like Steve Cohen’s SAC Capital, Greenlight, or Och-Ziff were up to, that’s what they are really griping about. It’s not the fact of the short sale, but the rumormongering. And banning particular kinds of transactions—even the extremely risky practice of naked shorting—won’t fix that problem.
That didn’t stop the German government from trying, of course. Last May, it imposed an overnight ban on naked shorting of bonds, stocks of German companies, and credit default swaps on bonds issued by European Union governments in the midst of the efforts to bail out Greece and somehow stop the Euro from melting down. This month, the International Monetary Fund issued a report card on that ban. Rather than making the markets function better, the IMF concluded, “market efficiency and quality in fact deteriorated substantially.†Nor did it help put a floor underneath asset prices.
Meanwhile, Shang Fulin, head of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, sent a signal to the North American and European markets that if they were going to crack down on short selling, China may be willing to step into any void that is left.
Shang told a financial group in Shanghai last June that the country plans to expand margin trading, short selling, and the use of financial derivatives—a reminder to regulators elsewhere that attempts to rein in speculation are likely to be fruitless without some kind of global agreement.
Restrictions on short selling elsewhere may simply drive a significant amount of trading onto Asian markets, if that is the only place that hedge fund managers can execute their strategies.
Short-sellers—even those who are “naked short-sellers†— may be vultures, but vultures are useful creatures, even in the financial markets. In volatile and sideways-moving markets, investors in funds that are able to sell short have another way to make money. “That’s part of what being nimble is all about,†says one hedge fund trader, who admits that he occasionally shorts stocks he doesn’t own. “Yes, it’s a lot riskier, but that just means I have to have a lot more confidence in my judgment and my research. And if I get it wrong, I pay a much heavier price.â€
The problem isn’t with short selling, per se, but with abusive behavior by some of those short-sellers. The solution, therefore, isn’t to ban short selling, but to better monitor the Wall Street rumor mill, watching for strange moves in asset prices and seeing whether they can be linked to particular short-sellers, strategies, or rumors.
It’s the people, not the trading strategy, that are the real problem. It’s always going to be harder to police what a handful of reckless short-sellers are saying and doing than it is to slap a ban on short selling itself. But it’s the right way to protect the integrity and the efficiency of our financial markets.
Read more: http://www.portfolio.com/industry-news/b....s#ixzz0xR3X37UX
Forbes.com
Two years ago the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the middle of dealing with the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, slapped a temporary moratorium on short selling in shares of 799 financial companies (well, some of them weren’t so financial, but whatever.) At the same time in Sept. 2008, it opened an investigation into the trading habits of hedge funds, particularly their short selling activities, much to the chagrin of the fund industry.
Nothing has ever come of those investigations, however, and a lawyer for Och Ziff Capital Management said in bankruptcy court Wednesday that it’s because there was nothing to see, after all. The probe “has gone nowhere because there is nothing,†said Kenneth Bressler, the attorney from Blank Rome who is representing the $26 billion hedge fund Och Ziff in a spat with Lehman’s bankruptcy representatives.
The SEC looked into most major hedge funds and their trading in shares of Lehman, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, American International Group, and Merrill Lynch, the lawyer said during the hearing. Contacted Thursday, a representative for Bressler said he wouldn’t comment beyond what was said in court.
Since the crisis days, the SEC has been busy slapping fines on Wall Street for misleading disclosures (Citigroup, $75 million, which a judge isn’t too keen on, and Goldman, $550 million) and cracking down on insider trading, but it hasn’t come up with an example to be made of nefarious short selling in bank stocks. It’s most recent cases involving short selling were brought against two small Los Angeles investment advisory firms in January and another two traders in Florida in May, all four for short selling before a secondary offering.
You’ll recall that back in the worst of the crisis, and even now, the chief executives of major Wall Street firms were crying foul about short-sellers targeting vulnerable financial stocks to make a profit. Lehman’s fallen chief executive, Richard Fuld, blamed short seller for driving Lehman into the ground. Conspiracy theories abounded in the weeks after the March 2008 collapse of Bear Stearns that hedge funds had colluded to drive its stock down.
Vikram Pandit, the chief executive of Citigroup, told a special Congressional panel this March that traders benefit when fear overtakes a market. “That’s the tool that short-sellers need to make money.â€
Still, no smoking gun…yet. In February the SEC voted in new rules restricting short selling activity in stocks that have fallen 10% already.
Lehman’s bankruptcy representatives are tussling with Och Ziff over a document subpoena Lehman sent the fund to get records of its trading. Lehman accuses the fund in court papers of having either received or spread damaging rumors and it wants the bankruptcy court to tell Och Ziff to comply. Och Ziff is resisting the subpoena, saying it is too vague and the document production could cost an onerous $3 million. The judge on Wednesday didn’t make a ruling.
Och Ziff is the only firm to resist Lehman, the fallen Wall Street bank claims. Six subpoenas were sent out. Reuters last week identified some of the other recipients as Greenlight Capital (which famously went negative on Lehman in the fall 2007 and spring 2008), SAC Capital, Citadel Investment Group and Goldman.
Is there an answer?
Unless the SEC works with the DTCC and brokers to stop this, then no there is no answer, and given the amount of money involved in total expect those invested in short selling to continue to do so.
At Heffernan Inc we have come to realize that it is not a game that can be won on the OTC, in fact they only way around the issue that we could see was to plan a 100% shift to a foreign exchange where there is no naked shorting and was outside the reach of the market makers active in the practice.
As the company, BZTG as it is now, Changes to Heffernan Inc we will seek to remove all stock to a new foreign exchange making for a full and complete covering of the short sold stock, it will be interesting to see how that turns out, we think we are on a big winner!
Shayne Heffernan www.livetradingnews.com
bmfl
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Rocket Man Friday, September 10, 2010 8:34:22 PM
Re: None Post # of 160221
"(7) EXTRAORDINARY DIVIDEND. If you wish to have the currently selected transacting entity pay out a special, or "extraordinary" dividend to its stockholders. This transaction is for corporations only -- individual don't pay dividends to anyone. To prevent you from thoroughly looting a corporation, and leaving its bank lender and bondholders holding the bag when the company implodes, there are strict limits on how much you can have a company pay out as an "extraordinary dividend." Also, banks and insurance companies are sometimes prohibited from doing so by government regulators, as well, and are much more limited in the amount they can pay out than other companies, when they are allowed to make such a distribution at all.
Any company that has a very poor credit rating will also be unable to pay an extraordinary dividend, and the amount a company is allowed to pay out will be limited, to prevent a payout that is so large it would nearly bankrupt the company.
Generally, an extraordinary dividend is taxable to the same extent as regular, quarterly dividends a company pays out. That is, it is fully taxable to an individual; only 30% of the payout is taxable to a corporation that owns less than 20% of the stock of the payor; only 20% is taxable to a corporation that owns 20% to 79% (or that is under common control with the payor, even if it owns less than 20%) of the stock; and none of the dividend is taxable to a company that owns 80% to 100% of the payor.
That is the general rule. However, if the dividend represents a significant percentage (which varies) of the assets of the paying company, or if the payor company tries to do multiple extraordinary distributions, then you will be warned that the payout will be considered a "partial liquidation" by the tax authorities, and thus will be fully taxable to ALL recipients, including corporations (except a parent corporation owning 80% or more of the payor's stock), and you will be given a chance to call off the transaction, rather than have any corporate recipients of the dividend incur large tax liabilities.
You will notice that when a company pays out a large "extraordinary dividend," the price of its stock will drop immediately after, roughly reflecting the reduction of its net worth (and credit rating) that results from paying out the dividend.
The "Extraordinary Dividend" is a tool used for many decades past by real corporate "raiders" (looters) to strip a company of its liquid assets after they have bought up its stock at a depressed price. It works well, if you don't get hit by too large a tax bite.
Note that if you have sold a stock short in a company that pays out an extraordinary dividend, or even regular quarterly dividends, you must pay, as an expense item, an amount equal to the dividend you would have received if you had been "long" that amount of shares. That expense is not deductible, except as a capital loss against any capital gains you may realize in the same year or later. (Which is only fair, since the reduced value of the shorted stock after the company pays a large dividend will increase your capital gain when you cover your short position in the stock.)" ~unsureofsource :_)
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FFGO~????
Tuesday, August 10th, 2010
NASDAQ
by Roger Schultz
A new, stock clearing house will open in the U.S. in March that will right many of the wrongs perpetrated by the market makers, brokers, and hedge funds conducting business on the NASDAQ and OTC markets. The NASDAQ OMX has been approved to start the clearing of stocks next month. Currently, 92% of all stocks in the U.S. markets are cleared by the DTC, which is an arm of the Federal Reserve.
The problem for the market makers, brokers, and hedge funds, is all of their NSS (naked short selling) will have to be covered when companies jump to the No Nonsense NASDAQ OMX from the DTC, that for years looked the other way when this practice occurred.
A naked short sell is perpetrated when a buy order is placed by an individual for a stock and a market maker pulls those stocks out of thin air and puts the imaginary stocks into the individuals broker account. This practice has bankrupted countless marginal companies in the last 8 years. Many, if not most market makers are owned by the large banks and brokers on Wall street.
This practice of naked short selling artificially deluded the outstanding shares, making each share worth less causing a death spiral. At this point the brokers and hedge funds sell short, betting that the stock would further decline, which was a no brainer of course.
Almost all of these affected companies did not survive, at least in their original form. However, the companies that did survive this savage market manipulation will soon leave the DTC and join the new clearing house of the NASDAQ OMX. I know of one CEO that spent over 750K of his own money to save his shell OTC company from this type of manipulation and will most likely have a very healthy profit for his troubles.
When this transpires in March, ALL OF THOSE AIR SHARES MUST BE COVERED by the brokers or market makers AND all those hedge fund short sells MUST BE COVERED AS WELL.???
How it eventually affects Pinkies is anyone's guess for now......~NASCOW
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Sent By: SevenTenEleven To: Bull Finch Date: Saturday, September 18, 2010 11:37:01 PM
SevenTenEleven Share Saturday, September 18, 2010 11:34:21 PM
Re: patchman post# 151084 Post # of 161414
Patchman, How come this post doesn't jive with "yours" and "Janice's" phone conversation(s) with FINRA?
Dragonwing Share Monday, February 22, 2010 1:33:09 AM
Re: ThePennyGuru post# 237 Post # of 1113
And there's even more that's not reported
"Trades in certain classes of securities, such as Rule 144A securities, are reported to the ORF, but not disseminated. Non-disseminated securities will not be included in either the daily short sale volume file or the monthly short sale transaction file."
"Tape reports are submitted to FINRA for public dissemination by the appropriate exclusive Securities Information Processor (‘‘SIP’’), while non-tape reports are submitted to FINRA, but are not submitted to the SIP for public dissemination. FINRA will not be including non-tape reports in either the daily short sale volume file or the monthly short sale transaction file. Accordingly, in those instances where the short sale indicator is only included in the related non-tape report, the short sale data published in the daily and monthly files may be under-inclusive. Similarly, the published figures will not include odd lots since these transactions are not disseminated to the consolidated tape."
"Once the Daily Short Sale Volume File is made publicly available at the end of each trading day, FINRA notes that users of such data should not expect the daily and monthly data to reconcile because, among other things, monthly transaction data will include reporting through the end of FINRA transaction reporting hours that terminate as late as 8:00 p.m., while daily volume reports will only include volume reported during regular trading hours."
"FINRA will not incorporate trading information into the daily short sale volume file that has not been executed and reported within the trading day. While members generally are required to report trades in equity securities to FINRA within 90 seconds, a firm could improperly delay reporting of short sales until well after the close, which would result in the under-reporting of over-the-counter short sale volume."
patchman Share Wednesday, March 03, 2010 6:31:31 PM
Re: fourkids_9pets post# 648 Post # of 1113
Short Sale Volume Reporting’s are deceiving.
I spoke to FINRA today and found out some very interesting things that until now I did not fully understand. I knew there was something wrong with this transparency of information but was not 100% sure what it was. I think I have my answer and it was enlightening.
I was first directed to the Notice to Members memo dated 9/29/2009
www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/Notices/2009/P120045
The individual I spoke with wanted to make clear that to maintain proper trade volume reporting accuracy, a trade with multiple legs in the trade would only be reported once in the volume reports. The example given would be.
