I’m predicting that much will be made of this development, and rightly so.

As you encounter conversations on this topic in the days to come, it is a good opportunity to point out that Deep Capture published irrefutable evidence of insider trading at short selling hedge funds SAC Capital, Kynikos Associates and Third Point Partners almost one year ago.

Read about it here: “Hedge funds reading tomorrow’s headlines today“

After all, it was 2007, and illegal short selling was almost the norm. The SEC, in passing a toothless Regulation SHO, had demonstrated that it didn’t care much. With just a few exceptions, America’s financial press had made it clear that the shorts were to be believed and their targets attacked or ignored.

And, in the midst of what history would eventually show to be the high-water mark of the greatest bull market of all time, how could a self-respecting short seller possibly be expected to do business in any other way?

What FSTG and Rhino couldn’t have known is that four factors were working against them:

1- In December of 2007, the SEC would appoint a true inspector general, in the form of David Kotz, and that Kotz would hear the cries of untold thousands of shareholders certain that the SEC had ignored their untold thousands of complaints of illegal naked shorting of companies in which they had invested untold millions of dollars, and that before too long, Kotz would issue a scathing report confirming as much, and…

2- In September of 2008, naked short selling would provide the spark that lit the fuse that ignited the greatest financial collapse of all time, and…

3-  In January of 2009, Joe Biden would leave the Senate for the Vice President’s mansion and Ted Kaufman, Biden’s successor, would make a major issue out of demanding the SEC start enforcing long-ignored prohibitions on illegal naked short selling, and, perhaps most unjustly…

4- By November of 2009, FSTG and Rhino would remain small and inconsequential firms (FSTG is headquartered at the end of a dirt road 90 miles from NYC), not at all the kinds of major players with deep payrolls into which SEC staffers hope the revolving door will eventually thrust them.

Rhino Trading Founder Damon Rein (on right)

Except for the “small and inconsequential” part, how could FSTG and Rhino Trading have possibly known that these factors would conspire to hold them to account in 2009 for their participation in an illegal and manipulative trading strategy that was de rigueur in 2007?

But it happened.

In fact, it happened yesterday.

Yes, the SEC has opened the second (or possibly third, depending on how you count an abortive 2005 case against the unrelated hedge fund Rhino Advisors) administrative proceeding alleging illegal naked short selling in its storied history. And we should be very happy about that. I know I am!

But I’m also bothered by the above alluded-to fact that Rhino Trading and FSTG are really just insignificant patsies, cast, like a pair of white-robed virgins, into a fiery volcano to appease the angry gods in Congress intent on forcing the SEC to do what it would really rather not (it’s job).

In the complaint, FSTG and Rhino are accused of illegally shorting such long-time threshold listees as USANA, iMergent, Medis Technologies, and NovaStar: all companies that experienced extreme levels of naked shorting for much longer periods of time than those described in the SEC’s action, and on a level unattainable by a firm headquartered at the end of a dirt road 90 miles from NYC.

In fact, certain very reliable sources confirm that a major hedge fund – one which has received much more than its fair share of coverage on this site – was coordinating media and message board attacks on one of these targeted companies during precisely the same period.

And yet the wrist slap (in the form of a $45,000 fine and firm instructions not to naked short any more) goes to the guys set up in a converted barn with dial-up internet access.

Brilliant.

The SEC was a bit tougher on Rhino Traders. The company and principals Damon Rein and Steven Peter will pay several hundred thousand dollars between them, in addition to promising to mend their naked short ways. They will also consider themselves officially censured.

Take that!

SB 605 is a bill on Capitol Hill

Something of great importance in our effort to finally end illegal naked short selling took place recently.

Senator Ted Kaufman of Delaware, together with three colleagues, distributed a letter to the remaining 96 members of the Senate formally requesting co-sponsors for SB 605: A bill to require the Securities and Exchange Commission to reinstate the uptick rule and effectively regulate abusive short selling activities.

You can find a copy of the letter and the bill itself here.

This is a very good sign that this most vital bill has momentum. However, this is always a very tenuous time for any bit of nascent legislation. That’s why I encourage all supporters of true market reform to contact their US senators (remember you each have two!), encouraging them to co-sponsor Senate Bill 605.

Every additional co-sponsor’s name added to the bill reduces the likelihood that backroom shenanigans — something at which our adversaries are experts — will kill our best opportunity for true reform yet, while still in its cradle.

Please reach out to your senators today. Click here to find his or her contact information.

Too many stinging disappointments, I suppose.

Too many instances of people behaving badly, to be certain.

But as they say, there’s some value in expecting the worst…you’ll never be disappointed.

And so it was with today’s second and concluding session of the SEC’s roundtable on securities lending and short selling: I expected the absolute worst, but in the end was pleasantly surprised to find that it wasn’t quite as bad as I feared.

That’s not the same as proclaiming it a good thing, because it was not. Indeed, I stick by yesterday’s characterization of the event as farce with a pre-determined outcome.

Having said that, I was deeply impressed by two surprises I clearly had not anticipated. And I’ll get to those in a moment.

But first, an overview.

There were two panels. The first examined proposed pre-borrow and hard locate requirements — keys to closing two of the most dangerous remaining loopholes in the US stock settlement system. The second panel examined proposals requiring enhanced disclosure of short selling data — a good idea but ultimately one that would be much less necessary were the proposals discussed in the first panel enacted.

I’ll start with the second panel, which surprised me by coming down overwhelmingly in favor of more transparency in short selling.

Georgetown University Professor James Angel pointed out that greater disclosure would essentially be doing legitimate short sellers a favor, by vindicating them in cases when they are incorrectly accused of manipulation in response to stocks dropping in value.

David Carruthers, of short selling analytics firm Data Explorers, supported greater transparency in short selling where the goal was to “prevent market abuse and prevent the development of a false market, or to prevent situations where market participants take advantage of a vulnerable company.”

Richard Gates, founder of short selling hedge fund TFS Capital, denied that shorting exacerbated the onset of the current financial crisis, but went on to concede that there should be greater disclosure parity on the short and long sides of market activity.

Michael Gitlin of investment manager T. Rowe Price echoed the position of Professor Angel in saying real time reporting of short versus long sales would result in the “demystification of short selling,” adding, “The ongoing debate of what caused an individual security to decline would largely disappear with this added level of transparency.”

As the lone issuer represented on the panel, Jesse Greene, Vice President of Financial Management at IBM, was enthusiastically in favor of a general overhaul of the SEC’s short selling regulatory framework, including public disclosure of short positions, in order to “improve market stability and restore investor confidence.”

Joseph Mecane, Executive VP at NYSE, noted that market fragmentation has made it more difficult to detect manipulation, requiring regulators have access to more short selling data in order to better conduct market surveillance.

In other words, the second panel was a slam dunk in the right direction.

The first and ultimately more meaningful panel, on the other hand, was the Yin to the second panel’s Yang.

Appropriately enough, Managing Director of the Equities Division at Goldman Sachs William Conley kicked things off, lamenting that “both the pre-borrow and hard locate requirement would require significant infrastructure builds on the part of the industry as well as its participants.”

By “infrastructure builds”, Conley is referring to the development of new software able to track down real shares for short sellers to borrow. He seems to have forgotten three things:

1. When there’s money to be made, Goldman Sachs has a rare talent for developing extremely complicated software. Could it be that Conley never met former co-worker Sergey Aleynikov?
2. LocateStock.com, then a bootstrapping startup, developed software that accomplishes precisely the same task Conley regards as so burdensome, on a shoestring budget.
3. If Goldman Sachs has enough cash on hand to spend nearly $12-billion in employee bonuses this year, it can probably set a couple hundred thousand aside to write some crumby software.

As I predicted yesterday, much of the balance of Conley’s mic time was spent echoing the anti-reform talking points currently being circulated on Capitol Hill by his employer’s army of lobbyists — in some cases, verbatim.

William Hodash, Managing Director at DTCC, took us on a trip to his organization’s mindset circa 2005 by pointing out that fails to deliver are not necessarily evidence of naked short selling. With one foot remaining firmly in 2005, another in 2009 and a third in a pile of his own illogic, Hodash then said that the reduction in fails observed before and after the SEC’s implementation of Rule 204 “may be relevant to the discussion of whether naked short selling remains a problem.”

No, you didn’t miss anything. That’s what he said, with all remaining panelists basically pleading some variation of the on his and Conley’s approaches.

With one very prominent exception: Dennis Nixon, Chairman of International BancShares Corporation (IBC).

Looking at the program, I had assumed that IBC’s role on the panel was that of a broker or other market intermediary. Well I was very wrong. IBC was there in the role of an issuer targeted by naked short sellers, and Nixon very poignantly expressed the anguish of someone in his position, after a 45-day long bear raid removed $1.2-billion in IBC shareholder value.

“And I think it was all attributed to this predator-type short selling that goes on in this market today that’s uncontrolled. It’s unbelievable,” Nixon said.

That was the first surprise.

The second surprise came from an even less likely source:Commissioner Elisse Walter.

Mostly silent throughout the previous day’s panels, today Walter made it clear that she’s not buying the excuses offered by industry representatives insisting this problem is too much for them to tackle.

“I’m sort of surprised that the industry hasn’t come up with a solution, particularly as this controversy has continued to swirl and does not go away,” Walter said, adding that by failing to address the issue, the industry is essentially passing the cost of non-compliance on to the SEC’s own Division of Enforcement.

I think she’d make a stronger case had the Enforcement Division brought more than two cases against naked short sellers in its entire history, but that’s a topic for another post.

The bottom line is, this panel was undeniably stacked against any additional meaningful steps to limit illegal naked short selling, but the contributions of Dennis Nixon and Elisse Walter were as welcomed as they were unanticipated.

The entire affair could have been much better, but also could have been much worse.

Deep Capture goes to Washington.

(Washington, DC) The SEC’s roundtable on securities lending and short selling got started today, and Deep Capture was there.

What follows is my assessment, based on my observations thus far.

In the simplest terms, I’d say the situation at the SEC is one of extreme disconnection. This is an agency that has completely lost track of its founding mission.

The day consisted of four panels, all dedicated to examining different aspects of securities lending. The panelists included one academic, one public employees’ pension fund manager, the CEO of FINRA, and 20 representatives of hedge funds and brokerages or companies that provide services to hedge funds and brokerages.

Not a single representative or advocate of retail investors had a voice on any panel, and the substance of the panelists’ comments was consistent with the thinking that obviously called them all together: the discussion never got beyond reforms to benefit the institutions that get rich from lending out the shares entrusted to them by the rest of us.

Nor did retail investors get any more than a passing reference in any other context. The industry was there to talk about the needs of industry. Period.

The result was eight hours of possibly the least interesting discussion I’ve voluntarily endured. In fact, it more resembled two dozen high school book reports on a handful of facets of a single industry, as the same thing was said over and over in the lest interesting way possible.

For eight hours.

Meanwhile, the subject that really matters: illegal naked short selling, is scheduled for just three hours tomorrow (including a break!), with panelists hailing from four hedge funds, Goldman Sachs, DTCC, the Security Traders Association, NASDAQ, NYSE, one academic, and one fish-out-of-water from IBM.

Is there any question how those panels are going to come down on the issue?

This entire exercise, I’m nearly prepared to declare, is little more than a farce.

Lest I leave you with the impression that everything was devoid of meaning, allow me to recount one of those moments of cosmic synchronicity that make days like today all worthwhile.

It happened during the fourth panel. Specifically, during the opening remarks given by Leslie Nelson (yes, a male, but sadly no, not the guy from The Naked Gun movies), Managing Director of Global Securities Lending at Goldman Sachs.

Just as Mr. Leslie Nelson was beginning to talk, about 15 of you emailed me a link to Matt Taibbi’s recent post where he announced that naked shorting will be a major component of his upcoming piece in Rolling Stone.

Included in that post was a link to a pamphlet apparently being circulated broadly on Capitol Hill by Goldman Sachs lobbyists, intent on preserving the status quo with regard to loopholes permitting illegal naked short selling. Trusting my audio recorder not to miss anything, I decided to tune Mr. Nelson out slightly to read the words of his notorious employer.

In the Goldman pamphlet, the first sub-point of bullet point one reads:
“Rule 204 of Regulation SHO has been effective at reducing fails in the marketplace.”

At precisely the same time read that line, I heard Nelson read the following from his prepared statement (prefatory to what — consistent with the rest of the day’s panel — had nothing to do with delivery failures):
“Rule 204 has been undeniably effective at bringing US equities fails to levels that are truly de minimis.”

See…I read and heard those lines at precisely the same moment.

It was as though the Goldman Sachs government relations team had briefly hijacked my eyes and ears.

It’s also indicative of how very seriously Goldman is taking this challenge to what is likely one of that company’s most plumb sources of revenue.

Finally, I’d say it’s predictive of the message what we can expect to hear repeated over and over again as the issue makes its was earnestly through Congress and flaccidly through the SEC.

You know, I do not drink, but if I did, I’d suggest everybody take a shot whenever they hear that phrase repeated during the three short hours (including a break) of the roundtable’s second and final day. That might just make the thing tolerable.

I’m looking for the best, most colorful examples of post-1934 short-side stock manipulations.

As I see it, stock manipulation comes in three general flavors…

1. Trade-based: on the short side, this is the essence of abusive, illegal short selling, is the general focus of this blog, and not something I need more examples of. Instead, please consider the following two types.
2. Action-based: where the manipulator, usually (but not always) from within the company, takes steps to literally affect the real or perceived value of the company for the purpose of benefiting an existing stock position. There are myriad examples of this sort of thing happening prior to Securities Exchange Act of 1934, but not nearly as many since, and most of those are long-side. If you know of any great examples of short-side, action-based stock manipulation, pleases add them as a comment below.
3. Information based: where the manipulator intentionally disseminates incorrect information about a company’s prospects for the purpose of benefiting a stock position. Much of DeepCapture.com is dedicated to exposing examples of this sort of abuse, primarily on the short side. This was also technically outlawed in 1934, but as I suspect we’ve all seen, happens on a grand scale nonetheless.  But if you know of any particularly interesting or outrageous examples not yet discussed here, please add them as a comment below.