Investor A is long 100 shares and wants to sell. They enter the order through their broker that is routed to a market maker. That market maker will go out and sell the stock into the market before they have bought the stock from you/your broker to close out their account. They do not take possession first as there is no guarantee they can sell the order into the market. By this Notice, the actual sale INTO the market is a short sale because the market maker sold the stock into the market BEFORE they had purchased the stock from you. It is a technicality since they know there position will be closed out minutes later when they go in and buy your shares. To avoid doubling up on trade volume and distorting the picture, only the sale into the market (consolidated tape) is recorded and not the second leg which was the sale transaction between seller and market maker.
So, this is why the short sale volume is high but also why the FTD’s and bi-Monthly short interest reports are not showing any indications of this volume. The short isn’t really a short it is the execution of a long sale by a market maker. The key language in the FINRA notice is this:
Quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Daily Short Sale Volume File will provide daily access to the aggregate volume of short sales in NMS Stocks and OTC Equity Securities reported to a consolidated tape and traded over-the-counter during regular trading hours on each trading day.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consolidated tape is the open market where the transaction between seller and market maker is not done at the consolidated tape. That call this the media transaction.
Now for those wondering about Bona-Fide Market Making, I found out it can still be done but not electronically. The 15c-211 applies to electronic trade. Market Makers can continue to execute Bona-Fide Market making through phonic transactions but those sales made would be reported in the short interest reports bi-monthly and if not closed out will be reported as FTD’s in the system like any other trade failure.
Hope this helps at least clear up the high short interest volume reports seen. The reason the number is not 100% is because not all orders are routed thru independent market makers.
Since there is so much discussion and confusion on this I would request this be added as a sticky note since it clears up the confusions here - Patchman
Tic TOC!
BTW, Here is the short volume as provided by FINRA
http://regsho.finra.org/DailyShortSaleVolumeFileLayout.pdf
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Bull Finch Share Friday, August 20, 2010 8:49:25 PM
Re: Generic post# 1632 Post # of 1713
So posts about Patrick Byrne and Mark Faulk
are not allowed, is that because they speak the truth about NSS.
At one time our Founding Fathers were not allowed to speak in public because of the British King.
Tell me, why can't we speak of these two men. Is there something to hide.
BMFL
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janice shell Share Friday, August 20, 2010 9:03:28 PM
Re: Bull Finch post# 1635 Post # of 1713
That's because this board is not about penny stocks.
And Faulk is long gone. He finally realized that Urbie Casavant was a crook.
Bull Finch Share Friday, August 20, 2010 9:23:00 PM
Re: janice shell post# 1636 Post # of 1713
Then what about Patrick Byrne?
Why can't we speak of him, is HE-WHO-MUST-NOT-BE-NAMED on this board, have something to say that others are afraid to hear. What could he have to say that is so terrifying, that we are not allowed to speak of him.
BMFL
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janice shell Share Friday, August 20, 2010 9:23:37 PM
Re: Bull Finch post# 1637 Post # of 1713
It's Deep Crapture that's objectionable. It's all about penny stocks.
Deep Capture Share Saturday, August 21, 2010 12:37:06 PM
Re: janice shell post# 1638 Post # of 1713
Ahem...deepcapture.com is about manipulation of major exchange traded stocks. Any references to penny stocks are purely ancillary. I'd like to see you find a example to the contrary.
basserdan Share Saturday, August 21, 2010 1:04:36 PM
Re: janice shell post# 1638 Post # of 1713
<<<It's Deep Crapture that's objectionable. It's all about penny stocks.>>>
No it's not, Janet.... not by a long shot, as this partial list of the titles at the Deep Capture site will attest:
Moral Hazard at the SEC
28 July 2010 by Judd Bagley
When attempting to understand much of what happens at the Securities and Exchange Commission, I believe moral hazard is nearly as important a factor as the much more frequently-discussed matter of regulatory capture.
Read the full story
Posted in Featured Stories, Our Captured Federal Regulator the SEC, The Deep Capture CampaignComments (28)
Notes on David Einhorn: The Predator in a Cute T-Shirt
10 June 2010 by Mark Mitchell
David Einhorn would have you believe that he is brave crusader against corporate malfeasance. The truth is, he's a fraud who did serious damage to the markets.
Read the full story
Posted in Featured Stories, The Mitchell ReportComments (131)
Europe Comes to Terms With Market Manipulation; the SEC and the American Media Bury Heads in the Sand
21 May 2010 by Mark Mitchell
The markets go haywire, Germany responds sensibly, and the American establishment refuses to contemplate the reality of criminal manipulation.
Read the full story
Posted in Featured Stories, The Mitchell ReportComments (120)
On Wall Street, membership has its privileges
13 May 2010 by Judd Bagley
When these two banks enabled manipulative short selling, they were silently transferring wealth from the masses into the accounts of the privileged few.
Read the full story
Posted in Featured StoriesComments (57)
Goldman’s gold has lost its luster
06 May 2010 by Judd Bagley
Goldman may be flush with cash, but with pressure mounting on politicians to reject any of it in the form of campaign contributions, suddenly that cash doesn’t spend nearly as well as it used to.
Read the full story
Posted in Featured Stories, Our Captured Federal Regulator the SEC, The Deep Capture CampaignComments (62)
The SEC and its culture of regulatory capture
29 April 2010 by Judd Bagley
But dig a little deeper and you’ll find the Stanford case is the bigger outrage by far, not so much for the scam itself, but for the shocking behavior of the regulators tasked with preventing it. Where Madoff was enabled by SEC bureaucratic incompetence, Stanford was empowered by overt SEC indifference.
Read the full story
Posted in Featured Stories, Our Captured Federal Regulator the SEC, The Deep Capture CampaignComments (82)
Podcast: Rexxfield repairs online reputations
23 April 2010 by Judd Bagley
Rexxfield founder Michael Roberts specializes in repairing online reputations.
Read the full story
Posted in AntiSocialMedia with Judd Bagley, Deep Capture Podcast, Featured StoriesComments (35)
Goldman Sachs, John Paulson, and the Hedge Funds that Pumped and Dumped Our Economy
20 April 2010 by Mark Mitchell
The Goldman CDO scandal and other evidence suggests that the U.S. economy was set up for a fall by market manipulating hedge funds.
Read the full story
Posted in Featured Stories, The Mitchell ReportComments (78)
Two must-read books for any market reformer
16 April 2010 by Judd Bagley
Regular readers of this blog come from remarkably diverse backgrounds, but seem united by at least one shared experience: the act of having examined some aspect of our capital markets only to conclude that much of what the world has accepted as fundamental simply does not make sense.
Read the full story
Posted in Featured StoriesComments (41)
Manipulating Gold and Silver: A Criminal Naked Short Position that Could Wreck the Economy
02 April 2010 by Mark Mitchell
Naked short selling of gold and silver -- a threat to the stability of the financial system and evidence that our markets are rigged
Read the full story
Posted in Featured Stories, The Mitchell ReportComments (170)
All can be found at:
http://www.deepcapture.com/
janice shell Share Saturday, August 21, 2010 3:18:01 PM
Re: Deep Capture post# 1639 Post # of 1713
I could show you the "example" of a defamatory page about me that is obviously sanctioned by the site
janice shell Share Saturday, August 21, 2010 3:20:18 PM
Re: basserdan post# 1640 Post # of 1713
Naked short selling of gold and silver -- a threat to the stability of the financial system and evidence that our markets are rigged
Is he talking about the futures markets?? I mean, that's what futures trading is about.
basserdan Share Saturday, August 21, 2010 4:00:34 PM
Re: janice shell post# 1642 Post # of 1713
<<<Is he talking about the futures markets?? I mean, that's what futures trading is about.>>>
In that instance, yes he is..... but Deep Capture is definitely not limited to writing about the capture of the futures market regulators of the CFTC, janice, by any means.
Kindly allow me to furnish you the access to answer your question:
http://www.deepcapture.com/manipulating-gold-and-silver-a-criminal-naked-short-position-that-could-wreck-the-economy/
Enjoy the weekend.
Deep Capture Share Saturday, August 21, 2010 4:56:27 PM
Re: janice shell post# 1641 Post # of 1713
There's a lot of content on DeepCapture.com, but you're not mentioned in any post...not once (see for yourself: www.deepcapture.com/?s=janice+shell). So, unless you go by a different name, that's strike two, Ms. Shell (refer to post#1639 to see strike one).
I get the impression you regard yourself as a bit of a player in this silly world of stock message boards, and that may or may not be the case, but one thing I'm sure of is that you've never made it on to our radar.
janice shell Share Saturday, August 21, 2010 4:58:09 PM
Re: Deep Capture post# 1645 Post # of 1713
Must be something wrong with your search engine.
http://www.deepcapture.com/forums/viewtopic.php?id=65
Now that you know about it, I'd appreciate your removing it.
Deep Capture Share Saturday, August 21, 2010 5:14:42 PM
Re: janice shell post# 1646 Post # of 1713
As I suspect you understand, you're referring to the Deep Capture forums, the content of which we neither endorse nor control (outside of requiring that it meet certain standards of decency and not be overtly libelous...which requires that it be untrue).
If you feel something on that thread -- which I have not taken the time to read -- defames you, I encourage you to take one or more of the following steps:
1- Sue the poster for defamation
2- Show me exactly what concerns you, and if you can demonstrate that it's false and damages you and not merely the poster's clearly-stated opinion, I will gladly remove it.
As I understand it, being a new member here I only get to post three times per day, this post being my third. So I won't be able to interact with you here until tomorrow, and frankly I have no intention of spending any more of my weekend on this site. So, please email me your specific concerns at: jbagley@deepcapture.com.
Thanks.
Bull Finch Share Sunday, August 22, 2010 3:09:37 PM
Re: puppydotcom post# 1651 Post # of 1713
I agree there should be zero tolerance
for NAKED SHORTING, and those days are SHORTLY approaching!
BMFL
next week(s) is here
Last edited by Bull Finch (2010-09-28 11:28:56)
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NASCOW Share Tuesday, August 10, 2010 1:47:08 PM
Re: None Post # of 39788
Tuesday, August 10th, 2010
NASDAQ
by Roger Schultz
A new, stock clearing house will open in the U.S. in March that will right many of the wrongs perpetrated by the market makers, brokers, and hedge funds conducting business on the NASDAQ and OTC markets. The NASDAQ OMX has been approved to start the clearing of stocks next month. Currently, 92% of all stocks in the U.S. markets are cleared by the DTC, which is an arm of the Federal Reserve.
The problem for the market makers, brokers, and hedge funds, is all of their NSS (naked short selling) will have to be covered when companies jump to the No Nonsense NASDAQ OMX from the DTC, that for years looked the other way when this practice occurred.
A naked short sell is perpetrated when a buy order is placed by an individual for a stock and a market maker pulls those stocks out of thin air and puts the imaginary stocks into the individuals broker account. This practice has bankrupted countless marginal companies in the last 8 years. Many, if not most market makers are owned by the large banks and brokers on Wall street.
This practice of naked short selling artificially deluded the outstanding shares, making each share worth less causing a death spiral. At this point the brokers and hedge funds sell short, betting that the stock would further decline, which was a no brainer of course.
Almost all of these affected companies did not survive, at least in their original form. However, the companies that did survive this savage market manipulation will soon leave the DTC and join the new clearing house of the NASDAQ OMX. I know of one CEO that spent over 750K of his own money to save his shell OTC company from this type of manipulation and will most likely have a very healthy profit for his troubles.
When this transpires in March, ALL OF THOSE AIR SHARES MUST BE COVERED by the brokers or market makers AND all those hedge fund short sells MUST BE COVERED AS WELL.???
How it eventually affects Pinkies is anyone's guess for now......
BMFL<OD
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basserdan Share Wednesday, September 15, 2010 11:34:25 AM
Re: None Post # of 1714
Naked Short-Sales, OTC Derivatives Face EU Limits
By Ben Moshinsky
September 15, 2010, 10:22 AM EDT
(Updates with comments from hedge-fund group in 15th paragraph.)
Sept. 15 (Bloomberg) -- Naked short-sales of shares and government bonds would be limited and some over-the-counter derivatives trades forced through clearinghouses under European Commission proposals to safeguard financial markets.
Frequent traders of some OTC derivatives in Europe will be forced to use central clearinghouses to close sales, while naked short-sellers would be required to submit proof they can access the underlying security to settle a trade designed to profit from falling prices, under two separate initiatives announced in Brussels today.
“In distressed markets, short selling can amplify price falls, leading to disorderly markets and systemic risks,†Michel Barnier, the European Union’s financial services commissioner, said in an e-mailed statement.
The rules on short-selling would bring the EU closer to the stance taken by Germany, where Chancellor Angela Merkel banned some naked short-selling in May. Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy argued that some bets against stocks and government bonds should be curbed as the Greek debt crisis made markets more volatile.