Please limit your suggestions to cases that went to trial or otherwise experienced some level of fact-finding or other official response.

As always, if you’d rather add your insights privately, my email is jbagley@deepcapture.com.

You can follow our Twitter feed in one of two ways:

Old fashioned way: Come to deepcapture.com and look for updates in the column to the right (just below the fold) under the title “Deep Capture on Twitter”.

Web 2.0-compliant way: Get a free Twitter account and follow us there. This also gives you the option of having our “tweets” delivered to you via email or even your phone via SMS. Don’t worry…unlike some, we not manic tweeters. Between one and three relevant updates per day is about our limit. Any more than that and you can assume the sky is falling.

Additionally, I invite those of you who find the kind of content that is suitable for our Twitter feed to let me know, either via email, or (preferably) via direct message on Twitter itself. If that last part doesn’t make sense, just get an account and it should be fairly obvious.

And so, as you bump into some of the many discussions currently underway touching upon the cause of Lehman’s demise and the global financial meltdown that followed, kindly refer folks to this video. When the shorts protest that it’s a “conspiracy theory,” you might agree that it is indeed a conspiracy, but a conspiracy fact, not theory.

When they continue to protest, ask them to get specific.

And then sit back and enjoy the silence.

Hedge Funds and the Global Economic Meltdown

As I wrote, a few months ago, I used this security flaw to determine an IP address frequently used by Gary Weiss, who, prior to being repeatedly outted by yours truly, was among the most active, anonymous spreaders of such disinformation on stock  message boards, blogs, and Wikipedia. With this information, I was able to prove that Weiss was again engaging in pro-naked short selling sockpuppetry, this time on political blog DailyKos.com (a claim DailyKos.com later verified).

Cade Metz, a reporter for the prominent British tech publication The Register, took note of the above-referenced security flaw, and wrote a very in-depth piece on it and the part it’s played in Weiss’s latest trip-up, in addition to examining the way this fight has so starkly turned in our favor as of late.

Take a look at Cade’s piece and, if you like it, be sure to Digg it here.

Today, Mr. Gasparino underscored that status while on air with Joe Grano, former CEO at UBS Financial Services and an early predictor of the current financial crisis. Grano’s interview was set to coincide with the upcoming first anniversary of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers — commonly recognized as the event that sparked the meltdown — and attempted to answer the question, “what have we learned?”

Along the way, the following exchange took place:

(starting at 00:55)

Co-Host: …doesn’t that eliminate a lot of the need for all this call for legislation?

Grano: A good part of it. And as long as you limit to a degree some of the leverage. I don’t believe in naked shorts, I don’t believe in naked credit default swaps when there’s really not a counterparty there because all you’re doing is levering into the sky. We don’t need that and it has nothing to do with our…

Gasparino: Patrick Byrne was right, all along…the Overstock guy…that everybody made fun of and then every Wall Street CEO mimics him right now.

Grano: In length of speculative excess there’s no question.

For taking a position that is undoubtedly very unpopular at CNBC, the Deep Capture team salutes Charlie Gasparino.

By the way, the interview in its entirety is very interesting, and can be seen here.

First, I highly recommend making a habit of listening to NPR’s Planet Money podcast. I’ve been listening for nearly a year (the entire length of its existence) and find the benefits innumerable. If you’re not familiar with podcasting, it’s basically an easy way to have audio content automatically downloaded to your computer or mp3 player as it’s released. That means you don’t need to go looking for it. It’s just there, waiting for you to consume at your convenience.

Planet Money publishes a new episode every Monday, Wednesday and Friday evening. The typical 20 minute edition focuses on some aspect of economics, more often than not related to the present financial crisis, and usually incorporating an interview with somebody fascinating.

Which brings me to thing #2…

The most recent episode of Planet Money includes an interview with Sam Antar, a convicted stock manipulator and known associate of now-defunct short selling hedge fund Copper River Partners (née Rocker Partners) and Gradient Analytics (née Camelback Research). In total fairness, Sam’s interview, which focuses on the crime he enabled as CFO of Crazy Eddie) is very interesting, although I’d say that’s more a reflection on the skill of the interviewers than on Sam himself.

At the conclusion of the interview, hosts Adam Davidson and David Kestenbaum wonder aloud whether Sam Antar is to be trusted.

In response, I added a comment to the segment’s accompanying blog portion, pointing out that in my opinion, Sam Antar remains in the stock manipulation business as evidenced by his involvement in — and financing of — smear attacks on public companies (which go beyond claims of accounting fraud to include accusations of anti-Semitism, marital infidelity, substance abuse, and worse) led by short sellers hoping to profit from an expected drop in the target companies’ share price. In support of my claim, I included this link, which offers a clear example of just such an attack against a company called USANA: http://antisocialmedia.net/when-youre-right-youre-right/

Well, typical of how Sam and his buddy Gary Weiss operate, they reported my comment as “inappropriate” and managed to get it removed (twice).

If you agree that the world could benefit from additional context when deciding whether to trust Sam Antar, you might consider making that clear by adding your own comment here.

I think we can all agree that the middle of last September was as strange a time as our financial markets have ever experienced.

In case you’ve forgotten, let me remind you with a simple timeline. As you read it, keep in mind that following the demise of Bear Stearns, the strictest interpretation of the so-called investment bank “Bulge Bracket” included just four entities: Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley.

• September 9: The short attack on Lehman Brothers begins in earnest.
• September 14: The New York Times reports Lehman will file bankruptcy.
• September 15: Goldman Sachs share price begins to wilt. Merrill Lynch announces it will be sold to Bank of America.
• September 17: Goldman Sachs’ share price continues to plummet. The SEC announces “new rules to protect investors against naked short selling abuses”.
• September 18: Goldman Sachs’ share price continues to plummet.
• September 19: The SEC “halts short selling of financial stocks to protect investors and markets”.  Goldman Sachs’ share price posts a strong gain.
• September 22: Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the two remaining members of the “Bulge Bracket” announce their intentions to transition to bank holding companies, giving them access to lending facilities of the US Federal Reserve (an organization with which Goldman has an uncommonly tight relationship).

As I see it, the most interesting event to come of that most eventful period was the SEC’s September 19 ban on legitimate short selling. What makes it so enigmatic is the fact that not even the most vocal opponents of illegal naked short selling have ever even hinted at the need to restrict legitimate shorting. In fact, Patrick Byrne himself compared the ban to limiting motorists to making only right-hand turns.

However, I have a theory that might explain what was going on.