The EU bill on derivatives clearing is part of a package of laws to strengthen regulation following the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. The plan is aimed at limiting losses in the event of a default by a major counterparty.
‘Wild West’
“No financial market can afford to remain a Wild West territory,†Barnier said. “OTC derivatives have a big impact on the real economy, from mortgages to food prices.â€
The commission, the executive arm of the 27-nation EU, announced the proposals for discussion by the European Parliament and member states. U.S. and European regulators are pushing for tighter oversight of the $605 trillion over-the- counter derivatives market.
To encourage traders to use central counterparties, OTC derivatives not cleared centrally will face increased capital charges, to be outlined in a revision of the EU’s rules on bank reserves at the end of the year.
The capital rules will implement agreements made by the central bankers and regulators of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision announced on Sept. 12.
Banks are “concerned about requirements for potentially higher levels of collateral and capital,†the European Banking Federation, a Brussels-based trade group, said in an e-mailed statement.
‘Crucial Points’
“These measures are crucial points in the strict regulatory agenda banks are facing and must be carefully weighed, both individually and as a whole,†Guido Ravoet, secretary general EBF, said in the statement.
The proposed law on short-selling would require traders to notify authorities of any short position exceeding 0.2 percent of issued capital, and tell the market of positions exceeding 0.5 percent.
“We have a concern about public disclosure at low thresholds,†Kevin McNulty, chief executive of the International Securities Lending Association, said in a telephone interview. “At that level, it artificially reduces short-selling.â€
The rules would also give regulators emergency powers to require more disclosure or temporarily ban short-sales of equities and credit-default swaps on bonds.
“We do hope however that new powers to ban short selling are never used,†Andrew Baker, chief executive of the Alternative Investment Managers Association, said in an e-mailed statement. “Such bans have never worked.â€
‘Therapeutic Effect’
“These proposals will have a very therapeutic effect,†said Michael Greenberger, a professor at the University of Maryland School of Law, said in a telephone interview earlier this week. “The problems speculators pose in markets far outweigh concerns about liquidity and financial costs.â€
In the U.S., regulators and Congress rejected a proposed ban on naked swaps last year, with House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank saying “there was concern that a broad grant to ban abusive swaps would be unsettling,†and U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner saying he doesn’t think such a measure would have merit.
‘Nefarious Practice’
The EU proposals were criticized by some groups for failing to require an outright ban on naked short-selling.
The commission “failed to grasp the nettle†to “ban this nefarious practice,†Pascal Canfin, a French Green party member of the European Parliament, said in an e-mailed statement.
Short sellers borrow assets and sell them, betting the price will fall, buying them later and pocketing the difference. In naked short-selling, traders never borrow the assets, so betting is unlimited.
Credit-default swaps are derivatives that pay the buyer face value if a borrower -- a country or a company -- defaults. In exchange, the swap seller gets the underlying securities or the cash equivalent. Traders in naked credit-default swaps buy insurance on bonds they don’t own.
The rules on OTC derivatives would force traders to record contracts with a central data bank known as a trade repository, and hand powers to European regulators to decide what type of derivatives must be cleared by a central counterparty.
A derivative is a contract between two parties linked to the future value or status of the underlying asset to which it refers, including the development of interest rates or price of commodities such as oil or wheat. An OTC derivative is one privately negotiated between two parties, rather than being traded on an exchange.
Clearinghouses operate as central counterparties for every buy and sell order executed by their members, who post collateral, reducing the risk that a trader defaults on a deal.
--With assistance from Abigail Moses in London. Editors: Peter Chapman, Christopher Scinta
To contact the reporters on this story: Ben Moshinsky in Brussels at bmoshinsky@bloomberg.net;
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-09-15/naked-short-sales-otc-derivatives-face-eu-limits.html
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Traders manipulating cheap stocks: market maker
Knight Capital Group, Inc.
KCG.N
$12.49
-0.13-1.03%
By Jonathan Spicer
WASHINGTON | Sun Sep 26, 2010 6:40pm EDT
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Some traders are manipulating U.S. stocks that are worth less than $1 by taking both sides of trades in order to earn big rebates, according to an official at Knight Capital Group Inc (KCG.N).
Knight, a top U.S. market maker for individual investors, and the other four largest market makers discussed this problem with federal securities regulators on Thursday, Jamil Nazarali, Knight's global head of electronic trading, told reporters on Friday.
"It happens for hundreds of millions of shares per day," Nazarali said, adding that this type of market manipulation is hard to prove. The gaming costs Knight "tens of thousands of dollars" per day on some days, he said on the sidelines of a Security Traders Association conference here.
Nazarali added that U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission officials "seemed empathetic" to the concerns of the five firms that execute much of the orders of individual, or retail, investors -- Knight, UBS AG (UBS.N), Citadel Investment Group, Citigroup Inc (C.N), and E*Trade Financial Corp (ETFC.O).
SEC spokesman John Heine neither confirmed nor denied the meeting. He did not comment on gaming in sub-dollar stocks.
The manipulation concerns come months after the May "flash crash" stoked a debate over fairness in the mostly electronic marketplace, which has grown faster and increasingly complicated in the last decade.
At issue is whether an individual trader is using separate brokerage accounts to trade against himself, something known as a wash trade. Shares that regularly trade below $1, such as Sirius XM Radio Inc (SIRI.O) and Level 3 Communications Inc (LVLT.O), are the typical targets, Nazarali said.
Exchanges charge fees to those that execute against standing buy and sell orders, something called a take fee, and pay rebates to those that provide standing orders that are executed against. This is known as "maker-taker" pricing.
While stocks are normally priced in penny increments, rules adopted five years ago allow exchanges to price sub-dollar stocks in one-hundredth of a cent. The fees and rebates, however, are based on penny increments for all stocks, including sub-dollar stocks -- which creates a possible loophole through which traders can earn out-sized rebates.
A trader can, for example, send a "limit order" bid through one brokerage account, and a corresponding "market order" to sell that same stock in another account. After trading with himself, the trader earns the bid's rebate and pays the smaller selling fee -- which is usually fixed at retail brokers like E*Trade -- and walks away with the difference.
In this scenario, market makers such as Knight would foot much of the bill.
For a short period earlier this year, large exchanges paid outsized fees and rebates in sub-$1 stocks, but did away with it in the spring after protests from market makers, said William Karsh, chief operating officer at exchange operator Direct Edge.
The smaller CBOE Stock Exchange, or CBSX, offers the out-sized rebates now. The exchange, run by Chicago-based CBOE Holdings Inc (CBOE.O), has seen its market share rise in sub-dollar stocks this summer.
"CBOE takes its regulatory responsibility very seriously and does investigate unusual trading activity," a CBOE spokeswoman said. "However we do not comment on individual investigations."
Nazarali said Knight has reported this activity to regulators on a daily bases in recent weeks, and has brought it to the attention of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.
"It is really damaging to investors," Nazarali told reporters.
The SEC in recent weeks said it is probing trading and quoting activity for evidence of market fraud and manipulation. In a comprehensive paper issued in January, the agency asked whether pricing in the market is problematic.
(Reporting by Jonathan Spicer, editing by Martin Golan)
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Cellar Boxing Naked Short Selling
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This article is kind of long, but very informative and well worth the time to read. I have seen this posted around the net by several different authors, so not sure who gets the credit.
badpuppy Share Tuesday, September 28, 2010 12:07:21 PM
Re: BikerBob post# 162418 Post # of 162422
-Please see this link to see what is happening with this and other Pink stocks by unscrupulous MM's.
http://www.mystockbuddy.com/forum/answer_center/401-cellar_boxing_naked_short_selling.html
-I like(or not) the part where the MM's can borrow your shares held in a street account all the while they are driving the you share price down. Quite unethical but that is where we are today...
Naked shorting into $0.0001, or, **Cellar Boxing**
There’s a form of the securities fraud known as naked short selling that is becoming very popular and lucrative to the Market Makers that practice it. It is known as “Cellar boxing†and it has to do with the fact that the NASD and the SEC had to arbitrarily set a minimum level at which a stock can trade. This level was set at $.0001 or one-one hundredth of a penny. This level is appropriately referred to as “the cellar†. This $.0001 level can be used as a "backstop" for all kinds of market maker and naked short selling manipulations.
“Cellar boxing†has been one of the security frauds du jour since 1999 when the market went to a “decimalization†basis. In the pre-decimalization days the minimum market spread for most stocks was set at 1/8th of a dollar and the market makers were guaranteed a healthy “spread†. Since decimalization came into effect, those one-eighth of a dollar spreads now are often only a penny as you can see in Microsoft’s quote throughout the day. Where did the unscrupulous MMs go to make up for all of this lost income? They headed "south" to the OTCBB and Pink Sheets where the protective effects from naked short selling like Rule 10-a, and NASD Rules 3350, 3360, and 3370 are nonexistent.
The unique aspect of needing an arbitrary “cellar†level is that the lowest possible incremental gain above this cellar level represents a 100% spread available to MMs making a market in these securities. When compared to the typical spread in Microsoft of perhaps four-tenths of 1%, this is pretty tempting territory. In fact, when the market is no bid to $.0001 offer there is theoretically an infinite spread.
In order to participate in “cellar boxing†, the MMs first need to pummel the price per share down to these levels. The lower they can force the share price, the larger are the percentage spreads to feed off of. This is easily done via garden variety naked short selling. In fact if the MM is large enough and has enough visibility of buy and sell orders as well as order flow, he can simultaneously be acting as the conduit for the sale of nonexistent shares through Canadian co-conspiring broker/dealers and their associates with his right hand at the same time that his left hand is naked short selling into every buy order that appears through its own proprietary accounts. The key here is to be a dominant enough of a MM to have visibility of these buy orders. This is referred to as "broker/dealer internalization" or naked short selling via "desking" which refers to the market makers trading desk. While the right hand is busy flooding the victim company's market with "counterfeit" shares that can be sold at any instant in time the left hand is nullifying any upward pressure in share price by neutralizing the demand for the securities. The net effect becomes no demonstrable demand for shares and a huge oversupply of shares which induces a downward spiral in share price.
In fact, until the "beefed up" version of Rule 3370 (Affirmative determination in writing of "borrowability" by settlement date) becomes effective, U.S. MMs have been "legally" processing naked short sale orders out of Canada and other offshore locations even though they and the clearing firms involved knew by history that these shares were in no way going to be delivered. The question that then begs to be asked is how "the system" can allow these obviously bogus sell orders to clear and settle. To find the answer to this one need look no further than to Addendum "C" to the Rules and Regulations of the NSCC subdivision of the DTCC. This gaping loophole allows the DTCC, which is basically the 11,000 b/ds and banks that we refer to as "Wall Street†, to borrow shares from those investors naive enough to hold these shares in "street name" at their brokerage firm. This amounts to about 95% of us. Theoretically, this “borrow†was designed to allow trades to clear and settle that involved LEGITIMATE 1 OR 2 DAY delays in delivery. This "borrow" is done unbeknownst to the investor that purchased the shares in question and amounts to probably the largest "conflict of interest" known to mankind. The question becomes would these investors knowingly loan, without compensation, their shares to those whose intent is to bankrupt their investment if they knew that the loan process was the key mechanism needed for the naked short sellers to effect their goal? Another question that arises is should the investor's b/d who just earned a commission and therefore owes its client a fiduciary duty of care, be acting as the intermediary in this loan process keeping in mind that this b/d is being paid the cash value of the shares being loaned as a means of collateralizing the loan, all unbeknownst to his client the purchaser.
An interesting phenomenon occurs at these "cellar" levels. Since NASD Rule 3370 allows MMs to legally naked short sell into markets characterized by a plethora of buy orders at a time when few sell orders are in existence, a MM can theoretically "legally" sit at the $.0001 level and sell nonexistent shares all day long because at no bid and $.0001 ask there is obviously a huge disparity between buy orders and sell orders. What tends to happen is that every time the share price tries to get off of the cellar floor and onto the first step of the stairway at $.0001 there is somebody there to step on the hands of the victim corporation's market.
Once a given micro cap corporation is “boxed in the cellar†it doesn’t have a whole lot of options to climb its way out of the cellar. One obvious option would be for it to reverse split its way out of the cellar but history has shown that these are counter-productive as the market capitalization typically gets hammered and the post split share price level starts heading back to its original pre-split level.