An examination of the volume of both naked and legitimate shorting of Goldman Sachs in September of 2008 reveals something very interesting: while there was an enormous amount of short selling taking place, there was essentially no naked shorting of Goldman shares. Indeed, short selling accounted for a third of total volume on September 15 and 16, while failed trades accounted for less than 0.07%, suggesting shortable Goldman shares were in abundant supply.

This conclusion is supported by an analysis of the stock loan rebate rate that prevailed for Goldman shares during the period in question: a very reliable indicator of the scarcity of shares available for short sellers to borrow, where a lower rebate rate indicates a more limited supply.

In the case of Goldman, from May through August 29 of 2008, the rebate rate averaged 1.80%. And, between September 1st and the September 19^th short selling ban, Goldman’s average rebate rate remained exactly the same: 1.80%.

By way of comparison, the average rebate rates for Lehman Brothers shares over the same periods were 1.18% and 0.16% (bottoming out at -0.25% during Lehman’s last week), respectively.

By contrast, Goldman shares appear to have been easy to borrow right up to and in the midst of its stock price free-fall.

This scenario is consistent with the levels of naked short selling of Lehman and Goldman during the same period: extremely high in the case of Lehman, and almost non-existent in the case of Goldman; furthermore, this suggests that, given abusive naked shorting does not tend to occur until after short sellers have exhausted the supply of borrowable shares, it was legitimate shorting that pushed Goldman’s share price over the edge.

With that in mind, let’s revisit the above timeline, focusing on Goldman, with my interpretation appended.

• September 15: Lehman declares bankruptcy. Goldman Sachs share price begins to fall. Following the destruction of Lehman Brothers at the hands of short selling hedge funds, the financial world is keenly aware of the capacity of naked shorting to decimate the share prices of financial firms. Furthermore, given the role Goldman undoubtedly played as broker in the criminal short selling hedge funds’ attack Lehman, the firm is justifiably concerned that the karma train is heading its way.
• September 16: Goldman lobbies its extremely well-placed (and well-documented) federal government contacts for a temporary ban on naked short selling.
• September 17: The SEC temporarily bans naked short selling.
• September 18: Despite the ban on naked shorting, Goldman Sachs’ share price continues to fall, suggesting legitimate short selling, not illegal naked short selling, is the cause of Goldman’s problems. Goldman lobbies for the SEC to temporarily ban legitimate shorting.
• September 19: The SEC temporarily bans legitimate shorting of all financial stocks. Goldman’s share price rises.

Might the SEC have been acting in the best interest of the market when it issued both emergency orders? I suppose that’s possible. But given the utter disinterest – even contempt – that organization has demonstrated toward investors and small public companies that have complained about the issue, I find it very difficult to believe.

Meanwhile, the SEC stood by and watched as naked short selling destroyed Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. Merrill Lynch then took itself out of the game, leaving a Bulge Bracket consisting of only Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley.

Of those two, which has uncommon influence over the federal government?

Goldman Sachs, of course.

And if this is true, does it leave any doubt as to the lengths the SEC might have gone to preserve a corrupt system when it benefited the company?

As always, I’m going to great lengths to ensure that every assertion in the book is defensible. However, because finance is not my primary (nor secondary, nor tertiary) vocation, I frequently rely on more experienced associates when it comes to testing the integrity of hypotheses formed by observation of data and events.

Recently, it occurred to me that, when it comes to the development of these theories, I ought to make better use of the expertise of the large and growing following we’ve been fortunate to build up here at deepcapture.com. Thus, starting later today, you’ll find the occasional post under the category “Deep Capture Book”, where I will present ideas being considered for the book, which could benefit from input by experts.

Am I overstating my case, or possibly understating it?

Is there another explanation?

What additional insights might strengthen my point?

These are all things that I’m hoping you folks will volunteer, via each post’s comment section.

Of course, if you should prefer to make your comment to me directly, you may do so via email: jbagley@deepcapture.com

As I said, look for the first of these posts in the next few hours.

Gary Weiss wonders how he managed to get caught sockpuppeting...again.

On the other hand, if you – like me – do enjoy seeing Weiss ensnared in the traps he’s haphazardly laid for others, you’ll appreciate what follows.

Earlier, I wrote about how I successfully confirmed my suspicion that Gary Weiss had spawned a new pro-illegal naked short selling sockpuppet in the form of Daily Kos blogger “Tom Sykes”.

As expected, both Weiss and “Sykes” responded on their respective blogs with furious and indignant denials and repeated insistence that I was lying.

As it turns out, DeepCapture.com reader Andrew Perez also has a blog on Daily Kos (in addition to his contributions to The New Argument), and he took justifiable offense at the con Weiss was attempting to pull on Daily Kos readers, penning a particularly well-written overview of the situation. In that post’s comment section, “Sykes” went on the offensive, but soon began to bob and weave as Perez worked to pin him down.

The key moment in their exchange is summarized below (you can read it in full here):

Perez: Correct me if I’m wrong: you are Gary Weiss. If you take offense with me addressing you as Gary, will you please confirm or deny that you are Gary Weiss? I asked you to do so already and you ignored my request.

Sykes: No I’m not and I’m not going to engage with you anymore. I just read the comments that you made on Deep Capture before you marched over here like a good Soldier of Byrne to write your little smear piece. You are much more of a shill for that creep than I thought you were. You use his tactics, you have his values. You belong there, not here.

Perez and I separately contacted Daily Kos administrators with evidence proving they were being scammed by Gary Weiss. I didn’t hear back, but Perez did. Via email, a Daily Kos administrator told him: “Sykes has been banned based on my evaluation of the material you and others provided.”

We can officially and unambiguously add Tom Sykes to the long list of abusive sockpuppet identities Gary Weiss has unsuccessfully created to trick people into believing illegal naked short selling is somehow a good thing.

The Bizarro World Code

Within minutes of my introduction to the world of short selling hedge funds, I encountered the analogy that remains the best suited to describe the truth to which they subscribe: Bizarro World.

A planet that appears from time to time in the DC Comics universe, Bizarro World is noteworthy for its utter opposition to everything associated with reality on Earth (in fact, another name for Bizarro World is Htrae – “Earth” spelled backwards).

Bizarro World made very infrequent appearances in the DC Comics universe; however what few insights we’ve been able to gain have been telling.

For one, we know that the residents of Bizarro World adhere to a simple moral code: “Us do opposite of all Earthly things! Us hate beauty! Us love ugliness! Is big crime to make anything perfect on Bizarro World!”

Bizarro Superman

For another, consistent with its black-is-white nature, the alpha-superhero of Bizarro World – a Superman-like figure appropriately named ‘Bizarro’ – is in fact a super villain, and one of many.

Fortunately, or possibly unfortunately, the Bizarro World of short selling hedge funds sits side-by-side with our own. Yet, true insights into how it actually operates have been startlingly rare.

Possibly the best behind-the-curtains view came in December of 2006, with Jim Cramer’s infamous admission as to how short selling hedge funds do (and indeed, according to Cramer, “must”) operate, moving the Bizarro World citizenship of that group from theory to undeniable fact.

See for yourself:

Cramer: “You can’t foment. You can’t create yourself an impression that a stock’s down. But you do it anyway because the SEC doesn’t understand it. So that’s the only sense that I would say that it’s illegal.”

Bizarro translation: “Us do opposite of all Earthly things! Us can break law to make money because regulator not understand regulations!”

Cramer: “Look what people can do. I mean that’s a fabulous thing! The great thing about the [stock] market is that is has nothing to do with the actual stocks. Look, over maybe two weeks from now the buyers will come to their senses and realize everything they heard was a lie…”

Bizarro translation: “Us hate beauty! Us pervert capital markets to make them hostile to small, promising businesses and technologies! Us stock market has nothing to do with actual stocks!”

Cramer: “These are all what’s really going on under the market that you don’t see. What’s important when you’re in that hedge fund mode is to not do anything remotely truthful – because the truth is so against your view, that it’s important to create a new truth to develop a fiction.”

Bizarro translation: “Us love ugliness! Us hate truth! Us prefer fiction!”

Cramer: “I think that it’s important for people to recognize the way that the market really works is to have that nexus of ‘hit the brokerage houses with a series of orders that can push it down’, then leak it to the press, and then get it on CNBC (that’s also very important), and then you have kind of a vicious cycle down. It’s a pretty good game.”

Bizarro translation: “Is big crime to make anything perfect on Bizarro World! Us make money by wrecking public companies! And here on Bizarro World, Jim Cramer not even pretend to be friend of small investor! Oh yeah…CNBC official network of Bizarro World!”

(Lest any suppose these clips have been taken out of context, I strongly encourage everybody to download and view the 10 minute conversation in its entirety.)

On Bizarro World, villains are treated like celebrities while the law-abiding are scorned and ostracized. So it should come as no surprise that on CNBC (the official network of Bizarro World), short selling hedge fund managers are called “titans” while those who question them are dismissed with a wink and a smirk.

Of course, this would seem consistent with the seemingly inverted reality that is short selling, where – as opposed to traditional investors who earn profits when they buy low and later sell high – shorts aspire to do the same by first selling high and then buying low.

While on the surface short selling might appear to have been invented on Bizarro World, that’s not true. Shorting is (as has been stated time and again on this blog) a healthy part of a normal market.

What was invented on Bizarro World, however, is shorting’s insidious doppelganger: naked short selling, which is a practice ripped straight from the Bizarro World welcome guide. Unlike legitimate short selling, which requires first borrowing the shares one sells short, naked shorting skips that step, allowing criminals to sell not only something they do not own, but something that does not even exist, except as a tradable electronic ledger entry which they themselves conspire with corrupt brokerages to create.

This, in turn has the effect of artificially increasing the supply of a company’s shares. In other words, on Earth, only companies get to issue stock, whereas on Bizarro World, it’s the naked short sellers that issue shares of a company’s stock, with impunity, sometimes in quantities rivaling the number of legitimate, company-issued shares in circulation (with the expected impact on share price).

Or, should I say, naked short sellers used to be able to do this.

The truth is, since shortly after the onset of the economic crisis naked short sellers themselves helped to spark, naked shorting has become an increasingly difficult crime to commit.

The result?

Despite the fact that we’re in the midst of an epic bear market – when one would normally expect short sellers to thrive – the biggest short selling hedge funds are getting hammered.

Today, Reuters business writer Svea Herbst-Bayliss has a shocking overview of the breadth of the situation, which she begins by comparing to Waterloo – the battle which forever put an end to Napoleon’s aspirations of world domination.

Based on insiders’ insights into forthcoming letters to investors explaining their performance over the first and second quarters of 2009, Herbst-Bayliss predicts that “To anyone considering hedge fund investments in the coming months, the data will illustrate that these managers who cashed in on last year’s financial markets crash now rank as the $1.4 trillion hedge fund industry’s worst performers.”

Specifically, Herbst-Bayliss notes, “In the first six months of 2009 [short selling hedge funds] lost 9.38 percent, compared with the 9.55 percent that other hedge funds gained.”

Most notably, the story quotes Brad Alford, a professional hedge fund advisor and investor, who says, “Every few years short-sellers have their day in the sun. Then things revert to normal where the markets rise and life becomes so difficult for them that many just go out of business,” he added.

In case you missed it, you might want to re-read Alford’s quote to make sure you catch what makes it so telling: that a rising market can be bad for short sellers.

But how can that be, given the recently-ended bull market – possibly the greatest in economic history – saw short selling hedge funds such as SAC Capital, Kynikos Associates and Third Point Capital experience mind-boggling growth, while a month-long rise in what is otherwise shaping up to be one of the greatest bear markets in economic history (when the shorts should be thriving) may prove to be their ultimate doom?

Talk about Bizarro World investing!

The difference, I suspect, is naked short selling: a crutch-like tool that allowed the shorts to defy gravity while the market soared, the effective removal of which has left them atrophied and uncoordinated when forced to fend for themselves in a market where capable, legitimate short sellers should thrive.

Blue vs. Green Kryptonite: Click to see full image

Or maybe a more apt metaphor is that of Kryptonite, the green version of which makes Superman weak and Bizarro strong, while the blue version has the opposite effect. For a long time, a captured media and SEC equipped short selling hedge funds with a big, fat slab of green Kryptonite, which their own hubris has caused to be replaced by a bit of the Bizarro-toxic blue stuff.

Will July of 2009 be the short sellers’ Waterloo?

Will short selling hedge funds’ greed simply assume another form?

Will the economy recover before it’s too late to matter?

Find out what happens in the next episode of Deep Capture!

In the end, we settled on the following:

“Entropy increases” and “The pendulum swings.”

The first sentence is a reference to the Second Law of Thermodynamics.

The second sentence is a reference to the fact that cultural trends will always increase in pervasiveness and acceptance until some limit is broached, at which time opposing forces will be applied that cause society to respond with increasing negativity toward that trend. And, as with an actual pendulum, the higher the upswing, the more forceful the push back will be.

How true both are.