Another option would be to organize a sustained buying effort and muscle your way out of the cellar but typically there will, as if by magic, be a naked short sell order there to meet each and every buy order. Sometimes the shareholder base can muster up enough buying pressure to put the market at $.0001 bid and $.0002 offer for a limited amount of time. Later the market makers will typically pound the $.0001 bids with a blitzkrieg of selling to wipe out all of the bids and the market goes back to no bid and $.0001 offer. When the weak-kneed shareholders see this a few times they usually make up their mind to sell their shares the next time that a $.0001 bid appears and to get the heck out of Dodge. This phenomenon is referred to as “shaking the tree†for weak-kneed investors and it is very effective.
__________________
All advice from me is guaranteed to be worth at least what you paid for it, or double your money back. All persons dealing with matters of personal finance are advised to gather information from blogs, books, radio and TV, consult with professionals, discuss the matter with anybody who will listen, and then make their own decision.
At times the market will go to $.0001 bid and $.0003 offer. This sets up a juicy 200% spread for the MMs and tends to dissuade any buyers from reaching up to the "lofty" level of $.0003. If a $.0002 bid should appear from a MM not "playing ball" with the unscrupulous MMs, it will be hit so quickly that Level 2 will never reveal the existence of the bid. The $.0001 bid at $.0003 offer market sets up a "stalemate" wherein market makers can leisurely enjoy the huge spreads while the victim company slowly dilutes itself to death by paying the monthly bills with "real" shares sold at incredibly low levels. Since all of these development-stage corporations have to pay their monthly bills, time becomes on the side of the naked short sellers.
At times it almost seems that the unscrupulous market makers are not actively trying to kill the victim corporation but instead want to milk the situation for as long of a period of time as possible and let the corporation die a slow death by dilution. The reality is that it is extremely easy to strip away 99% of a victim company’s share price or market cap and to keep the victim corporation “boxed“ in the cellar, but it really is difficult to kill a corporation especially after management and the shareholder base have figured out the game that is being played at their expense.
As the weeks and months go by the market makers make a fortune with these huge percentage spreads but the net aggregate naked short positions become astronomical from all of this activity. This leads to some apprehension amongst the co-conspiring MMs. The predicament they find themselves in is that they can’t even stop naked short selling into every buy order that appears because if they do the share price will gap and this will put tremendous pressures on net capital reserves for the MMs and margin maintenance requirements for the co-conspiring hedge funds and others operating out of the more than 13,000 naked short selling margin accounts set up in Canada. And of course covering the naked short position is out of the question since they can’t even stop the day-to-day naked short selling in the first place and you can't be covering at the same time you continue to naked short sell.
What typically happens in these situations is that the victim company has to massively dilute its share structure from the constant paying of the monthly burn rate with money received from the selling of “real†shares at artificially low levels. Then the goal of the naked short sellers is to point out to the investors, usually via paid “Internet bashers†, that with the, let’s say, 50 billion shares currently issued and outstanding, that this lousy company is not worth the $5 million market cap it is trading at, especially if it is just a shell company whose primary business plan was wiped out by the naked short sellers’ tortuous interference earlier on.
The truth of the matter is that the single biggest asset of these victim companies often becomes the astronomically large aggregate naked short position that has accumulated throughout the initial “bear raid†and also during the “cellar boxing†phase. The goal of the victim company now becomes to avoid the 3 main goals of the naked short sellers, namely: bankruptcy, a reverse split, or the forced signing of a death spiral convertible debenture out of desperation. As long as the victim company can continue to pay the monthly burn rate, then the game plan becomes to make some of the strategic moves that hundreds of victim companies have been forced into doing which includes name changes, CUSIP # changes, cancel/reissue procedures, dividend distributions, amending of by-laws and Articles of Corporation, etc. Nevada domiciled companies usually cancel all of their shares in the system, both real and fake, and force shareholders and their b/ds to PROVE the ownership of the old “real†shares before they get a new “real†share. Many also file their civil suits at this time also. This indirect forcing of hundreds of U.S. micro cap corporations to go through all of these extraneous hoops and hurdles as a means to survive, whether it be due to regulatory apathy or lack of resources, is probably one of the biggest black eyes the U.S. financial systems have ever sustained. In a perfect world it would be the regulators that periodically audit the “C†and “D†sub-accounts at the DTCC, the proprietary accounts of the MMs, clearing firms, and Canadian b/ds, and force the buy-in of counterfeit shares, many of which are hiding behind altered CUSIP #s, that are detected above the Rule 11830 guidelines for allowable “failed deliveries†of one half of 1% of the shares issued. U.S. micro cap corporations should not have to periodically “purge†their share structure of counterfeit electronic book entries but if the regulators will not do it then management has a fiduciary duty to do it.
A lot of management teams become overwhelmed with grief and guilt in regards to the huge increase in the number of shares issued and outstanding that have accumulated during their “watch†. The truth however is that as long as management made the proper corporate governance moves throughout this ordeal then a huge number of resultant shares issued and outstanding is unavoidable and often indicative of an astronomically high naked short position and is nothing to be ashamed of. These massive naked short positions need to be looked upon as huge assets that need to be developed. Hopefully the regulators will come to grips with the reality of naked short selling and tactics like "Cellar boxing" and quickly address this fraud that has decimated thousands of U.S. micro cap corporations and the tens of millions of U.S. investors therein.
__________________
All advice from me is guaranteed to be worth at least what you paid for it, or double your money back. All persons dealing with matters of personal finance are advised to gather information from blogs, books, radio and TV, consult with professionals, discuss the matter with anybody who will listen, and then make their own decision.
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DTCC Responds to The Wall Street Journal article, "Blame the 'Stock Vault?'"
New York, NY, July 6, 2007 - The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article "Blame the 'Stock Vault?'" (July 5, 2007) contained a number of omissions and factual errors that misinform readers. DTCC is providing the following information, as it did during lengthy meetings with the reporters, to set the record straight.
1.The WSJ article failed to report DTCC's response to a core premise, i.e., whether we played a role in naked short selling?
As DTCC has explained, short-selling and naked short selling are trading strategies. These trading activities are regulated and policed by the marketplaces/exchanges, the self-regulatory organizations and the SEC. DTCC is involved in post-trade processing, which occurs after a trade is completed. DTCC has no regulatory authority over trading activity or to release information related to trading activity. In fact, as we told the WSJ reporters, we have no power to force the closing of an open fail, no matter what the cause, and we do not have the authority to force a buy-in. And we provided information to the reporters from the SEC, which regulates the clearance and settlement system, so they had the highest credible source on this issue.
While rehashing baseless claims from old lawsuits, the article missed the opportunity to educate readers regarding the role DTCC plays in the capital market system. We process the trading volume from all equity markets in the U.S. (NYSE, Nasdaq, Amex, regional stock exchanges and ECNs), which on a peak trading day can represent over 6 billion shares and $1.5 trillion. Our job is to protect the safety and soundness of the system, by ensuring this trade data is processed, ownership records are changed and financial obligations between trading parties are settled. As for enforcement of the securities laws, however, this is a matter for the governmental regulators and the SROs. DTCC provides the SEC and the markets with data on the results of trading activity, and it is left to them to enforce the law.
As for delivery failures in particular, there are SEC and SRO rules setting forth the responsibilities of brokers. Contrary to the WSJ article, the regulatory authorities do indeed have "mechanisms" to enforce the delivery rules. From the perspective of DTCC, however, in addition to not having enforcement powers, we do not know whether a sale is long or short -- certainly not whether it is "naked."
We can understand that some of our critics and legal adversaries have sought to portray DTCC as a contributor to naked short selling, but as the SEC has said repeatedly on its Web site and in legal filings (http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrfaqregsho1204.htm and http://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/nanopiercesecbrief.pdf), we are not responsible for this issue. The WSJ had this information.
2. The WSJ article said: "The naked shorting debate is a product of the revolution that has occurred in stock trading over the past 40 years."
Not true. The development of automated clearing and settlement processes, while indeed revolutionary and key to the development of the U.S. capital markets, did not create naked short selling. Indeed, failure to deliver shares sold short occurs with paper certificates, and always has.
While the term "naked short selling" may be new, the practice of abusive shorting by failing to deliver is as old as trading itself.
DTCC pointed the WSJ to authoritative academic pieces written on short selling by Yale professor Owen Lamont. His extensive research found short sellers were often proved correct in that shorted companies were non-performers with weak balance sheets and growth. Lamont also documented that typical tactics of these companies included citing naked short selling as the cause of the poor stock performance when, in fact, the cause was almost invariably poor business performance. (http://www.mba.yale.edu/faculty/pdf/overpricing.pdf).
3. The WSJ article said: "Some companies with falling stock prices say it (naked short selling) is rampant and blame DTCC as the keepers of the systems where it happens."
This claim that DTCC is responsible for naked short selling has been expressly rejected by the SEC. Further, as we explained to the WSJ, this claim displays a fundamental misunderstanding of our role in the capital markets. It ignores that naked short selling is a trading strategy and has nothing to do with the post-trade clearance and settlement process. It ignores that we do not know the underlying reasons why trades fail, information that is known only to the broker/dealer. It ignores the fact that DTCC is not the "keepers of the systems where it happens," since this implies DTCC has regulatory authority over trading parties, which by federal statute or federal regulation it does not. It ignores that none of these claims articulated in lawsuits has been successful, and no new case has been filed in more than two years. We think that is adequate evidence to reject any assertion that DTCC is to "blame" for NSS. The fact is the story carried by WSJ on July 5, 2007 is old news presented without proper context, and it grossly underplayed the important steps taken by the SEC this year that have addressed this issue of long-standing fails to deliver.
4. The WSJ article said: "About 99% of the time, trades are completed without incident. But about 1% of the shares -- valued at about $2.5 billion on a given day - aren't delivered to the buyer within the requisite three days, for one reason or another."
The 1% figure represented 1% of the dollar value, not 1% of the trades. In fact, the number of trades that fail (both aged and new fails) amount to about one-tenth of 1% of the daily number of trades, and 80% of the total failed positions (which may include a number of trades) are resolved in two business weeks.
Moreover, the story fails to make clear that the $2.5 billion estimate is an aggregate number; it does not represent the value of each day's fails, but the average value of all outstanding fails on any particular day.
What the WSJ omitted is the sizable amount of daily trading, $350 billion on average in 2006, that does clear and settle in the three-day period.
The WSJ also omitted that it would be impossible with the high volume of trading (over 5 billion shares daily) across equity markets to force all trades to complete in three days. Those seeking a solution would force a return to an earlier period in history, akin to a time when paper stock certificates and payments were exchanged on a trade-for-trade basis. Were this line of argument to be successful, it would bring the robust equity markets in the U.S. to a screeching halt, and destroy our competitiveness with other capital markets around the world.
Lastly, the WSJ incorrectly gives equal weight to the reasons for fails, when the SEC in their Q&A on this issue pointed out that trade failures largely occur due to administrative reasons. The SEC states that a failed trade does not automatically mean there is naked short selling. The lack of proper context by the WSJ is misleading to readers.
5. The WSJ article said: "Critics contend DTCC has turned a blind eye to the naked shorting problem."
Untrue. DTCC has met with a variety of groups, including broker / dealers, marketplace regulators, state regulators and academics, and has communicated with concerned companies, the media, as well as plaintiffs and plaintiffs' counsels on this issue. This effort includes seven hours of meetings and conference calls with the WSJ reporters who wrote this story.
We have shared insights and information in an effort to educate those who were unfamiliar with DTCC's role in clearance and settlement and correct misimpressions of our authority and non-involvement in this issue. We have also rightfully called into question excessive claims and the lack of empirical data to support claims, and pointed to the public filings (e.g., 10K documentation) of why many of these companies were losing money and experiencing declining stock prices.
The WSJ was fully briefed on these issues. We also responded directly to assertions being made by lawyers for companies who have sued DTCC (unsuccessfully), but our response to these accusations were not included in the WSJ article.
As the article did note, DTCC submitted a comment letter to the SEC last September proposing there be greater transparency in providing fails data o the public. Moreover, the SEC has recently indicated their support for our recommendation and expressed a willingness to look at releasing this data. Since the data is confidential to the brokerage firms, we cannot release it. Only the SEC has this authority. Since the WSJ had this information and understood how this process works, we're surprised it would repeat such misleading comments.
6. The WSJ article said: "If the stock in a given transaction isn't delivered in the three-day period, the buyer, who paid his money, is routinely given electronic credit for the stock. While the SEC calls for delivery in three days, the agency has no mechanism to enforce that guideline."