I first encountered the market reform movement near the end of 2005. Over the months that followed, I witnessed the following:

1. An SEC staffer in San Francisco subpoenaed the communications of Jim Cramer, Herb Greenberg, Bethany McLean, Carol Remond and a handful of other “journalists” suspected of colluding with Gradient Analytics and short selling hedge fund Rocker Partners, only to have SEC Chairman Chris Cox personally sabotage the effort. This was followed up almost immediately by the SEC vindictively subpoenaing Patrick Byrne.
2. FOIA requests filed with the SEC intended to give some sense of the scope of the delivery failure problem were regularly denied or spitefully filled with minimal accompanying explanation.
3. Numerous brutal articles were published attacking opponents of naked short selling – Byrne primarily among them – under the bylines of (surprise) Jim Cramer, Herb Greenberg, Bethany McLean, Carol Remond, Joe Nocera, and Roddy Boyd.
4. Audio tape captured by a market reform operative who covertly accessed a panel discussion featuring Herb Greenberg, Joe Nocera and Dan Colarusso (then Roddy Boyd’s editor) hosted by the Society of American Business Editors and Writers. The theme of the discussion was essentially “How do we deal with these lying anti-naked short selling bloggers who are so critical of us?” Among other things, the tape caught Joe Nocera saying (to loud applause) he felt life was too short to bother understanding whether naked shorting is actually a problem, and Dan Colarusso saying he and his newspaper had the capacity to “crush” Patrick Byrne.
5. An all-out PR offensive launched by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) attacking opponents of naked short selling.
6. The emergence of Gary Weiss, an ostensibly credible former business journalist and blogger, bursting onto the scene, proclaiming naked short selling beneficial and its opponents crazy.
7. The hijacking and distortion of the Wikipedia article on naked short selling by whom we would soon learn was none other than Gary Weiss. Given journalists’ well-documented over-reliance on Wikipedia, this was undoubtedly a key factor in our difficulty getting them to provide more balanced coverage of the issue.
8. A special session of the Utah Legislature which, catching the banks flat-footed, resulted in passage of a law requiring brokerages with operations in Utah to promptly disclose stock delivery failures. But before it could go into effect, and after the prime brokers managed to rally their armies of lobbyists, the law was handily repealed.
9. Unprecedented growth of companies on the Reg SHO Threshold Securities list, indicating that, contrary to the intended aim of Regulation SHO, naked shorting was becoming increasingly prevalent.

On balance, it was a very dark time for the market reform movement, as every charge was followed by a blistering counter-charge, and every lunge answered by a quick parry. More than once, I recall hearing even the staunchest market reformers openly question the capacity of a rag-tag band of revolutionaries to counter the enormous influence and resources brought to bear by the hedge funds and prime brokers who were getting rich from the practice of manipulative naked short selling, and I couldn’t help but wonder whether I’d picked the wrong battle.

That’s not to say I ever doubted the correctness of the cause – only the correctness of my decision to join a fight that sometimes seemed impossible to win and certain to result in damage to my reputation as it had to Patrick Byrne’s and so many others’.

But in those moments of doubt, I’d remind myself of an eternal truth: the pendulum swings.

In other words, as dark as those days were, there would invariably be restraining forces applied to help slow – and eventually stall and even reverse – the momentum built up by decades of Wall Street villainy and the deep regulatory capture of the institutions intended to counter it.

What we could not have realized – as such perspective only comes with time – is that we (meaning, you, me, and everybody else who’s taken steps to do something about illegal naked short selling) were in fact the very restraining forces so many of us were expecting to arrive, cavalry-like, from some unknown quarter, and that as dark as those days seemed, they appeared quite bright to those who had endured the 1990s and early part of the current decade, when the practice persisted, without restraint, like a drunken orgy.

Of course, the event that finally brought the pendulum to a decisive halt and reversal was the current economic crisis, which saw the term “naked short selling” dragged into the popular lexicon (as determined by Yahoo! listing it as one of its five most popular search terms in September of 2008).

Since then, as the link between naked short selling and the beginning of the crisis itself has been solidly established, valiant members of Congress – most notably Delaware Senator Ted Kaufman – have dragged the issue of naked short selling into the political lexicon, as well.

Where are we today?

1. The SEC recently enacted permanent restrictions on illegal naked short selling, which include greatly enhanced disclosure of delivery failures and shorting activity.
2. Today, the SEC brought its first enforcement cases against illegal naked short selling.
3. Also today, FINRA expelled a member firm for engaging in illegal short selling.
4. Jim Cramer has been deeply and publicly shamed. Herb Greenberg is now a ‘consultant’. Bethany McLean has left business journalism. Dan Colarusso continues looking for steady employment. Roddy Boyd, Carol Remond and Joe Nocera all retain their former positions, but seem to steer clear of anything resembling the issue of naked shorting.
5. The DTCC is mum on the issue as well.
6. Gary Weiss – since abashed and banned from Wikipedia – sinks ever deeper into obscure irrelevance while the Wikipedia article on naked short selling that he once controlled has been liberated and made to read nearly as it should.
7. Substantive legislation with the capacity to end illegal naked short selling and other short-side market abuses once and for all is currently working its way through Congress.
8. As of today, the Reg SHO Threshold Securities list is 23% shorter than it was on the day I met Patrick Byrne (and 90% smaller than it was at its height in July of 2008), and is nearly devoid of the kinds of promising, well-capitalized companies whose inclusion used to be a sure sign of an impending bear raid.

These are all developments that seemed impossible in the dark days of 2006.

But here we are.

Yes, the pendulum is now unambiguously swinging in our direction, but the job is not done. Indeed, we can only be assured of progress to the extent that we each recognize our responsibility to continue pushing.

Apparently aware of the ruin that is his own reputation, Gary Weiss has taken to battling in favor of illegal stock market manipulation on political blog aggregator DailyKos.com, under the pseudonym “Tom Sykes”.

Weiss has a rich history of abusive sockpuppeting, mostly for the purpose of attacking those who advocate ending  illegal naked short selling. At one time, Weiss did this on behalf of the DTCC. Now, exactly who’s paying him is unknown, though it must be someone because the fellow has otherwise been unemployed since 2004 (apart from his less-than-lethargic book sales, the pittance in ad revenue generated by his all-but-mothballed blog, and his tiny handful of ostensibly paid pieces for Portfolio Magazine – a publication whose final coffin nail Weiss personally helped to drive).

And the trend continues up to this very day, with Weiss as Tom Sykes.

To anybody who has followed Weiss for any period of time and come to recognize his overly-ripe writing style, that he and Tom Sykes are one in the same is beyond obvious.

But the Deep Capture team adheres to a higher standard when making such claims with certainty, and so I shall now explain how I can do so now.

Among the many flaws on the Yahoo message boards is one which makes it possible, under specific circumstances, to embed any html code, up to and including javascript, on the site. This, in turn, makes it possible not only to capture the IP address from which a user is accessing the site, but also their Yahoo username.

In other words, one can tie a Yahoo username to a specific IP address, sans ambiguity.

Gary Weiss lives in Greenwich Village, NY, but in August of 2008 he bought a second home upstate (tellingly financed by the property owner, not a bank) in the tiny Sullivan County hamlet of Callicoon Center.

A few months ago, using the above-referenced method, I was able to determine that the Yahoo account belonging to user garyrweiss@verizon.net was accessing the web via IP address 74.64.81.92, which maps to within a few miles of Callicoon Center. Given the tininess of Callicoon Center, this is what one would expect of an instance of Weiss being online at his second home.

(Hint: remember that IP address, for we shall return to it shortly.)

We know that garyrweiss@verizon.net belongs to our Gary Weiss thanks to emails we’ve acquired between Weiss and kindred stock manipulator Floyd Schneider.

With the 15-part series on Dendreon recently completed, and our self-imposed hiatus from posting anything else ended, I decided it was time to prove once and for all that Gary Weiss and Tom Sykes are the same person.