This completely misrepresents how failed trades are handled in DTCC's clearance and settlement systems. In fact, the broker for the buyer does not pay the contractual value for the trade to the clearing system until the stock is delivered, although the broker's customer may be given a security entitlement on the broker's records immediately. That security entitlement is what makes it possible for the markets and investors to buy and sell securities freely throughout the day or over several days. If an investor had to wait until stock was delivered and paid for, they'd have to wait several days to trade that stock again. Imagine an investor buying a stock in the morning, then finding market information being announced mid-day that might adversely impact that stock and then being told you can't sell out your position to minimize the potential loss. Freedom to trade is a cornerstone of our equity markets and a fundamental principle in the regulatory schemes that govern the markets. The SEC has flatly rejected the argument that there are such things as phantom shares or credits being created in the market.
A seller's obligation to deliver securities does not go away. And the broker/dealer who acts as a buyer of securities has a regulatory entitlement and the power -- and, in many cases, an affirmative obligation after a period of time -- to execute a buy-in on a failed delivery to force the seller to fulfill its obligations. In a buy-in, the broker/dealer failing to receive the securities essentially purchases the undelivered stock from some other broker, with the selling broker/dealer who failed to deliver having to absorb any difference in price or other costs incurred on the buy-in. And the SEC or applicable market regulator also has the power, under existing appropriate regulations, to force a fail to be closed. (We note that DTCC, in contrast, does not have any such authority.) So the WSJ is wrong in suggesting that there aren't market and regulatory mechanisms available to enforce delivery obligations. Lastly, to include this assertion without talking about the SEC's elimination of the grandfather clause under Reg SHO is to ignore further steps by our regulators to address concerns about closing long-standing failed trades.
7. The WSJ article said: "Denver-based Nanopierce Technologies Inc. contended that DTCC allowed "sellers to maintain significant open fail to deliver" positions of millions of shares of the semiconductor company's stock for extended periods."
While the WSJ makes reference to the Nanopierce litigation in the context of naked short selling, it fails to note that plaintiffs in that case insist that the case is not about naked short selling, but about how DTCC processes transactions through systems that have been expressly approved by the SEC. This case was dismissed by the original trial judge, but the plaintiffs have kept it alive by a series of appeals. If the WSJ was going to reference this lawsuit, it was incumbent upon it to look into the company's business fundamentals and draw its own conclusions as to why it is selling at 40 cents. The WSJ should have simply stuck with the fact that almost all of these naked short selling cases against DTCC have either been dismissed or filed and then not pursued by plaintiffs.
8. The WSJ article said: "The cost of buying and selling stock has fallen to less than 3.5 cents a share, a tenth of paper-era costs."
First, it is the cost of clearing and settling a trade that had fallen to an average of 3.5 cents and it does not, as the article states, represent the cost of trading. This was the cost per transaction, not per share. It doesn't matter if the trade is for 100 shares or 1,000 shares, each transaction costs the same to clear and settle. In 2007, the average cost of clearing and settling a trade is down to 1.7 cents per side. The earlier figure of 3.5 cents is from 2005. The WSJ did not have access to this latest number, but we did point out that DTCC's costs were the lowest in the world.
9. In the DTCC "By the Numbers" section, The WSJ lists the volume of OTC derivatives transactions processed as $2.6 million.
It is 2.6 million transactions. The notional dollar value of transactions has not been tracked by DTCC, but would probably be in the trillions of dollars. DTCC currently confirms 80%+ of all OTC credit default swap trades in this $18 trillion market.
Once again, the narrow focus of this WSJ article ignores DTCC's 30-year track record of bringing automated solutions that have eliminated risk, brought certainty and safety to the equities and fixed income markets, expanded investor choice for a broad array of mutual funds, mitigated potential crises by insulating the clearance and settlement system from the impact of firm failures, and brought certainty to the OTC credit default swap markets by automating and increasing the confirmation of these trades from 15% to 80% in three years, among many other accomplishments that the article chooses to ignore.
About DTCC
The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC), through its subsidiaries, provides clearance, settlement and information services for equities, corporate and municipal bonds, government and mortgage-backed securities and over-the-counter derivatives. In addition, DTCC is a leading processor of mutual funds and insurance transactions, linking funds and carriers with their distribution networks. DTCC's depository provides custody and asset servicing for 2.8 million securities issues from the United States and 100 other countries and territories, valued at $36 trillion. Last year, DTCC settled more than $1.5 quadrillion in securities transactions. DTCC has operating facilities in multiple locations in the United States and overseas. For more information on DTCC, visit www.dtcc.com.
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AlanC Share Wednesday, October 13, 2010 8:31:52 AM
Re: Rocket Man post# 163906 Post # of 163913
Morning FFGO longs! Credit to Lugemeister for this information:
Tuesday, April 28, 2009
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*****WHAT IS NAKED SHORT SELLING?*****
by Eric deCarbonnel
What is Naked Short Selling?
Naked short selling (naked shorting) refers to the practice of selling a stock short without first either Borrowing the shares or Making an "affirmative determination" that the shares can be borrowed.
In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued "Regulation SHO" in an effort to curb abusive naked shorting. Many other countries and trading markets have developed similar regulations.
The Problem
Short selling is a bet that a stock price will decline. A short seller borrows stock and then sells it, hoping to buy back the same amount of stock later, at a lower price, for return to the lender. Short selling is legal.
Naked short selling involves selling stock without first borrowing (or sometimes even locating) the stock [naked short selling = selling imaginary stocks (with the assumption of borrowing stock later to make it real)]. If a naked short seller does not borrow the stock he sold, he will be unable to deliver that stock to the buyer to close the transaction. This is called a “failure to deliver†(FTD) [When a brokerage “fails to deliver†, the imaginary stock ends up staying imaginary, possibly for years]. Naked short selling is generally illegal, though market makers are allowed to temporarily naked short for the sake of bona fide market making. FTDs are always illegal when delivery failure exceeds 13 days.
Exchanges do not disclose whether short sales are naked and supply no information on FTDs. Even worse, in transactions where shares are not delivered, brokerages issue stock IOUs called “share entitlements [This is a nightmare waiting to happen].†Retail customers’ account statements do not distinguish between real shares and share entitlements. [brokerages are adding counterparty risks to their clients stock purchases without their knowledge. This is fraud.]
FTDs create phantom shares that circulate in the system as real shares. Just as counterfeit currency dilutes and destroys value, phantom shares deflate share prices by flooding the market with false supply.
Some short sellers use naked shorting and oversupply of phantom shares to manipulate stock prices downward. Because regulations are loose and enforcement lax, they are unafraid of failing to deliver.
Customers holding phantom shares can, and often do, re-sell those phantom shares as if they were real. Subsequent purchasers do not receive real shares; instead they receive only share entitlements. Phantom shares sold by naked short sellers are thus laundered in the market by subsequent transactions in which share entitlements come to resemble (but cannot become) real shares of stock.
FTDs threaten market integrity in at least three ways
The corporate voting system is undermined by chronic over-voting. The circulation of FTDs leads to more ownership than there are shares to own. As a result, brokers and transfer agents routinely mail out and receive back more proxy votes than there are shares to vote. [As actual data is unavailable, this massive over-voting is the best evidence/proof that naked short selling problem.]
Companies and shareholder value are destroyed
Market integrity is threatened. Large brokerage firms and hedge funds often use leverage to build naked short positions, a strategy that poses systemic risk to financial markets.
What little is publicly known about FTDs is available as a result of Regulation SHO, implemented by the SEC in January, 2005, in order to curb abusive naked short selling and reduce FTDs. Regulation SHO requires exchanges (e.g., NYSE and NASDAQ) to publish daily a list of firms with FTDs above a calculated threshold. That list is known as the Regulation SHO Threshold List.
Since Regulation SHO was enacted two years ago, 4,512 companies have appeared on the Threshold List. According to a recent Office of Economic Analysis report, 6,223 securities have graduated from the Threshold List, meaning thousands of companies have been on the Threshold List more than once. Curiously, Regulation SHO only reports victim companies; there is no disclosure of either the amount of FTDs or of the institutions who fail to deliver. The size of past (but not current) FTDs can only be obtained through petition to the SEC’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) office.
Neither the SEC nor the exchanges will disclose the names of the institutions failing to deliver, even through FOIA petition, as “fails statistics of individual firms…is proprietary information and may reflect firms’ trading strategies.†[These “trading strategies†involve blatant fraud. Therefore releasing “fails statistics of individual firms†would obvious affect these “trading strategiesâ€
Regulation SHO “grandfathered†FTDs older than January 2005 and new FTDs prior to an issuer’s appearance on the Threshold List, thus pardoning sales for which money was paid but no stock delivered. [Since FTDs older than January 2005 have been “grandfathered†, they are excluded from all the data disclosed by Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC)]
While publicly downplaying the issue, the SEC has quietly admitted to adopting the grandfather clause because of concern about “creating volatility where there were large pre-existing open positions.†[As with gold (and other commodities), brokerages have over the years slowly build up a massive short position in the US stock market. Making them unwind these short positions would cause the US financial system to collapse.]
Scholars have shown that many FTDs are strategic—that is, used to manipulate prices.
Large U.S. brokerages collectively own and operate the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC). The DTCC operates with little SEC oversight and consistently denies the existence of a systemic problem while simultaneously fighting public disclosure of even minimal FTD data.
What little data the DTCC does disclose is misleading. For example, the DTCC claims failed trades sum to $6 billion daily, or 1.5% of the dollar volume.
The true magnitude of FTDs is obscured by Continuous Net Settlement (CNS), which nets failures against shares held by brokers. The DTCC asserts that CNS has “eliminated the need to settle 96% of total obligations.†If the DTCC processes $400 billion in trades daily as claimed, then $384 billion are netted out and only $16 billion require delivery. Thus, the $6 billion in FTDs that exist on any given day is 37.5% of the trades that require delivery—twenty-five times the 1.5% reported by the DTCC.
The statistics above ignore “ex-clearing†—that is, trades cleared directly by brokers bypassing the DTCC. Some scholars believe that “fails occurring through ex-clearing may elude the [reporting] requirements of Regulation SHO.†FTDs in ex-clearing may be four times as great as quantities discussed above. The DTCC’s Stock Borrow Program (SBP) adds additional mystery to the situation.
My reaction: Regulators have allowed US brokerages to turned the stock market into a Ponzi scheme.
1) Brokerages are allowed to sell imaginary stocks to investors, with the assumption of replacing them with real shares later.
2) When brokerages “fail to deliver†and replace imaginary shares with real ones, these brokerages issue stock IOUs called "share entitlements.â€
3) Exchanges do not disclose whether short sales are naked and supply no information on FTDs.
4) Retail customers' account statements do not distinguish between real shares and share entitlements.
5) Share entitlements created by FTDs circulate in the system as real shares, flooding the market with false supply. Companies and shareholder value are destroyed.
6) Large US brokerages collectively own and operate the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC). The DTCC is the primary vehicle for enabling naked short selling.
7) What little information available about FTDs comes from the DTCC, and these discloses are misleading:
A) FTDs older than January 2005 have been "grandfathered" and are excluded from DTCC disclosures.
B) Continuous Net Settlement (CNS), which nets failures against shares held by brokers and obscures the true magnitude of FTDs.
C) DTCC statistics ignore "ex-clearing†data (trades cleared directly by brokers bypassing the DTCC).
D) The DTCC's Stock Borrow Program (SBP), which allows brokers to borrow nonexistent shares, reducing FTDs.
8) Widespread, chronic over-voting offers the most telling evidence of the “stock IOUs†floating around the financial system.
Conclusion: While I am disgusted that brokerages use naked short selling to manipulate the stock market, it is not what worries me about naked short selling. The two issues I have with naked short selling are:
1) “Share entitlements†creates a counterparty risk that investors are completely oblivious to. For example, lets an investor named Jon is worried about the dollar collapse, and, to protect himself he buys $500,000 of gold mining stocks through JPMorgan. Jon relaxes, thinking his investment in gold stocks will protect him from a currency collapses. However, when the dollar does collapse, JPMorgan goes under, and Jon finds out he actually owns 500,000 of “share entitlements†to gold mining stocks, not the stocks themselves. This makes him a general creditor in JPMorgan’s bankruptcy. Months later, after much litigation, Jon is able to recover $100,000 of his initially investment. Unfortunately for Jon, the dollar has already lost so much money that this 100,000 won’t even buy a pack of gum.
While this is an extreme example, it illustrates how naked short selling has added counterparty risks to owning stocks.
2) Brokerages are selling billions, if not trillions, of imaginary assets. These imaginary stocks sales (and associated fees) are responsible for a large portion of the financial “profits†used to justify huge banker bonuses. The proceeds from these imaginary stocks sales also help pay these huge bonuses or any other purpose these institutions see fit. This is simply ridiculous: the sale of imaginary assets can't be the basis of a viable financial system.