It took a few short hours to hit paydirt.

In short, email sent to tomsykes.kos@gmail.com (the address Tom Sykes lists as his own on dailykos.com) induced the recipient to visit the Yahoo message boards in such a way as to reveal his IP address to me.

The result: 74.64.81.92.

This IP address has been conclusively linked to garyrweiss@verizon.net, which in turn has been conclusively linked to Gary R. Weiss, the bumbling sockpuppeteer and defender of illegal naked short selling.

But wait, there’s more.

Among Weiss’s most notable accomplishments has been epic sockpuppeting on Wikipedia in order to cover-up evidence of the damaging impact of illegal naked short selling. Once this finally came to light, Weiss and his home IP address range, which is well known, were unambiguously banned from editing Wikipedia.

But what about Weiss’s new IP address, tied to his new, second home?

Well, as we’d expect, realizing that it was unknown by Wikipedia administrators, Weiss used it, on two occasions, to remove references to Mark Mitchell’s Dendreon-related reporting on deepcapture.com, which had been previously added to the Wikipedia article on Michael Milken.  To see these edits for yourself, follow this link, which will show you the only two contributions made by IP address 74.64.81.92. To see the substance of the edits, click on the links that say “diff”. What you’ll then see is a before and after comparison, with the text in yellow being what 74.64.81.92 (Weiss) removed.

What could possibly be motivating Weiss to carry on in this manner?

I see one of two possibilities: either he’s like the 80-year-old Japanese soldier living in the jungles of Guam who refuses to accept that his “side” lost the war, or – as I suspect – he remains in active contact with his “side,” which remains mobilized and intent on subverting all that we’ve accomplished.

So what next?

Well, obviously, the editorial staff at dailykos.com will want to know that they’ve given forum to a deeply conflicted contributor who – beyond simply using a pseudonym – is actively pretending not to be Gary Weiss by referring to Weiss in the third person and linking to his own blog as though it were actually really relevant. You can let them know what we’ve discovered about Mr. Sykes by going here.

In addition, any active Wikipedians among you will probably want to make it known there that 74.64.81.92 is in fact the dread sockpuppet Mantanmoreland/Gary Weiss.

Finally, I’d simply suggest the Deep Capture community understand that there are many who are actively working – usually anonymously – to discredit the market reform movement. I encourage you to seek out and bring instances of such to our attention, so that we can investigate further when warranted, in order to better understand their real motives.

And as a postscript, I wish to thank Gary Weiss for being so very predictable. His consistently reptilian-brain-based responses to my occasional prodding has made this aspect of my job not only productive, but very enjoyable, as well.

UPDATE: Both Tom Sykes and Gary Weiss are “separately” expressing outrage at this situation tonight. I encourage each of you to make use of “their” blogs’ comment functions to let “them” know what you think about how “they” have been lying to you.

You can get there by clicking here, or via the link at the top of every page on the blog.

At this point, the only live category is one requesting input on how to best structure the rest of the forum, meaning, which categories and subcategories will best accommodate the broadest range of discussion with the greatest amount of focus at the same time. Based on what we see in that thread, we’ll create the basis of a more permanent structure in the next day or so.

In order to minimize forum spammers, you will be required to register on the forum page in order to post. Reading forum posts, on the other hand, is open to everybody.

As the forum grows, we will also be designating administrators. More on that later.

Finally, I hope the forum option will make it easier for folks to keep their comments on the regular blog section more strictly related to the topic at hand.

Now, go have fun!

Pressing the “embed” button will provide you with the code you need to embed this video on other sites. Kindly spread the word.
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“In particular, a group of investment firms and hedge funds decided to hold out for the prospect of an unjustified taxpayer-funded bailout…They were hoping that everybody else would make sacrifices and they would have to make none…Some demanded twice the return that other lenders were getting.”

Bloomberg has the full story.

This is a very good sign that the Executive Branch is aware of the high cost of unregulated greed.

And you’re invited to join. Dare to get to know your fellow market reformers!

The Deep Capture team is very pleased to present the new and vastly improved deepcapture.com.

Please take a moment to orient yourself to the new design and features, each implemented in response to your requests for a site that is easier to navigate and use.

Among the more interesting additions is a “featured story” window, where the latest posts will get more prominent placement. You’ll also see a “tag cloud” behind the tab marked “Tags” in the right sidebar. This will allow you to read posts organized thematically.

There’s also an archive section, with posts organized chronologically.

In addition, the email notification should be working more reliably now, and you’ll also have the option of subscribing to RSS feeds corresponding to individual authors (be it myself, Patrick Byrne or Mark Mitchell).

As far as improvements on the horizon are concerned, very soon we’ll be adding a forum section, where you, the users, can create discussion threads on whatever topics you choose.

We’ll also shortly be adding a fascinating, interactive “timeline” feature, which will permit us to visually document and organize all noteworthy events in the history of illegal naked short selling.

We’re also preparing to implement a dynamic “relationship web”, which will make it easy (and entertaining) to explore the ties that bind the people and organizations that are ultimately the focus of our investigative efforts.

Thank you all for your continued support!

Not because the content itself contains inappropriate language, but because of the language it will very likely evoke upon watching it.

This is the final three minutes of today’s Bloomberg-TV hosted debate between former SEC Commissioner Roel Campos and infamous short seller Manuel Asensio.

What this represents, more than anything, is confirmation of the long-suspected belief that naked short sellers inhabit an alternate moral universe, complete with an alternate version of reality.

There might be no other explanation for what transpires in this debate, which includes such gems as the following by Asensio:

“There should be no reason to borrow stock. One should be able to sell stock at will, regardless of whether the people that are manipulating the stock up are willing to lend it to short sellers…There is absolutely no economic reason why America should cause and force short sellers to borrow stock.”

You’ve been warned…

(you can view the full debate here)

As a post-script, it’s worth pointing out that, by way of ascribing motives to otherwise incomprehensible actions, Gary Weiss spent much of his career at Business Week fawning over and taking orders from Asensio. Here are some examples.

Akahele, if you’re curious, is a Hawaiian word meaning “slow” or “deliberate”, in contrast with wiki, the Hawaiian word for “fast” (and the origin of the “wiki” in Wikipedia).

The following is my most recent contribution to Akahele, and is an examination of the Wikipedia/Gary Weiss saga, with a new twist.

My direct involvement notwithstanding, I feel it’s both fair and accurate to say that the events surrounding the Gary Weiss/Mantanmoreland affair were among the strangest and most polarizing in Wikipedia’s history.

For those lucky enough to have no idea what I’m referring to, here’s the highest of high-level summations (much more in-depth explanations can be found here and here):

Gary Weiss

Former business journalist Gary Weiss used multiple sockpuppet accounts to ingratiate himself with Wikipedia’s inner circle and – thanks primarily to the relationships he established there – gain control of, most notably, the article describing an illegal form of stock market manipulation known as naked short selling.

Weiss then proceeded to dramatically alter the content of this and related articles in order to minimize the perceived negative impact of naked short selling while marginalizing critics of the practice, myself included.