Brokerages are supposed to be middle men for their clients. When investors turn over cash for the purchase of a stock, brokerages are supposed to use this money to secure the actual share. Instead of doing so, brokerages are putting “stock IOUs†into their clients account instead. This is even worse than the deposit reclassification scheme banks use with their client’s checking account.
Final note: See why I like physical gold now? In a financial system overflowing with “imaginary shares†and “stock IOUs†, owning any asset via a brokerage firm, even a regular stock share, has counterparty risks.
BMFL<OD
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10-35 SEC Approval and Effective Date for New Consolidated FINRA Rule; Effective Date: October 15, 2010
View PDF
SEC Approves New Consolidated FINRA Rule
Regulatory Notice
Notice Type
Consolidated Rulebook
Rule Approval Referenced Rules & Notices
FINRA Rule 4320
Information Notice 03/12/08
Information Notice 10/06/08
Regulatory Notice 08-57
Regulation SHO
Suggested Routing
Compliance
Legal
Operations
Senior Management
Trading and Market Making Key Topics
Short Sale Delivery
Short Sales
Executive Summary
Following the consolidation of NASD and the member regulation, enforcement and arbitration functions of NYSE Regulation into FINRA, FINRA established a process to develop a new consolidated rulebook (Consolidated FINRA Rulebook), which FINRA has discussed in previous Information Notices.1 FINRA is proposing new consolidated rules in phases for approval by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as part of the Consolidated FINRA Rulebook.2 In June and July, the SEC approved five new consolidated FINRA Rules.3 This Regulatory Notice specifically addresses the approval and effective date of new FINRA Rule 4320 (Short Sale Delivery Requirements).4
Text of new FINRA Rule 4320 is available in the online FINRA Manual at www.finra.org/finramanual/rules/r4320.5
Questions regarding this Notice should be directed to Racquel Russell, Assistant General Counsel, Office of General Counsel, at (202) 728-8363.
Background & Discussion
On July 20, 2010, the SEC approved a FINRA proposed rule change to adopt NASD Rule 3210, with minor changes, as FINRA Rule 4320 in the Consolidated FINRA Rulebook.6 FINRA Rule 4320 applies short sale delivery requirements to equity securities not otherwise covered by the close-out requirements of Regulation SHO.7 Among other things, FINRA Rule 4320 requires participants of registered clearing agencies to take action on failures to deliver that exist for 13 consecutive settlement days in certain non-reporting securities. In addition, if the fail to deliver position is not closed out in the requisite time period, a participant of a registered clearing agency or any broker-dealer for which it clears transactions is prohibited from effecting further short sales in the particular specified security without borrowing, or entering into a bona fide arrangement to borrow, the security until the fail to deliver position is closed out.8
With a few exceptions, new FINRA Rule 4320 is identical to former NASD Rule 3210, and the changes made to the text do not alter the operation and application of the rule. For example, the new FINRA rule omits language that provided allowances for "grandfathered" securities during the initial implementation period of NASD Rule 3210 which no longer is relevant. In addition, FINRA Rule 4320 clarifies, consistent with Regulation SHO, the borrowing requirements for clearing agency participants—including broker-dealers for which they clear transactions—that sell short non-reporting threshold securities for which a fail to deliver position has not been closed out in the requisite time.9
In addition, FINRA will apply to FINRA Rule 4320 all interpretive positions issued by the SEC and its staff with respect to the parallel provisions of Regulation SHO (i.e., Rule 203(b)(3) of Regulation SHO), as was the case with NASD Rule 3210. Therefore, FINRA continues to expect firms to observe all interpretive views issued by the SEC and its staff with respect to Rule 203(b)(3) and apply such positions to FINRA Rule 4320.10
Rule Conversion Charts
As discussed in additional detail in Information Notice 10/06/08 and Regulatory Notice 08-57, FINRA has posted three Rule Conversion Charts on its website to help firms become familiar with the new rules and show how the new rules relate to the NASD and/or Incorporated NYSE Rules in the Transitional Rulebook that they will replace.
Firms should be aware that the charts are intended as a reference aid only. FINRA reminds firms that the charts do not in any way serve as a substitute for diligent review of the relevant new rule language. The Rule Conversion Charts are located at www.finra.org/ruleconversionchart.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 See Information Notice 10/06/08 (Rulebook Consolidation Process: Effective Dates of New Consolidated Rules; Introduction of Rule Conversion Chart); see also Information Notice 03/12/08 (Rulebook Consolidation Process).
2 The current FINRA rulebook consists of (1) FINRA Rules; (2) NASD Rules; and (3) rules incorporated from NYSE (Incorporated NYSE Rules) (together the NASD Rules and Incorporated NYSE Rules are referred to as the Transitional Rulebook). While the NASD Rules generally apply to all FINRA member firms, the Incorporated NYSE Rules apply only to those members of FINRA that are also members of the NYSE (Dual Members). The new FINRA Rules apply to all member firms, unless such rules have a more limited application by their terms. As the Consolidated FINRA Rulebook expands with the SEC's approval and with the new FINRA Rules taking effect, the rules in the Transitional Rulebook that address the same subject matter of regulation will be eliminated. When the Consolidated FINRA Rulebook is completed, the Transitional Rulebook will have been eliminated in its entirety.
3 In July 2010, the SEC approved three FINRA proposed rule changes to adopt five new rules in the Consolidated FINRA Rulebook. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62482 (July 12, 2010), 75 FR 41562 (July 16, 2010) (SR-FINRA-2010-024); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62533 (July 20, 2010), 75 FR 43588 (July 26, 2010) (SR-FINRA-2010-028); and Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62539 (July 21, 2010), 75 FR 44033 (July 27, 2010) (SR-FINRA-2010-029).
4 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62533 (July 20, 2010), 75 FR 43588 (July 26, 2010) (SR-FINRA-2010-028). FINRA will issue separate Regulatory Notices announcing the effective dates of the approved rules set forth in SR-FINRA-2010-024 and SR-FINRA-2010-029. See supra note 3.
5 FINRA updates the rule text on its online Manual within two business days of SEC approval of changes to the rule text.
6 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62533 (July 20, 2010), 75 FR 43588 (July 26, 2010) (SR-FINRA-2010-028).
7 The Regulation SHO close-out requirements apply only to "reporting" securities (i.e., issuers that are registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act or that are required to file reports pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act).
8 In July 2009, the SEC adopted Rule 204 under Regulation SHO as a permanent rule. This rule is intended to further the goal of reducing fails to deliver and addressing potentially abusive "naked" short selling in all equity securities by requiring the delivery of securities by settlement date or, in connection with a short sale, the immediate purchase or borrow of such securities to close out the fail to deliver position by no later than the beginning of regular trading hours on the following settlement day.
Notwithstanding the SEC's adoption of Rule 204, the provisions of NASD Rule 3210 continue to be necessary to provide regulatory coverage for fails to deliver in non-reporting over-the-counter equity securities that pre-exist the SEC's implementation of temporary Rule 204 in September 2008. Thus, FINRA has adopted NASD Rule 3210 with minor changes as FINRA Rule 4320.
9 Specifically, if a fail to deliver position is not closed out in accordance with FINRA Rule 4320(a), the clearing agency participant and any broker-dealer for which it clears, including market makers otherwise entitled to rely on the Rule 203(b)(2)(iii) exception of Regulation SHO, would not be able to short sell the non-reporting threshold security either for itself or for the account of another, unless it has previously arranged to borrow or borrowed the security, until the participant closes out the fail to deliver position by purchasing securities of like kind and quantity and that purchase has cleared and settled at a registered clearing agency.
10 For example, with respect to the requirement that participants "immediately" close out a fail to deliver position by purchasing securities of like kind and quantity, the SEC has clarified that "immediately" should be interpreted to mean that close out is required no later than the morning of the fourteenth business day. Likewise FINRA expects that, under FINRA Rule 4320, firms "immediately" close out fail to deliver positions no later than the morning of the fourteenth business day.
4320. Short Sale Delivery Requirements
This version of the rule (or interpretive material) does not become effective until Oct 15 2010.
This rule was introduced with the filing of SR-FINRA-2010-028, which has been approved by the SEC. This rule becomes effective on October 15, 2010.
(a) If a participant of a registered clearing agency has a fail to deliver position at a registered clearing agency in a non-reporting threshold security for 13 consecutive settlement days, the participant shall immediately thereafter close out the fail to deliver position by purchasing securities of like kind and quantity.
(1) Provided, however, if a participant of a registered clearing agency has a fail to deliver position at a registered clearing agency for thirty-five consecutive settlement days in a non-reporting threshold security that was sold pursuant to SEC Rule 144, the participant shall immediately thereafter close out the fail to deliver position in the security by purchasing securities of like kind and quantity. The requirements in paragraph (b) shall apply to all such fails to deliver that are not closed out in conformance with this paragraph (a)(1).
(b) If a participant of a registered clearing agency has a fail to deliver position at a registered clearing agency in a non-reporting threshold security for 13 consecutive settlement days (or 35 consecutive settlement days if entitled to rely on paragraph (a)(1)), the participant and any broker or dealer for which it clears transactions, including any market maker that would otherwise be entitled to rely on the exception provided in paragraph (b)(2)(iii) of Rule 203 of SEC Regulation SHO, may not accept a short sale order in the non-reporting threshold security from another person, or effect a short sale in the non-reporting threshold security for its own account, without borrowing the security or entering into a bona-fide arrangement to borrow the security, until the participant closes out the fail to deliver position by purchasing securities of like kind and quantity and that purchase has cleared and settled at a registered clearing agency.
(c) If a participant of a registered clearing agency reasonably allocates a portion of a fail to deliver position to another registered broker or dealer for which it clears trades or for which it is responsible for settlement, based on such broker or dealer's short position, then the provisions of this Rule relating to such fail to deliver position shall apply to the portion of the fail to deliver position allocated to such registered broker or dealer, and not to the participant.
(d) A participant of a registered clearing agency shall not be deemed to have fulfilled the requirements of this Rule where the participant enters into an arrangement with another person to purchase securities as required by this Rule, and the participant knows or has reason to know that the other person will not deliver securities in settlement of the purchase.
(e) For the purposes of this Rule, the following terms shall have the meanings below:
(1) the term “market maker†has the same meaning as in Section 3(a)(38) of the Exchange Act.
(2) the term “non-reporting threshold security†means any equity security of an issuer that is not registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act and for which the issuer is not required to file reports pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act:
(A) for which there is an aggregate fail to deliver position for five consecutive settlement days at a registered clearing agency of 10,000 shares or more and for which on each settlement day during the five consecutive settlement day period, the reported last sale during normal market hours for the security on that settlement day that would value the aggregate fail to deliver position at $50,000 or more, provided that if there is no reported last sale on a particular settlement day, then the price used to value the position on such settlement day would be the previously reported last sale; and
(B) is included on a list published by FINRA.
A security shall cease to be a non-reporting threshold security if the aggregate fail to deliver position at a registered clearing agency does not meet or exceed either of the threshold tests specified in paragraph (e)(2)(A) of this Rule for five consecutive settlement days.
(3) the term “participant†means a participant as defined in Section 3(a)(24) of the Exchange Act, that is a FINRA member.
(4) the term “registered clearing agency†means a clearing agency, as defined in Section 3(a)(23)(A) of the Exchange Act, that is registered with the SEC pursuant to Section 17A of the Exchange Act.
(5) the term “settlement day†means any business day on which deliveries of securities and payments of money may be made through the facilities of a registered clearing agency.
(f) Pursuant to the Rule 9600 Series, the staff, for good cause shown after taking into consideration all relevant factors, may grant an exemption from the provisions of this Rule, either unconditionally or on specified terms and conditions, to any transaction or class of transactions, or to any security or class of securities, or to any person or class of persons, if such exemption is consistent with the protection of investors and the public interest.
BMFL<OD
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Bike Share Friday, October 15, 2010 9:40:58 AM
Re: None Post # of 164104
FFGO ,, thanks 4kids!!
SHORT & DISTORT
another interesting read
The Short And Distort: Stock Manipulation In A Bear Market
by Rick Wayman (Contact Author | Biography)
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Filed Under: Recession, Short Selling, Stocks
A less-publicized and more-sinister version of short selling can take place on Wall Street. It's called "short and distort" (S&D).
Nothing is inherently wrong with short selling, which is permissible under the regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). However, the S&D type of short seller uses misinformation and a bear market to manipulate stocks. S&D is as illegal as the pump and dump, but is mainly used in a bear market. It is important for investors to be aware of the dangers and to know how to protect themselves.