There’s strong evidence suggesting Weiss was paid to do this by the very organization many fault as the primary enabler, not to mention a financial beneficiary of, illegal naked short selling.

I suspect most would agree with my assessment that among the darkest moments in the more than two-year drama between Weiss’s arrival and eventual forced departure were those in which Wikipedia co-founder Jimbo Wales injected himself into the controversy – always seemingly uninvited – and always with the effect of derailing whatever progress might have been made toward bringing about Weiss’s removal.

Among these, the most incomprehensible episode occurred at the crescendo of what is widely regarded the largest and most thorough sockpuppeting investigation in the history of Wikipedia, in which dozens of volunteers dedicated hundreds of hours amassing a body of evidence overwhelmingly implicating Weiss in a deeply disturbing deception.

It was at that time that Wales posted an unprovoked indictment of the process under the heading ‘I have personally seen no persuasive evidence’, resulting in Weiss getting another pass. This, despite Wales having told others, privately, that he knew Weiss was guilty; and many more, publicly, that I was a liar for making the same claim.

What follows is my best explanation for Jimbo’s odd behavior.

But first, I need to explain a little more about the nature of short selling, both legal and illegal.

Legal short selling involves selling borrowed shares with the expectation of buying them back and returning them to their owner at a later date and a lower price, allowing the short seller to pocket the difference.

Naked short sellers, on the other hand, sell shares short without borrowing them first, thereby creating the equivalent of counterfeit shares. This has the effect of artificially swelling the supply of stock, which has a markedly depressive influence on price, making the naked short seller rich, while inflicting immense harm upon legitimate shareholders and the companies in which they’ve invested.

There have been, in theory, rules intended to prevent naked short sales from occurring, or at least, from enduring longer than 13 trading days. Unfortunately, the people behind the practice are quite smart, and the monetary incentive to violate the law quite large.

In other words, they’ve found a path around the rules.

And that path runs right through the heart of Chicago’s financial district.

As it turns out, there is a law, known as the “options market maker exemption”, which permits certain brokerages, specifically those registered as ‘options market makers’, to engage in a highly-controlled form of naked short selling in the course of bona fide options market making – comparable to the permission police officers have to exceed the speed limit under certain extreme circumstances when it’s in everybody’s best interest that they do so.

Naked short sellers have discovered that they can essentially “rent” the options market maker exemption from certain corrupt options market makers, producing massive amounts of counterfeit shares in the process.

It’s as though a corrupt cop rented his police cruiser to a random citizen so he or she could drive it around at 120 mph for a day, without being held responsible for any of the damage they might cause.

Of course, it’s silly to think that either the citizen or the cop could get away this, but in the financial world, such overt violations of the law regularly take place on a grand scale. And though the reason is not immediately clear, research proves that this abuse of the options market maker exemption nearly always takes place on the Chicago Stock Exchange.

Why Chicago?

My guess is that it’s a cultural thing: the same way you’d never even think of bribing a cop who pulled you over in San Diego, while doing the same just 30 miles south in Tijuana is not a big deal.

What does this have to do with Jimbo Wales?

Well it turns out that both he and former Wikimedia Foundation trustee Michael Davis used to work at Chicago Options Associates, where Wales was a research director and Davis was CEO.

To be clear, while it existed, Chicago Options Associates traded options and futures on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and was not an options market maker. But because I suspect the Chicago phenomenon is a cultural one, and given the near certainty that Wales counts many equities options market making traders as his friends, I’m not sure it really matters: his professional background is deeply rooted in the same dark corner of the financial world that facilitates the same form of stock fraud Gary Weiss worked so hard to defend on Wikipedia.

Which I suspect explains why Jimbo Wales worked so hard to defend Gary Weiss.

Is Jimbo Wales above influencing Wikipedia content based on his personal relationships?

Rachel Marsden would probably say that no, he is not.

I recently asked Jimbo whether anybody with ties to options market making on the Chicago Stock Exchange sought to influence his decisions in this respect, and was not entirely surprised when Jimbo insisted that they did not.

However I was surprised when Jimbo followed with “it is still to this day completely unproven that the claims you’ve made about Mantanmoreland being Gary Weiss are true.”

Once I’d picked myself up off the floor, I decided to take Jimbo up on his invitation to finally show him the first bit of proof linking Gary Weiss to Mantanmoreland, despite the fact that doing so felt like proving to a skeptic that the moon is not composed of dairy products.

What I ultimately sent Wales were:

Click to enlarge.

1. A scatter graph (seen at right) showing Mantanmoreland’s Wikipedia editing pattern over several months, including a 12 hour time shift limited to the period in which Gary Weiss was known to be visiting India.
2. Email from Gary Weiss (if you want to know how I came to possess Weiss’s private email, read this) in which he told a friend that he intended to edit a specific Wikipedia article to include a reference to a book he wrote.
3. A link showing that Mantanmoreland did in fact edit that very article to include a reference to that very book.

I also made it clear that should these bits of evidence fail to convince him, I’m ready to send much, much more.

Maybe Jimbo was convinced and he decided there was no reason to respond further.

Maybe the evidence simply left him speechless.

Or maybe owning up to his reckless actions in this case would prove unpopular with his friends back in Chicago.

All I know is that once the evidence was sent as requested, the conversation went cold.

Whatever the case, the legacy of Gary Weiss’s campaign of misinformation endures on Wikipedia to this day, due in large part to the apartheid-like probationary status imposed upon the naked short selling article after Wales condemned the inquest into Weiss’s activities as having produced no persuasive evidence.

All the while, Wikipedia remains the first option offered those searching the web for information about naked shorting, and its role in the current financial crisis.

Weiss may have created this problem, but Jimbo Wales — whatever his motivation — has allowed it to persist. The time has come for Wales himself to step in, help find a real solution, and acknowledge the damage this dark episode has caused real people in the process.

This is the first anniversary of the destruction of Bear Stearns.

For a while there, just after it happened, everybody was talking about the role of short selling, both legal and illegal, in Bear’s rather violent passing.

Since then, the big question has gone from “who the hell set this fire?” to “how did this place devolve into such a firetrap, anyway?” and “how the hell do we get out of this burning building?”

Finding answers to all three questions is vitally important. Yet, I’m a little bothered by the fact that these days, so little attention is being focused on the first.

And so, exactly one year after criminal arsonists set a match to the over-leveraged heap of oily rags that was Bear Stearns, I offer up this video examination of that event, and those that would follow.

While I hope you will all enjoy and help circulate it, I should point out that this video was not primarily made for the frequent readers of DeepCapture.com (as everything in it has already been examined in these pages). Instead, it’s for those who’ve yet to understand why they should be outraged at what’s going on.

In other words, it’s primarily for future readers of DeepCapture.com.

Yet, I need you regulars to take a look, and then help get this out there. Plus, the music is pretty cool, so it’ll be worth your time to watch anyway.

Download:
Windows Media (85 mb).
Ipod compliant .mv4