Shorters' Actions Can Promote a Healthy Market
Short selling is the practice of selling borrowed stock in the hope that the stock price will soon fall, allowing the short seller to buy it back for a profit. The SEC has made it a legal activity for several good reasons. First, it provides the markets with more information. Shorters (traders who practice selling short for a living) often complete extensive and legitimate due diligence to discover facts and flaws that support their suspicion that the target company is overvalued. Because most shorters are scrupulous and ethical, their actions are conducive to the health of the market. Finally, short selling also provides investors who own the stock (with "long" positions) with the ability to generate extra income by lending their shares to the shorts. (For background reading, see the Short Selling tutorial.)
S&D Traders Manipulate Stock Prices With Smear Campaigns
On the other hand, S&D traders manipulate stock prices in a bear market by taking short positions and then using a smear campaign to drive down the price of the targeted stock. This is the inverse version of the "pump and dump" tactic, whereby crooks buy stock (take a long position) and issue false information that causes the target stock's price to increase.
Generally, it is easier to manipulate stocks to go down in a bear market and up in a bull market. The pump and dump is better known than the S&D because of the long bull market and the media. For example, the stock market had been in a general uptrend in the early to mid 1980s, which provided ample fodder for "pumpers". Movies like "Wall Street" (1987) and "The Boiler Room"(2000) helped educate investors about the risk of this type of stock manipulation. (To read more about stock market movies, see Financial Careers According To Hollywood.)
The S&D shysters try to profit by stimulating fear, but this only works if they have credibility. As such, when working online they will often use screen names and email addresses that imply that they are associated with the SEC or the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) (formerly the National Association of Securities Dealers), or that they can regularly spot worthless stocks. Their goal is to convince investors that every proponent of the stock has ties to the company and that the SEC is watching and will halt the stock. S&Ds also intimate that they are looking out for investors' interests.
S&D players clutter message boards, so optimistic information cannot easily be found. "Get out before it all comes crashing down" and "Investors who wish to enter a class action lawsuit can contact…" are typical posts, as are their projections of $0 stock prices and 100% losses. If their strategy is suspected by "longs", they attack the person who has caught them. In other words, the market manipulator will do everything in his or her power to keep buyers out of the stock and keep the price heading south.
The Net Effect
When the short and distort maneuver succeeds, investors who initially bought stock at higher prices sell at low prices because of their mistaken belief that the stock is worthless, caused by an effective distortion campaign. At the same time, the S&Ds cover at low prices and lock in their gains.
Right after prominent bankruptcies such as Enron in 2001 or Nortel in 2009, investors could be more susceptible to this type of manipulation than during prosperous periods such as the 1990s in the U.S. During downturns, the first appearance of impropriety could cause investors to run for the hills much easier. As a result, many innocent, legitimate and growing companies could get burned, and investors along with them. (To learn about how you can profit when everyone else is heading for cover, read Profit From Panic Selling.)
How to Identify and Prevent S&D
Do not believe everything you read - verify the facts.
Do your own due diligence and discuss it with your broker.
Hypothecate your stock - take it out of its street name to prevent the short sellers from borrowing and selling it. (Learn more about doing your own due diligence in our related article, Due Diligence In 10 Easy Steps)
The best way to protect yourself is to do your own research. Many stocks with great potential are ignored by Wall Street. By doing your own homework you should feel much more secure in your decisions. And, even if the S&Ds attack your stock, you will be better able to detect their distortions and be less likely to fall prey to them by selling the stock at a loss.
How To Identify Good Research
Ask yourself these questions to spot the key characteristics of a good research report:
1. Is There a Disclaimer?
The SEC requires that everyone providing investment information or advice fully disclose the nature of the relationship between the information provider (the research analyst) and the company that is the subject of the report. If there is no disclaimer, investors should disregard the report. (For related reading on disclosures, see Disclosures: The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly.)
2. What Is the Nature of the Relationship?
Investors can get good information from pieces published by investor relations firms, brokerage houses and independent research companies. Using all of these sources will provide information and perspectives that can help you make better investing decisions. However, you need to evaluate their conclusions in light of the compensation (if any) that the information provider received for the report.
Can a Wall Street analyst who is even partially compensated by trading generated by the report be more objective than a fee-based research firm that is paid a flat monthly rate with no "performance" bonus? The answer to this question is left for each investor to decide, but both reports are available to use for evaluating a potential investment. The nature of the compensation will provide information to help you evaluate a report's objectivity.
3. Is the Author Identified and Contact Information Provided?
Generally speaking, if the author's name and contact information are on the report, it is a good sign because it shows that the author is proud of the report, and provides investors with a way to contact the author for additional information.
Research reports from legitimate brokerage firms post the author's name and contact information near the top of the front page. If the author's name is not given, investors should be very skeptical of the report's contents.
4. What Are the Author's Credentials?
Letters after a name do not necessarily mean that the author of the report is a better analyst, but they do indicate that the analyst has undertaken additional studies to expand his or her knowledge of finance and investing. (For more insight, see The Alphabet Soup Of Financial Certifications.)
5. How Does the Report Read?
If the report contains grandiose words and exclamation points, beware. This not to say that good analysts are boring, but good reports don't read like the National Enquirer. A reputable analyst would never use exaggerations like "sure things" or "rockets", and would never suggest that you mortgage your home to buy a stock.
Objective research reports provide reasoned arguments to buy or sell a stock. Key factors such as management expertise, competitive advantages and cash flows are cited as evidence to support the recommendation. (For more insight, read Research Report Red Flags.)
6. Is There an Earnings Model and Target Price With Reasonable Assumptions?
The bottom line for any recommendation is the earnings model and target price. The assumptions upon which the earnings model is based should be clearly stated so the reader can evaluate whether the assumptions are reasonable. The target price should be based on valuation metrics - such as the price-to-earnings (P/E) or price-to-book (P/B) ratio - that are also based on reasonable assumptions. If a report lacks these details, it is generally safe to assume that the report lacks a sound basis, and should be ignored.(For more details about analyzing ratios, see the Financial Ratio Tutorial.)
7. Is There Ongoing Research Coverage?
A commitment to providing ongoing research coverage (at least one report per quarter for at least one year) indicates that there is a solid belief in the company's fundamental strengths. It takes a lot of resources to provide this type of coverage, so a firm providing ongoing coverage is a sign that it legitimately believes in the long-term potential of a stock.
This contrasts with one-time reports that are used to manipulate stocks. In these cases, supposed research firms will suddenly issue "reports" on stocks they have never reported on before. Generally, these reports can be identified as an attempt at stock manipulation because they will not contain the attributes of a legitimate research report (discussed above).
The Bottom Line
Unscrupulous short and distort tactics can leave investors holding the bag. Fortunately, high-quality stock reports are relatively easy to spot, and needn't be confused with stock manipulators' dramatic claims. Keep your cool when analyzing a stock, and avoid getting caught up in online hype. By analyzing potential investments carefully and objectively, you can protect yourself from falling prey to S&D players - and make better stock picks overall.
--
4kids
all jmo
BMFL<OD
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fourkids_9pets Share Wednesday, October 20, 2010 3:06:25 PM
Re: None Post # of 453
Retiring CFTC Judge: We Covered Up Market Manipulation
Check this out.....
The Daily Bell
Wednesday, October 20, 2010
by Staff Report
[Suppressed Image]
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CFTC SCANDAL: On September 17, 2010, CFTC Administrative Law Judge, George H Painter, issued a "Notice and Order" announcing his retirement from his position. In this notice Judge Painter wrote of a conspiracy at the highest levels of the CFTC (within the ENFORCEMENT DIVISION) where a long time judge of 20 years has been conspiring with past CFTC Chairs to RIG THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW by NOT finding ANYONE guilty of market manipulation. Here are Judge Painter's own words:
"There are two administrative law judges at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission: myself and the Honorable Bruce Levine. On Judge Levine's first week on the job, nearly twenty years ago, he came into my office and stated that he had promised Wendy Gramm, then Chairwoman of the Commission, that we would never rule in a complainant's favor. A review of his rulings will confirm that he has fulfilled his vow. Judge Levine, in the cynical guise of enforcing the rules, forces pro se complaints to run a hostile procedural gauntlet until they lose hope, and either withdraw their complaint or settle for a pittance, regardless of the merits of the case"
A copy of Judge Painter's letter can be found below with a stamp proving that it was received and filed by the CFTC on October 13, 2010. – RoadtoRoota
Dominant Social Theme: Please don't look at the man behind the curtain.
Free-Market Analysis: We are well aware of the corruption that inevitably arises when regulatory democracies persist and like tumors begin to swell. The United States is perhaps the world's most powerful regulatory democracy, and likely its most icily corrupt. Nevertheless, it is absolutely startling to find a senior judge (see article excerpt above) at one of America's most important financial regulatory agencies – the Commodities Futures Trading Commission – bluntly accusing a former CFTC Chairwoman (Wendy Gramm, wife of former Senator Phil Gramm) and a fellow judge of deliberate malfeasance, apparently over decades. Sub dominant social theme: "This kind of thing doesn't happen in the US!"
OK, rewind. It has been kind of ironic to watch the US mainstream media wring its collective hands over the "corruption" in Afghanistan as if the US itself, and its deliberately corrupt system of regulatory democracy, were not worse by orders of magnitude than anything Afghanistan could summon. The three most corrupt places in the world are probably Beijing, Brussels and Washington DC in no particular order. We'll throw in London as a fourth. And Moscow as fifth. And, wait, there's India, too. We probably could go on and on. Is there a pattern here, dear reader?
The corruption of the West's regulatory democracies began after the American Civil War and grew far worse in the early 21st century once the Federal Reserve was founded. The corruption was driven by a familial elite of Western power players, mostly banking families that wanted to install one-world government. They intended to do so incrementally using regulatory democracy as a Trojan Horse. Thus the West's institutions were imperceptibly corrupted over time and almost every aspect of Western culture and commerce was tainted as well. (my bolding for emphasis)
Once the money spigot had been turned on via the Federal Reserve, many other central banks began to form around the world. At the same time, after World War I, the first effort to create a global government was made with the League of Nations. When that collapsed, it can be seen that the elite tried again almost immediately with the United Nations after World War II. The two world wars militarized the West, especially America. Central banking began to distort the West's economies and gold was in a sense demonetized. World government was initiated with the empowerment of the IMF, the World Bank and the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland, which enjoys total immunity from prosecution around the world. What a deal – a modern day Vatican! The seeds for the EU were conveniently planted as well during this time.
Much of the rest of the 20th century was subsumed by the "cold war" between the Soviet Union and the West, and thus the militarization of the West, especially the US, continued apace. The USSR was in fact midwife to the endless expanson of the Anglo-American military-industrial complex and provided a convenient justification for even the most outrageous goverenment manpulations. Anything, seemingly, could be justified on national security grounds, and the most outrageous and violent violations of public trust were apparently initiated and boldly concluded.
There is, for instance, considerable uncertainty (as we have been exploring) as to whether the NASA flights to the moon were genuine. Operation Gladio, which the CIA operated in Europe, set up violent Marxist cells with an eye toward pushing Europe rightward in response. In America, the CIA and FBI apparently facilitated the Hippie movement with a similar idea – to confuse the baby-boomers about their constitutional heritage and generally to fracture civil society via drug-taking, radical socialism and vitriolic feminism.
At the same time in both Europe and America, most major civil and industrial institutions were being corrupted by the money spigot of central banking. Every few years a boom would turn into a bust as waves of paper currency washed ruinously over national economies around the world. The results were always the same: Increased governmental involvement in private industry and the further consolidation of private industry under corporate control. Public unions were empowered, public health care became ubiquitous in the West, public education expanded with merciless incompetence and vast regulatory apparatuses were set up to compensate for the lack of market competition.
The end result of all of this is a Western "capitalist" system that has little or no marketplace governor. The entire mechanism has been reborn as a public enterprise beholden to the elite. Teacher, lawyer, educator, accountant, doctor or military person – all are entangled in a quasi-public system beholden to government at almost every level (and many are aware of their unwitting complicity, even if they can't verbalize it). For those who seek to survive outside of the system, there are various intelligence agencies and other adversarial governmental institutions manufactured to make life difficult. The graduated income tax is yet another form of entrepreneurial control.
Competition has been drained away, replaced by regulatory democracy. Yet regulation cannot substitute for competition. Regulation is merely an excuse for the powers-that-be to operate behind-the-scenes without fear of confrontation. Create a society that removes competition and substitutes government watchdogs and it is easy for the powers-that-be to engage in whatever manipulations they wish via mercantilism.
Regulators are always subject to "regulatory capture" by the biggest private players. Thus, regulation never provides "fairness" but only continually raises the barriers to entry for all but the largest firms that can afford the fines and penalties. The regulators themselves are bought off. Lucrative jobs in the private sector await those regulators who make friends with those they are supposed to regulate. Regulatory democracy enshrines corruption throughout society. It substitutes mandates of man for competitive discipline and marketplace competition.
All regulatory agencies within modern Western democracies are corrupt. Laws are written to exempt the powerful and criminalize what was previously seen as respectable business practice. At the higher levels of regulatory democracies, those who enforce the "laws" are well aware of the system's basic corruption. None of it is intended to facilitate fairness; it has been constructed to ease the path of mercantilism for the most powerful.
One could say in fact that agencies like the tremendously inept SEC and CFTC are merely gatekeepers of the status quo. They have been put in place to give the public the sense that big financial players and banks are being "watched." In fact, as we can see from the letter written by Judge Painter, the CFTC in particular (but one could substitute almost any agency) are created not to impede business-as-usual but to enhance and it and protect it. That business-as-usual, of course, has to do with facilitating the power elite's stranglehold over wealth and power.
This is the reason, in fact, for market manipulations, mostly aimed (unsuccessfully these days) at damping the value of money metals (gold and silver) in favor of paper currencies that the elite itself can control and print through central banks. Entrepreneurs attempting to build gold and silver based mining companies are often targets as well, of this we are all too aware. The "silver lining" to all of this, if there is one, is that the truth-telling of the Internet has thoroughly upset the artificial construct – the all-encompassing monetary and professional matrix – that the elite created through money power in the 21st century. As we have written before, there is nothing more powerful than an idea whose time has come.
Conclusion: Lately, we have suggested that the West must return to private justice and common law – and in fact we expect this may be a natural process of changing times. The infinite corruption of the West's judicial processes will certainly come under scrutiny as the Internet helps reveal the dysfunction, generally, of Western regulatory democracy. Economic, political and judicial practices are part of the larger disintegration. Tug on one thread to unravel all.
http://www.thedailybell.com/1461/Retiring-CFTC-Judge-We-Covered-Up-Market-Manipulation.html
--
original post courtesy of basserdan
--
4kids
all jmo
BMFL<OD
next week(s) is here
Last edited by Bull Finch (2010-10-21 17:05:56)
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fourkids_9pets Share Thursday, October 21, 2010 9:06:18 AM
Re: janice shell post# 440 Post # of 453
why is their wells notice going to finally be disclosed?
--
that is the rumor out there anyway and *perhaps* why their stock
dropped like a rock last october .. how *odd* that wells notices
aren't required to be disclosed by the company/mgmt .. hmm
especially since we all know what .. er .. damage .. *rumors*
can do via today's technology :0
i just view the morons at the sec and dtcc
as in cahoots with the biggest pos on the OTC
that exists .. and as we head 3rd world with
one of the most corrupt entities on the planet
the SEC will finally have to take a good look
at themselves and a system so toxic .. unless
completely *revamped* there will never again
be *investor* confidence in their bs again *imo*
funny how *NITE* (who like other pc's of crap)
felt the *urge* to change out their ticker from
the well known *NITE* to KCG .. as if they could
fool anyone with that *event*
and now they too do what others do *whine 24/7*
as their *possible* illegal actions may finally
be held accountable :0
i've said to the sec .. how many 1000s of complaints
does it take to get more than a slap on the wrist for NITE?
as their MM is allowed to consistently block on the bid and
ask? edit>>> they don't make a market .. they manipulate it
needless to say .. the SEC silence is deafening but is that
really too surprising? nah .. anyone done a study as to where
exactly sec's employees head off to *work* after they've done
their bit at the sec?
hmmm
wouldn't it be interesting for the sec to er .. *comment*
on just how *collusive* knight's actions would be
with a 30 percent stake taken in a .. er .. SMB ..
oh i dunno say back in early 2007 .. right when NITE'S
MONOPOLY on the OTC .. was getting fully underway
the possibilities are mind boggling *if true* aren't they?
--
4kids
all jmo
janice shell Share Wednesday, October 20, 2010 3:35:09 PM
Re: fourkids_9pets post# 439 Post # of 453
Knight Capital Urges Short-Selling Leniency for U.S. Stock Market Makers
By Nina Mehta - Sep 27, 2010 1:53 PM ET
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Regulators should consider giving market makers more latitude to sell stock short to ease the burden of increased obligations that may be imposed on those firms, according to an executive at Knight Capital Group Inc.
Market makers sometimes can’t sell stock in response to demand because some securities that aren’t actively traded are hard to borrow, Jamil Nazarali, global head of the electronic trading group at Knight Capital Group Inc., said at a Security Traders Association conference in Washington on Sept. 24.
“More latitude around being able to short stock†would offer market makers relief, Nazarali said. Brokers that make markets by providing bids and offers for investors to trade with should be allowed to maintain short sales for longer than the current period, he said. In a short sale, borrowed shares are sold with the aim of profiting by later buying back the stock at a lower price.
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is considering new obligations and benefits for market makers to ensure that sufficient liquidity is available in times of volatility. SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro has said the agency may give market makers new benefits that will entice them to accept heftier commitments following the May 6 plunge that briefly erased $862 billion in U.S. equity value in less than 20 minutes.
“When an investor wants to buy certain stocks, market makers can’t always sell them short†to meet that need because they must provide the borrowed shares even in less actively traded stocks, Nazarali said. “In these thin names, that’s when you need a market maker the most.â€
Motors Liquidation
For instance, last year Knight wanted to sell short Motors Liquidation Co., the firm formed to liquidate the assets of automaker General Motors Corp., which filed for bankruptcy protection in 2009. Knight couldn’t because that would have required closing out the positions by delivering shares prior to the start of trading on the sixth day after the transaction, which it couldn’t do, Nazarali said.
Motors Liquidation traded at around $1 during the middle of last year even though the equity shareholders would eventually be wiped out, Nazarali said. Because Knight and other market makers couldn’t short the shares, they weren’t able to push the price lower. The shares trade for 35 cents now.
Knight, Getco LLC and Virtu Financial LLC in July urged the SEC to adopt stricter quoting requirements for market makers than currently exist on most exchanges. New obligations should require market makers to quote at the national best bid or offer, which represents the highest price at which investors can sell shares and the lowest at which they can buy, a certain portion of the day, Nazarali said. The three firms also said market makers should submit orders at several price levels.
Investor Costs
High-frequency trading firms RGM Advisors LLC, Allston Trading LLC, Hudson River Trading LLC and Quantlab Financial LLC countered on Sept. 14 that these requirements would raise costs for investors such as mutual funds without preventing market plunges.
Market makers who meet certain quoting requirements now receive an exemption from the obligation to locate shares for stocks they want to sell short and more-lenient terms than other investors for when they must deliver shares for bearish trades.
William Neuberger, global co-head of electronic trading at Morgan Stanley in New York, said at the conference that altering the obligations and benefits for market makers won’t ensure that they stick around in difficult times to buy when investors flood them with sell orders.
“If something’s happening in the world, why should they buy stock at the wrong price when things are coming down, down, down?†he said. “Even doing that doesn’t mean there won’t be another crash. It’ll just be a slower crash. They’re going to take the fine, basically, and live.â€
To contact the reporter on this story: Nina Mehta in New York at nmehta24@bloomberg.net.
To contact the editor responsible for this story: Nick Baker at nbaker7@bloomberg.net.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-27/knight-capital-urges-short-selling-leniency-for-u-s-stock-market-makers.html
AlanC Share Thursday, October 21, 2010 12:34:24 PM
Re: janice shell post# 440 Post # of 453
Pot, kettle, black! That is hysterical!
fourkids_9pets Share Thursday, October 21, 2010 1:56:06 PM
Re: AlanC post# 442 Post # of 453
isn't it tho' and i do so love to see who it is
who touts for wall street .. MMs' .. B/Ds' and
even the SEC
nite is a whiny sob who has held the *monopoly*
on the OTC since early 2007 and the sec only has
themselves and the dtcc to blame for the mess they
have allowed to be *created* there .. as they now
try to *instill* .. er .. investor confidence in
a system so polluted and toxic and quite frankly
*corrupt*
good luck to them .. i don't believe it's a *realistic* goal
at this point in time .. perhaps when more *bs* is revealed
i give it at minimum another 12 to 18 months b4 that event
comes to pass
--
4kids
all jmo
janice shell Share Thursday, October 21, 2010 2:22:43 PM
Re: fourkids_9pets post# 441 Post # of 453
i've said to the sec .. how many 1000s of complaints
does it take to get more than a slap on the wrist for NITE?
NITE is the penny plungers' favorite whipping boy, and I have absolutely no doubt that most of those complaints are submitted by the utterly uninformed.
And they've been fined heavily more than once, as have many other b/ds.
fourkids_9pets Share Thursday, October 21, 2010 2:25:44 PM
Re: janice shell post# 444 Post # of 453
nite has held the *MONOPOLY* on the OTC
since may of 2007
they and their *feeder funds* deserve everything
that is coming their way over the coming months
oh and thanks for that article .. whiny and
squirming becomes them
--
4kids
all jmo
janice shell Share Thursday, October 21, 2010 2:30:12 PM
Re: fourkids_9pets post# 445 Post # of 453
They had it before then. They were always the biggest MM in OTC stocks.
As for the article, they were obviously simply defending their interests. But I thought they made several good points.
fourkids_9pets Share Thursday, October 21, 2010 2:34:31 PM
Re: janice shell post# 446 Post # of 453
semantics .. sbsh held the *monopoly*
back in 2006 b4 they wisely moved elsewhere
and handed off to nite in may of 2007 (OTC)
regardless the monopoly is nite's
for well over 3+ years now ~ and i
(and others) look forward to the day
of reckoning that is en route
one mess at a time
--
4kids
all jmo
janice shell Share Thursday, October 21, 2010 2:37:32 PM
Re: fourkids_9pets post# 447 Post # of 453
No they didn't. NITE was always on top, usually followed by Herzog, until they were bought out by somebody...
fourkids_9pets Share Thursday, October 21, 2010 2:56:52 PM
Re: janice shell post# 448 Post # of 453
really have a link?
i kept track of every piece of data out of
finra on a handful of co.s i *observed* (06/07)
and tellingly nite was never the primary mm
on these OTC co.s (ytd 2006) .. it wasn't until
MAY of 2007 .. that NITE became the PRIMARY MM
for pretty much all co.s on the OTC as proven
by finra's ytd data for 2007 (vs. 2006's data)
needless to say
that *monopoly* didn't change for 2008/2009 and
nite is on track *yet again* in 2010 ~ no one
even comes close .. including that british MM
that showed up this past july and now showing
the secondary MM to nite's primary on various
and sundry OTC stocks .. hmmm
oh and another question to get answered in due time
pertains to a 30 percent stake taken in a uk based
parent corp of a SMB .. which overlapped time lines (2007)
let's see if khuzami lives up to his reputation and *retail*
actually gets some answers *known* b4 another decade passes
--
4kids
all jmo
janice shell Share Thursday, October 21, 2010 3:04:22 PM
Re: fourkids_9pets post# 449 Post # of 453
No. I do not keep exhaustive accounts of MM activity. Herzog was absorbed by whoever it was years ago. Probably around 2002.
fourkids_9pets Share Thursday, October 21, 2010 3:12:28 PM
Re: janice shell post# 450 Post # of 453
again my point isn't that nite wasn't a MM in the OTC
for the last decade ... they were .. it's the timing
of when they took over and *created the monopoly*
re: stocks on the OTC .. it is the spring of 2007
that data as well as 1000s of complaints filed against them
by *retail* and other brokers for blocking on the ask
(or bid in some cases) is also *known* .. now what comes
to pass over the coming months as more dirty laundry
is aired is what i'm interested in learning .. i find it
ironic that 2 sources of l2 were talking class action
law suits against nite within one year of their *monopoly*
that was 2008
they are everyone's whipping boy for a reason
what comes to be known still awaits us all
always a pleasure
--
4kids
all jmo
janice shell Share Thursday, October 21, 2010 3:13:57 PM
Re: fourkids_9pets post# 451 Post # of 453
For as long as I can remember, NITE has been the 800 pound gorilla in the OTC world.
fourkids_9pets Share Thursday, October 21, 2010 3:16:11 PM
Re: janice shell post# 452 Post # of 453
but finra's data doesn't bear that out
until 2007
--
4kids
all jmo
BMFL<OD
next week(s) is here
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